Narrative:

Simultaneous intersecting runway operations were being conducted at dca on runways 3, 36, 33. We were cleared to takeoff on runway 36 and acknowledged clearance to tower. At the same time, tower cleared another aircraft to land on runway 33 and also had previously cleared a light aircraft for takeoff on runway 3. Our aircraft was on taxiway C holding short of 36 when clearance to takeoff was received, so it was impossible to see runway 3. We were rolling onto runway 36, completing checklists and advanced power for takeoff. Suddenly, tower called 'air carrier X, stop, stop!' I aborted the takeoff immediately and, at the same time, saw that the light aircraft was just beginning takeoff on runway 3. We exited the runway at taxiway a and taxied back to runway 36. The light aircraft continued his takeoff. Simultaneous operations at dca are particularly hazardous. 2-MAN crew aircraft are extremely busy in certain phases of operations and especially so just prior to takeoff. Fortunately, tower and I saw the conflict soon enough to avoid an accident. In 2-MAN crews, 1 crew member is reading checklist items and the other is responding just prior to takeoff roll. Although we both clearly heard our clearance and responded to tower, our situational awareness of what tower was doing with other aircraft was not as clear as it should be. 3-MAN crew concept aircraft are much better in this regard, as 2 complete pre- takeoff checks and PF devotes total attention to flying the aircraft and situational awareness. Communications also are increasingly blocked by too many xmissions and many times, clrncs are delayed or totally lost. Simultaneous intersecting operations at dca are an accident waiting to happen.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR ABORTS TKOF AS SMA STARTS TKOF ROLL.

Narrative: SIMULTANEOUS INTERSECTING RWY OPS WERE BEING CONDUCTED AT DCA ON RWYS 3, 36, 33. WE WERE CLRED TO TKOF ON RWY 36 AND ACKNOWLEDGED CLRNC TO TWR. AT THE SAME TIME, TWR CLRED ANOTHER ACFT TO LAND ON RWY 33 AND ALSO HAD PREVIOUSLY CLRED A LIGHT ACFT FOR TKOF ON RWY 3. OUR ACFT WAS ON TXWY C HOLDING SHORT OF 36 WHEN CLRNC TO TKOF WAS RECEIVED, SO IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE RWY 3. WE WERE ROLLING ONTO RWY 36, COMPLETING CHKLISTS AND ADVANCED PWR FOR TKOF. SUDDENLY, TWR CALLED 'ACR X, STOP, STOP!' I ABORTED THE TKOF IMMEDIATELY AND, AT THE SAME TIME, SAW THAT THE LIGHT ACFT WAS JUST BEGINNING TKOF ON RWY 3. WE EXITED THE RWY AT TXWY A AND TAXIED BACK TO RWY 36. THE LIGHT ACFT CONTINUED HIS TKOF. SIMULTANEOUS OPS AT DCA ARE PARTICULARLY HAZARDOUS. 2-MAN CREW ACFT ARE EXTREMELY BUSY IN CERTAIN PHASES OF OPS AND ESPECIALLY SO JUST PRIOR TO TKOF. FORTUNATELY, TWR AND I SAW THE CONFLICT SOON ENOUGH TO AVOID AN ACCIDENT. IN 2-MAN CREWS, 1 CREW MEMBER IS READING CHKLIST ITEMS AND THE OTHER IS RESPONDING JUST PRIOR TO TKOF ROLL. ALTHOUGH WE BOTH CLRLY HEARD OUR CLRNC AND RESPONDED TO TWR, OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF WHAT TWR WAS DOING WITH OTHER ACFT WAS NOT AS CLR AS IT SHOULD BE. 3-MAN CREW CONCEPT ACFT ARE MUCH BETTER IN THIS REGARD, AS 2 COMPLETE PRE- TKOF CHKS AND PF DEVOTES TOTAL ATTN TO FLYING THE ACFT AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. COMS ALSO ARE INCREASINGLY BLOCKED BY TOO MANY XMISSIONS AND MANY TIMES, CLRNCS ARE DELAYED OR TOTALLY LOST. SIMULTANEOUS INTERSECTING OPS AT DCA ARE AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.