Narrative:

Receiving radar vectors to an ILS 14R approach at kimpo airport, seoul, south korea. Multiple scattered layers, overcast at 10000 ft with light rain. Visibility 2 1/2 mi. Local time XA45. Unable to identify either the outer or inner locator. While on a modified right base (approximately the 19 DME arc), the outer locator was received with considerable intensity. The identifier was correct, however, the needle indicated that the station was located north of the base-to-final turn. The radio was twice retuned and reidented, with the same result. The crew discussed the possibility of a false signal, and we continued to monitor the beacon through the base and final legs. It never faltered, consistently pointing to the wrong location, as the aircraft heading changed. At the passage of the OM, all other approach components were operating normally, with the exception of the 2 beacons (the inner was never received). After landing, we parked at our gate, on a northeast heading, and observed that while the needle should have been indicating directly off the left wing, it was now 10-15 degrees ahead of where it should be. We notified kimpo ground control of the incident, but due to a severe language problem, it was unclear if the potential severity of the problem was understood. Upon arrival at our hotel, we contacted our company flight control in louisville, ky, and made the fleet supervisor on duty aware of the fact that we had reason to believe that possibly a false beacon might be emanating from north korea. The supervisor agreed to contact the next crew inbound to seoul and alert them to the possibility. He further indicated that he would notify all company flts that would be affected, and that he would also alert the FAA. The following day, still in seoul, the flight crew contacted our local gateway manager, and he put us in touch with the shift manager at kimpo tower. We briefed him of the incident, and he indicated that it was the first occurrence of which he had heard. The following day, it was brought to the flight crew's attention that on the subsequent flight, the #1 ADF had been 'written up' for pointing 180 degrees out of phase. Obviously, we felt the credibility of our story somewhat compromised, however, we know what we saw, and pressed the company to continue notifying flts that might be affected. To the best of my knowledge, they made the decision to wait for another report before escalating the alert. Although I completely understand my company's hesitancy in sounding what might very well be a false alarm, I tend to disagree with their decision, as my tendency would be to notify as many flight crew's as possible. I can't imagine how I would feel if I were to learn of an aircraft that inadvertently strayed into north korean airspace, only to be shot down. I would imagine that it's been a long day for many of the flight crew's that find themselves being vectored for the approach to seoul. In addition to contending with fatigue and language difficulties, perhaps being politically aware, with a small dose of skepticism will keep us all alert and a little safer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CARGO FLT HAS POOR NAV INDICATIONS ON FINAL APCH.

Narrative: RECEIVING RADAR VECTORS TO AN ILS 14R APCH AT KIMPO ARPT, SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA. MULTIPLE SCATTERED LAYERS, OVCST AT 10000 FT WITH LIGHT RAIN. VISIBILITY 2 1/2 MI. LCL TIME XA45. UNABLE TO IDENT EITHER THE OUTER OR INNER LOCATOR. WHILE ON A MODIFIED R BASE (APPROX THE 19 DME ARC), THE OUTER LOCATOR WAS RECEIVED WITH CONSIDERABLE INTENSITY. THE IDENTIFIER WAS CORRECT, HOWEVER, THE NEEDLE INDICATED THAT THE STATION WAS LOCATED N OF THE BASE-TO-FINAL TURN. THE RADIO WAS TWICE RETUNED AND REIDENTED, WITH THE SAME RESULT. THE CREW DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF A FALSE SIGNAL, AND WE CONTINUED TO MONITOR THE BEACON THROUGH THE BASE AND FINAL LEGS. IT NEVER FALTERED, CONSISTENTLY POINTING TO THE WRONG LOCATION, AS THE ACFT HDG CHANGED. AT THE PASSAGE OF THE OM, ALL OTHER APCH COMPONENTS WERE OPERATING NORMALLY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE 2 BEACONS (THE INNER WAS NEVER RECEIVED). AFTER LNDG, WE PARKED AT OUR GATE, ON A NE HDG, AND OBSERVED THAT WHILE THE NEEDLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN INDICATING DIRECTLY OFF THE L WING, IT WAS NOW 10-15 DEGS AHEAD OF WHERE IT SHOULD BE. WE NOTIFIED KIMPO GND CTL OF THE INCIDENT, BUT DUE TO A SEVERE LANGUAGE PROB, IT WAS UNCLEAR IF THE POTENTIAL SEVERITY OF THE PROB WAS UNDERSTOOD. UPON ARR AT OUR HOTEL, WE CONTACTED OUR COMPANY FLT CTL IN LOUISVILLE, KY, AND MADE THE FLEET SUPVR ON DUTY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT POSSIBLY A FALSE BEACON MIGHT BE EMANATING FROM NORTH KOREA. THE SUPVR AGREED TO CONTACT THE NEXT CREW INBOUND TO SEOUL AND ALERT THEM TO THE POSSIBILITY. HE FURTHER INDICATED THAT HE WOULD NOTIFY ALL COMPANY FLTS THAT WOULD BE AFFECTED, AND THAT HE WOULD ALSO ALERT THE FAA. THE FOLLOWING DAY, STILL IN SEOUL, THE FLC CONTACTED OUR LCL GATEWAY MGR, AND HE PUT US IN TOUCH WITH THE SHIFT MGR AT KIMPO TWR. WE BRIEFED HIM OF THE INCIDENT, AND HE INDICATED THAT IT WAS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF WHICH HE HAD HEARD. THE FOLLOWING DAY, IT WAS BROUGHT TO THE FLC'S ATTN THAT ON THE SUBSEQUENT FLT, THE #1 ADF HAD BEEN 'WRITTEN UP' FOR POINTING 180 DEGS OUT OF PHASE. OBVIOUSLY, WE FELT THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR STORY SOMEWHAT COMPROMISED, HOWEVER, WE KNOW WHAT WE SAW, AND PRESSED THE COMPANY TO CONTINUE NOTIFYING FLTS THAT MIGHT BE AFFECTED. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, THEY MADE THE DECISION TO WAIT FOR ANOTHER RPT BEFORE ESCALATING THE ALERT. ALTHOUGH I COMPLETELY UNDERSTAND MY COMPANY'S HESITANCY IN SOUNDING WHAT MIGHT VERY WELL BE A FALSE ALARM, I TEND TO DISAGREE WITH THEIR DECISION, AS MY TENDENCY WOULD BE TO NOTIFY AS MANY FLC'S AS POSSIBLE. I CAN'T IMAGINE HOW I WOULD FEEL IF I WERE TO LEARN OF AN ACFT THAT INADVERTENTLY STRAYED INTO NORTH KOREAN AIRSPACE, ONLY TO BE SHOT DOWN. I WOULD IMAGINE THAT IT'S BEEN A LONG DAY FOR MANY OF THE FLC'S THAT FIND THEMSELVES BEING VECTORED FOR THE APCH TO SEOUL. IN ADDITION TO CONTENDING WITH FATIGUE AND LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES, PERHAPS BEING POLITICALLY AWARE, WITH A SMALL DOSE OF SKEPTICISM WILL KEEP US ALL ALERT AND A LITTLE SAFER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.