Narrative:

This was a taxi incident for a flight from bwi to bdl, part 121. The theme was high workload, multiple distrs and generally rushing/being rushed. The captain arrived in the cockpit shortly before pushback. The flight was full (within 9 seats) and had a jumpseater onboard the medium large transport X. We were completing checklists as the gate agent delivered final passenger counts, fuel, and security data. Flight attendants gave us their passenger count and safety check complete message (and the captain was trying to carry on a conversation with the jumpseat occupant virtually until we were #1 for takeoff). I obtained a pushback clearance from ramp control and the checklists were continued during the pushback (as well as starting our #1 engine). The #1 engine was started, the captain called for the after start checklist for southeast taxi, at the same time I called for taxi clearance from ramp control and I was beginning to read the weight and balance information that was arriving via our ACARS unit, which showed an incorrect passenger count. I read the after start checklist (challenge/response) and got the ramp taxi clearance to follow the medium large transport Y ahead to the spot (the point to contact ground control). I told the captain to follow the medium large transport Y to the spot and said that I would be off frequency to talk to load control to get the weight and balance corrected. It was a short taxi to the 'spot' and my head was down as I was working to straighten out the weight and balance data. I also had to call the flight attendants to get them to verify the passenger count. I felt the aircraft turn the corner at the spot and glanced up to notice we were still following the medium large transport Y. The captain called to start the second engine while I was completing the weight and balance 'transaction.' he wanted me to start the engine 'unassisted' while he taxied. I accomplished the first step (to configure the aircraft system and open the start valve) and reported that I was back on frequency. As I did this, I sensed the aircraft turning to cross a runway en route to the active runway and switched my microphone selector to #1, adjusted the volume, and then glanced at the #1 radio head and was horrified to note that it was still on the ramp control frequency and hadn't been switched to ground control! We were crossing a runway without clearance! I yelled to the captain that we were crossing a runway without clearance, and that we were still on ramp control frequency! (He should have switched frequencys at the spot and gotten taxi clearance from ground control there.) he slowed the aircraft but continued to taxi and told me not to talk to ground. Just switch to tower and maybe they won't notice. Tower contacted us shortly afterward to ask if we'd received taxi clearance and we admitted that we were embarrassed to admit that we hadn't. No further comment came from the tower. The chain of events of rushing/being rushed led to this incident. When possible, flight crew members try to double check each other, but there are times when they are in separate 'loops' and must simply trust that the other pilot will do his job while the other is away. This was my fourth trip from this base, but the captain had been on the east coast for 16 yrs. (I'm from the west coast.) I would have expected that he would have had a better situational awareness than he did. Of course, the armchair quarterback can observe and say that I should have spoken up to say that we were rushing and that we should slow down, that the jumpseater and the captain should cease their conversation during taxi, and that I generally should have kept a closer eye on the captain and the taxi operations and allowed the weight and balance issue to wait until the runup area and accept the consequential delay. I definitely will do things differently next time and speak up early.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG FAILS TO CONTACT GND CTL, CROSSES ACTIVE RWY.

