Narrative:

We were on an IFR flight being vectored to the airport for a visual approach. At approximately 5 mi west of airport I cancelled the IFR flight plan after identing the airport, and continued to the airport VFR. I attempted to contact the airport operator through the unicom 3 times with no response. I then flew directly over the airport to check the wind sock, and interpreted the sock to indicate a southwest wind. I then entered the pattern and landed on runway 23. The approach and landing seemed normal, however, our speed seemed fast after touchdown and I was unable to stop on the available runway. We came to a stop about 25 yards past the end of the runway. There were no injuries with damage to the left main gear, left flap, and left propeller. After everyone exited the aircraft, I started walking up the hill back toward the runway to see if I could find somebody or at least a telephone at the operations office. It was then that I realized the wind was blowing directly into my face telling me I had just attempted a downwind landing on a relatively short runway. It is hard to describe how foolish I felt after realizing the error I made interpreting the wind sock, especially since I am a professional pilot with considerable experience in various types of aircraft. However, after much thought, I realize I made several errors and poor decisions that afternoon, not just one. As I mentioned, I have considerable flying experience, but I was flying an aircraft I had only about 10 hours and 5 lndgs in so I was not totally familiar with it. Not being able to get the local wind from unicom, there were several other sources which I did not use and should have. I could have asked the approach controller for wind information from a nearby airport, or I could have listened to ATIS from a nearby airport since it was available. Then when my perception from the wind sock did not agree, I would have known something was wrong. My friend in the right seat who holds a private pilot license did agree with my interpretation of the wind sock and I probably allowed his agreement to reinforce my erroneous reading of the wind sock. I should not have allowed that to happen, my friend has minimal flight experience and I did not consider him a qualified crew member on this trip. I was PIC. The airport I landed at has 2 runways, one is 3100 ft, the other is 2400 ft long. Because of my perception of the wind, I elected to use the shorter of the 2. I feel with my limited experience in the type of aircraft, the longer runway with a crosswind landing would have been a better choice. I feel the approach and landing were normal, but after touchdown, I slid my right foot up too high on the brake pedal causing my toes to hit the structure under the instrument panel and delaying the application of braking. I also did not raise the flaps after touchdown which is recommended in the flight manual for maximum braking effectiveness. I am not sure if these things would have prevented the overrun, but I feel they were contributions due to my lack of total familiarity with the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LNDG PROC DOWNWIND LNDG RESULTS IN RWY EXCURSION.

Narrative: WE WERE ON AN IFR FLT BEING VECTORED TO THE ARPT FOR A VISUAL APCH. AT APPROX 5 MI W OF ARPT I CANCELLED THE IFR FLT PLAN AFTER IDENTING THE ARPT, AND CONTINUED TO THE ARPT VFR. I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE ARPT OPERATOR THROUGH THE UNICOM 3 TIMES WITH NO RESPONSE. I THEN FLEW DIRECTLY OVER THE ARPT TO CHK THE WIND SOCK, AND INTERPRETED THE SOCK TO INDICATE A SW WIND. I THEN ENTERED THE PATTERN AND LANDED ON RWY 23. THE APCH AND LNDG SEEMED NORMAL, HOWEVER, OUR SPD SEEMED FAST AFTER TOUCHDOWN AND I WAS UNABLE TO STOP ON THE AVAILABLE RWY. WE CAME TO A STOP ABOUT 25 YARDS PAST THE END OF THE RWY. THERE WERE NO INJURIES WITH DAMAGE TO THE L MAIN GEAR, L FLAP, AND L PROP. AFTER EVERYONE EXITED THE ACFT, I STARTED WALKING UP THE HILL BACK TOWARD THE RWY TO SEE IF I COULD FIND SOMEBODY OR AT LEAST A TELEPHONE AT THE OPS OFFICE. IT WAS THEN THAT I REALIZED THE WIND WAS BLOWING DIRECTLY INTO MY FACE TELLING ME I HAD JUST ATTEMPTED A DOWNWIND LNDG ON A RELATIVELY SHORT RWY. IT IS HARD TO DESCRIBE HOW FOOLISH I FELT AFTER REALIZING THE ERROR I MADE INTERPRETING THE WIND SOCK, ESPECIALLY SINCE I AM A PROFESSIONAL PLT WITH CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN VARIOUS TYPES OF ACFT. HOWEVER, AFTER MUCH THOUGHT, I REALIZE I MADE SEVERAL ERRORS AND POOR DECISIONS THAT AFTERNOON, NOT JUST ONE. AS I MENTIONED, I HAVE CONSIDERABLE FLYING EXPERIENCE, BUT I WAS FLYING AN ACFT I HAD ONLY ABOUT 10 HRS AND 5 LNDGS IN SO I WAS NOT TOTALLY FAMILIAR WITH IT. NOT BEING ABLE TO GET THE LCL WIND FROM UNICOM, THERE WERE SEVERAL OTHER SOURCES WHICH I DID NOT USE AND SHOULD HAVE. I COULD HAVE ASKED THE APCH CTLR FOR WIND INFO FROM A NEARBY ARPT, OR I COULD HAVE LISTENED TO ATIS FROM A NEARBY ARPT SINCE IT WAS AVAILABLE. THEN WHEN MY PERCEPTION FROM THE WIND SOCK DID NOT AGREE, I WOULD HAVE KNOWN SOMETHING WAS WRONG. MY FRIEND IN THE R SEAT WHO HOLDS A PVT PLT LICENSE DID AGREE WITH MY INTERP OF THE WIND SOCK AND I PROBABLY ALLOWED HIS AGREEMENT TO REINFORCE MY ERRONEOUS READING OF THE WIND SOCK. I SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED THAT TO HAPPEN, MY FRIEND HAS MINIMAL FLT EXPERIENCE AND I DID NOT CONSIDER HIM A QUALIFIED CREW MEMBER ON THIS TRIP. I WAS PIC. THE ARPT I LANDED AT HAS 2 RWYS, ONE IS 3100 FT, THE OTHER IS 2400 FT LONG. BECAUSE OF MY PERCEPTION OF THE WIND, I ELECTED TO USE THE SHORTER OF THE 2. I FEEL WITH MY LIMITED EXPERIENCE IN THE TYPE OF ACFT, THE LONGER RWY WITH A XWIND LNDG WOULD HAVE BEEN A BETTER CHOICE. I FEEL THE APCH AND LNDG WERE NORMAL, BUT AFTER TOUCHDOWN, I SLID MY R FOOT UP TOO HIGH ON THE BRAKE PEDAL CAUSING MY TOES TO HIT THE STRUCTURE UNDER THE INST PANEL AND DELAYING THE APPLICATION OF BRAKING. I ALSO DID NOT RAISE THE FLAPS AFTER TOUCHDOWN WHICH IS RECOMMENDED IN THE FLT MANUAL FOR MAX BRAKING EFFECTIVENESS. I AM NOT SURE IF THESE THINGS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE OVERRUN, BUT I FEEL THEY WERE CONTRIBUTIONS DUE TO MY LACK OF TOTAL FAMILIARITY WITH THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.