Narrative:

Approaching sfo from lax via BSR1 arrival. Cleared to cross boldr intersection at 10000 ft. We changed to bay approach with instructions to slow to 210 KIAS. Approximately 30 DME from oak VOR cleared to 'descend to 8000 ft turn left to 280 degree heading.' after about 2 mins, cleared to 'turn right to 050 degree heading.' next, 'turn to 010 degree heading descend to 6000 ft.' at this point we were about 90 degrees to the runway 28L ILS course heading. Changed to 310 degree heading and cleared to 'intercept runway 28L localizer.' traffic reported as an light transport at 2 O'clock 4000 ft 'report traffic in sight.' we were unable to identify the light transport due to the bright lights of the east bay commercial/residential areas, and the poor exterior lighting of the relatively small aircraft. Approach told us to 'maintain 4000 ft and report the traffic in sight.' we stated we were looking and approach stated we were 'not going to be cleared until we reported the traffic in sight.' at this time the light transport flew out of the east bay lights and over the water and we sighted the aircraft below and to the right. However, the traffic was only visible from the first officer (PNF) seat in level flight. At this time we were 'cleared for a visual approach to runway 28L keep the traffic in sight, contact tower on 120.5.' attempted to begin a descent toward the runway 28L centerline but we were too high to make a stabilized approach (3500 ft at 5.5 DME) due to a tailwind. Announced to sfo tower that we were 'going around.' what followed was a question and answer period inquiring as to why we were going around. The statement that we were too high didn't seem to be one of the answers they wanted to hear. Tower instructed us to maintain 3000 ft 280 degree heading contact departure control for a return to sfo.' departure gave us a heading of '210 degrees and climb to 5000 ft.' also advised us to expect a 12 NM final turn. Changed back to approach control which cleared us to turn left to 100 degrees. Shortly later a left turn to 010 degrees and descent to 4000 ft with a TA of an small aircraft 2 O'clock climbing to 6000 ft and 'he has you in sight.' at this time we received a TCASII RA to climb at 1500 FPM to avoid the traffic that we could not see, but they 'saw us.' we climbed to 5600 ft before the 'monitor vertical speed' basically announced the end of conflict. We were then vectored back to runway 28L final approach course. Asked to report 'heavy widebody transport Y 12 O'clock 4 NM on quiet bridge to runway 28R.' while we were unable to determine the type of aircraft or altitude we did report traffic at 12 O'clock in sight. Instructed to 'maintain visual separation with heavy widebody transport Y and maintain speed 180 KTS to the bridge cleared for visual approach runway 28L.' I asked if we were following a heavy now at 1 O'clock 2 NM or less. Approach stated yes, that I was to keep my speed up (180 KTS to the bridge) and 'pass the widebody transport Y, he is slowing to minimum approach speed.' at 180 KTS we were unable to pass the aircraft by the bridge. In fact we never got any closer. I asked the controller if the heavy knew we were passing on the left side and if he (the widebody transport Y) would then maintain visual separation with us after we passed, and could no longer assume the requirement for visual separation. The answer was never to be stated. At this point we were 1 1/2 - 2 mi behind a heavy widebody transport Y with a 10 KT tailwind blowing toward us. The widebody transport Y actually 'favored' the left side of runway 28R due to the slight crosswind so I maneuvered to the left of runway 28L centerline to avoid the widebody transport Y. I also slowed to minimum approach speed (140 KTS) and stayed 2 dots above the GS to avoid wake turbulence. To be totally safe at this point I should have gone around (again). I was in a hazardous situation that was not of my making. However, out of total frustration and diminishing fuel, I elected to take all precautions to allow a continued approach with as much safety as possible. This was a 'nightmare' arrival to sfo, something I have been doing for 27 plus yrs. ATC is overburdened trying to get too many aircraft into and out of sfo with inadequate ground facilities. Too many rules of safety were disregarded by everyone concerned just to 'make it work.' parallel visual approachs to closely spaced parallel runways, with 750 ft between runway ctrlines, with no stagger and inadequate wake turbulence separation is just 'plane' dangerous!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MULTIPLE RWY OP PARALLEL RWYS VISUAL APCHS ACR X HAD CONFLICT WITH WDB. EVASIVE ACTION TAKEN.