Narrative: THIS WAS A TAXI INCIDENT FOR A FLT FROM BWI TO BDL, PART 121. THE THEME WAS HIGH WORKLOAD, MULTIPLE DISTRS AND GENERALLY RUSHING/BEING RUSHED. THE CAPT ARRIVED IN THE COCKPIT SHORTLY BEFORE PUSHBACK. THE FLT WAS FULL (WITHIN 9 SEATS) AND HAD A JUMPSEATER ONBOARD THE MLG X. WE WERE COMPLETING CHKLISTS AS THE GATE AGENT DELIVERED FINAL PAX COUNTS, FUEL, AND SECURITY DATA. FLT ATTENDANTS GAVE US THEIR PAX COUNT AND SAFETY CHK COMPLETE MESSAGE (AND THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO CARRY ON A CONVERSATION WITH THE JUMPSEAT OCCUPANT VIRTUALLY UNTIL WE WERE #1 FOR TKOF). I OBTAINED A PUSHBACK CLRNC FROM RAMP CTL AND THE CHKLISTS WERE CONTINUED DURING THE PUSHBACK (AS WELL AS STARTING OUR #1 ENG). THE #1 ENG WAS STARTED, THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE AFTER START CHKLIST FOR SE TAXI, AT THE SAME TIME I CALLED FOR TAXI CLRNC FROM RAMP CTL AND I WAS BEGINNING TO READ THE WT AND BAL INFO THAT WAS ARRIVING VIA OUR ACARS UNIT, WHICH SHOWED AN INCORRECT PAX COUNT. I READ THE AFTER START CHKLIST (CHALLENGE/RESPONSE) AND GOT THE RAMP TAXI CLRNC TO FOLLOW THE MLG Y AHEAD TO THE SPOT (THE POINT TO CONTACT GND CTL). I TOLD THE CAPT TO FOLLOW THE MLG Y TO THE SPOT AND SAID THAT I WOULD BE OFF FREQ TO TALK TO LOAD CTL TO GET THE WT AND BAL CORRECTED. IT WAS A SHORT TAXI TO THE 'SPOT' AND MY HEAD WAS DOWN AS I WAS WORKING TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THE WT AND BAL DATA. I ALSO HAD TO CALL THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO GET THEM TO VERIFY THE PAX COUNT. I FELT THE ACFT TURN THE CORNER AT THE SPOT AND GLANCED UP TO NOTICE WE WERE STILL FOLLOWING THE MLG Y. THE CAPT CALLED TO START THE SECOND ENG WHILE I WAS COMPLETING THE WT AND BAL 'TRANSACTION.' HE WANTED ME TO START THE ENG 'UNASSISTED' WHILE HE TAXIED. I ACCOMPLISHED THE FIRST STEP (TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT SYS AND OPEN THE START VALVE) AND RPTED THAT I WAS BACK ON FREQ. AS I DID THIS, I SENSED THE ACFT TURNING TO CROSS A RWY ENRTE TO THE ACTIVE RWY AND SWITCHED MY MIKE SELECTOR TO #1, ADJUSTED THE VOLUME, AND THEN GLANCED AT THE #1 RADIO HEAD AND WAS HORRIFIED TO NOTE THAT IT WAS STILL ON THE RAMP CTL FREQ AND HADN'T BEEN SWITCHED TO GND CTL! WE WERE XING A RWY WITHOUT CLRNC! I YELLED TO THE CAPT THAT WE WERE XING A RWY WITHOUT CLRNC, AND THAT WE WERE STILL ON RAMP CTL FREQ! (HE SHOULD HAVE SWITCHED FREQS AT THE SPOT AND GOTTEN TAXI CLRNC FROM GND CTL THERE.) HE SLOWED THE ACFT BUT CONTINUED TO TAXI AND TOLD ME NOT TO TALK TO GND. JUST SWITCH TO TWR AND MAYBE THEY WON'T NOTICE. TWR CONTACTED US SHORTLY AFTERWARD TO ASK IF WE'D RECEIVED TAXI CLRNC AND WE ADMITTED THAT WE WERE EMBARRASSED TO ADMIT THAT WE HADN'T. NO FURTHER COMMENT CAME FROM THE TWR. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS OF RUSHING/BEING RUSHED LED TO THIS INCIDENT. WHEN POSSIBLE, FLC MEMBERS TRY TO DOUBLE CHK EACH OTHER, BUT THERE ARE TIMES WHEN THEY ARE IN SEPARATE 'LOOPS' AND MUST SIMPLY TRUST THAT THE OTHER PLT WILL DO HIS JOB WHILE THE OTHER IS AWAY. THIS WAS MY FOURTH TRIP FROM THIS BASE, BUT THE CAPT HAD BEEN ON THE E COAST FOR 16 YRS. (I'M FROM THE W COAST.) I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD HAVE HAD A BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS THAN HE DID. OF COURSE, THE ARMCHAIR QUARTERBACK CAN OBSERVE AND SAY THAT I SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP TO SAY THAT WE WERE RUSHING AND THAT WE SHOULD SLOW DOWN, THAT THE JUMPSEATER AND THE CAPT SHOULD CEASE THEIR CONVERSATION DURING TAXI, AND THAT I GENERALLY SHOULD HAVE KEPT A CLOSER EYE ON THE CAPT AND THE TAXI OPS AND ALLOWED THE WT AND BAL ISSUE TO WAIT UNTIL THE RUNUP AREA AND ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENTIAL DELAY. I DEFINITELY WILL DO THINGS DIFFERENTLY NEXT TIME AND SPEAK UP EARLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.