37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 247766 |
Time | |
Date | 199308 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : yyj |
State Reference | BC |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 37000 msl bound upper : 37000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zvr artcc : zse tower : dfw |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 170 flight time total : 13000 flight time type : 2800 |
ASRS Report | 247766 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : clearance other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : became reoriented |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
We were en route from anc to sea, level at 37000 ft. The first officer noticed that we had started to pick up 'sea clearance delivery' on 128.0, the same frequency we had been on for vancouver center. We had obviously gotten out of range of vancouver center. We assumed we either missed the handoff to sea or that the controller forgot to hand us off. In any case, neither one of us noticed until it was time for our descent and we began to wonder why we hadn't gotten lower altitude. We called ZSE immediately and were given a descent clearance. I don't believe there was any conflict and I don't think we were out of range very long -- perhaps 5-10 mins, if that. The interesting part of this story is why it happened, why we didn't notice. We were distracted. About 1 hour into the flight our md chief pilot announced that he was onboard and wanted to enter the cockpit. He then proceeded to criticize my performance on the PA system -- not that I had not made required PA's. I had made them and several more, but that my travelogue was inadequate. I had made 2 boarding announcements, the seat belt sign, route of flight, time, WX, etc announcements and 2-3 'sights of interest' announcements. Apparently, he felt they weren't enough and felt strongly enough about it to enter the cockpit and disturb us and upset us (this is the chief pilot). We spent the remainder of the flight looking out the window, pouring over road maps, reading travel information, making PA's and worrying about, and very angry about, his actions. It's a wonder we didn't make more mistakes, maybe we did -- I hope not. I think his en route critique was inappropriate and fostered an unsafe environment in the cockpit. This was not a chkride (he was deadheading), his attitude was clearly hostile (he was tired) an his comments had absolutely nothing to do with safety of flight issues. This is a line pilot who should know something about CRM and what effect his actions were most likely to have on the crew. It was irresponsible, dangerous, and without a doubt, if in fact we did miss our handoff, the cause. This is a situation for us where there is no recourse within the company. Again, this is the chief pilot. But FAA or someone should remind these people that everyone's first responsibility is to safety and to keep that in mind.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FREQ CHANGE MISSED LATE.
Narrative: WE WERE ENRTE FROM ANC TO SEA, LEVEL AT 37000 FT. THE FO NOTICED THAT WE HAD STARTED TO PICK UP 'SEA CLRNC DELIVERY' ON 128.0, THE SAME FREQ WE HAD BEEN ON FOR VANCOUVER CTR. WE HAD OBVIOUSLY GOTTEN OUT OF RANGE OF VANCOUVER CTR. WE ASSUMED WE EITHER MISSED THE HDOF TO SEA OR THAT THE CTLR FORGOT TO HAND US OFF. IN ANY CASE, NEITHER ONE OF US NOTICED UNTIL IT WAS TIME FOR OUR DSCNT AND WE BEGAN TO WONDER WHY WE HADN'T GOTTEN LOWER ALT. WE CALLED ZSE IMMEDIATELY AND WERE GIVEN A DSCNT CLRNC. I DON'T BELIEVE THERE WAS ANY CONFLICT AND I DON'T THINK WE WERE OUT OF RANGE VERY LONG -- PERHAPS 5-10 MINS, IF THAT. THE INTERESTING PART OF THIS STORY IS WHY IT HAPPENED, WHY WE DIDN'T NOTICE. WE WERE DISTRACTED. ABOUT 1 HR INTO THE FLT OUR MD CHIEF PLT ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS ONBOARD AND WANTED TO ENTER THE COCKPIT. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO CRITICIZE MY PERFORMANCE ON THE PA SYS -- NOT THAT I HAD NOT MADE REQUIRED PA'S. I HAD MADE THEM AND SEVERAL MORE, BUT THAT MY TRAVELOGUE WAS INADEQUATE. I HAD MADE 2 BOARDING ANNOUNCEMENTS, THE SEAT BELT SIGN, RTE OF FLT, TIME, WX, ETC ANNOUNCEMENTS AND 2-3 'SIGHTS OF INTEREST' ANNOUNCEMENTS. APPARENTLY, HE FELT THEY WEREN'T ENOUGH AND FELT STRONGLY ENOUGH ABOUT IT TO ENTER THE COCKPIT AND DISTURB US AND UPSET US (THIS IS THE CHIEF PLT). WE SPENT THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT LOOKING OUT THE WINDOW, POURING OVER ROAD MAPS, READING TRAVEL INFO, MAKING PA'S AND WORRYING ABOUT, AND VERY ANGRY ABOUT, HIS ACTIONS. IT'S A WONDER WE DIDN'T MAKE MORE MISTAKES, MAYBE WE DID -- I HOPE NOT. I THINK HIS ENRTE CRITIQUE WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND FOSTERED AN UNSAFE ENVIRONMENT IN THE COCKPIT. THIS WAS NOT A CHKRIDE (HE WAS DEADHEADING), HIS ATTITUDE WAS CLRLY HOSTILE (HE WAS TIRED) AN HIS COMMENTS HAD ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH SAFETY OF FLT ISSUES. THIS IS A LINE PLT WHO SHOULD KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT CRM AND WHAT EFFECT HIS ACTIONS WERE MOST LIKELY TO HAVE ON THE CREW. IT WAS IRRESPONSIBLE, DANGEROUS, AND WITHOUT A DOUBT, IF IN FACT WE DID MISS OUR HDOF, THE CAUSE. THIS IS A SIT FOR US WHERE THERE IS NO RECOURSE WITHIN THE COMPANY. AGAIN, THIS IS THE CHIEF PLT. BUT FAA OR SOMEONE SHOULD REMIND THESE PEOPLE THAT EVERYONE'S FIRST RESPONSIBILITY IS TO SAFETY AND TO KEEP THAT IN MIND.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.