Narrative: APCHING SFO FROM LAX VIA BSR1 ARR. CLRED TO CROSS BOLDR INTXN AT 10000 FT. WE CHANGED TO BAY APCH WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO SLOW TO 210 KIAS. APPROX 30 DME FROM OAK VOR CLRED TO 'DSND TO 8000 FT TURN L TO 280 DEG HDG.' AFTER ABOUT 2 MINS, CLRED TO 'TURN R TO 050 DEG HDG.' NEXT, 'TURN TO 010 DEG HDG DSND TO 6000 FT.' AT THIS POINT WE WERE ABOUT 90 DEGS TO THE RWY 28L ILS COURSE HDG. CHANGED TO 310 DEG HDG AND CLRED TO 'INTERCEPT RWY 28L LOC.' TFC RPTED AS AN LTT AT 2 O'CLOCK 4000 FT 'RPT TFC IN SIGHT.' WE WERE UNABLE TO IDENT THE LTT DUE TO THE BRIGHT LIGHTS OF THE EAST BAY COMMERCIAL/RESIDENTIAL AREAS, AND THE POOR EXTERIOR LIGHTING OF THE RELATIVELY SMALL ACFT. APCH TOLD US TO 'MAINTAIN 4000 FT AND RPT THE TFC IN SIGHT.' WE STATED WE WERE LOOKING AND APCH STATED WE WERE 'NOT GOING TO BE CLRED UNTIL WE RPTED THE TFC IN SIGHT.' AT THIS TIME THE LTT FLEW OUT OF THE EAST BAY LIGHTS AND OVER THE WATER AND WE SIGHTED THE ACFT BELOW AND TO THE R. HOWEVER, THE TFC WAS ONLY VISIBLE FROM THE FO (PNF) SEAT IN LEVEL FLT. AT THIS TIME WE WERE 'CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28L KEEP THE TFC IN SIGHT, CONTACT TWR ON 120.5.' ATTEMPTED TO BEGIN A DSCNT TOWARD THE RWY 28L CTRLINE BUT WE WERE TOO HIGH TO MAKE A STABILIZED APCH (3500 FT AT 5.5 DME) DUE TO A TAILWIND. ANNOUNCED TO SFO TWR THAT WE WERE 'GOING AROUND.' WHAT FOLLOWED WAS A QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD INQUIRING AS TO WHY WE WERE GOING AROUND. THE STATEMENT THAT WE WERE TOO HIGH DIDN'T SEEM TO BE ONE OF THE ANSWERS THEY WANTED TO HEAR. TWR INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT 280 DEG HDG CONTACT DEP CTL FOR A RETURN TO SFO.' DEP GAVE US A HDG OF '210 DEGS AND CLB TO 5000 FT.' ALSO ADVISED US TO EXPECT A 12 NM FINAL TURN. CHANGED BACK TO APCH CTL WHICH CLRED US TO TURN L TO 100 DEGS. SHORTLY LATER A L TURN TO 010 DEGS AND DSCNT TO 4000 FT WITH A TA OF AN SMA 2 O'CLOCK CLBING TO 6000 FT AND 'HE HAS YOU IN SIGHT.' AT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED A TCASII RA TO CLB AT 1500 FPM TO AVOID THE TFC THAT WE COULD NOT SEE, BUT THEY 'SAW US.' WE CLBED TO 5600 FT BEFORE THE 'MONITOR VERT SPD' BASICALLY ANNOUNCED THE END OF CONFLICT. WE WERE THEN VECTORED BACK TO RWY 28L FINAL APCH COURSE. ASKED TO RPT 'HVY WDB Y 12 O'CLOCK 4 NM ON QUIET BRIDGE TO RWY 28R.' WHILE WE WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE TYPE OF ACFT OR ALT WE DID RPT TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK IN SIGHT. INSTRUCTED TO 'MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH HVY WDB Y AND MAINTAIN SPD 180 KTS TO THE BRIDGE CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH RWY 28L.' I ASKED IF WE WERE FOLLOWING A HVY NOW AT 1 O'CLOCK 2 NM OR LESS. APCH STATED YES, THAT I WAS TO KEEP MY SPD UP (180 KTS TO THE BRIDGE) AND 'PASS THE WDB Y, HE IS SLOWING TO MINIMUM APCH SPD.' AT 180 KTS WE WERE UNABLE TO PASS THE ACFT BY THE BRIDGE. IN FACT WE NEVER GOT ANY CLOSER. I ASKED THE CTLR IF THE HVY KNEW WE WERE PASSING ON THE L SIDE AND IF HE (THE WDB Y) WOULD THEN MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH US AFTER WE PASSED, AND COULD NO LONGER ASSUME THE REQUIREMENT FOR VISUAL SEPARATION. THE ANSWER WAS NEVER TO BE STATED. AT THIS POINT WE WERE 1 1/2 - 2 MI BEHIND A HVY WDB Y WITH A 10 KT TAILWIND BLOWING TOWARD US. THE WDB Y ACTUALLY 'FAVORED' THE L SIDE OF RWY 28R DUE TO THE SLIGHT XWIND SO I MANEUVERED TO THE L OF RWY 28L CTRLINE TO AVOID THE WDB Y. I ALSO SLOWED TO MINIMUM APCH SPD (140 KTS) AND STAYED 2 DOTS ABOVE THE GS TO AVOID WAKE TURB. TO BE TOTALLY SAFE AT THIS POINT I SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND (AGAIN). I WAS IN A HAZARDOUS SIT THAT WAS NOT OF MY MAKING. HOWEVER, OUT OF TOTAL FRUSTRATION AND DIMINISHING FUEL, I ELECTED TO TAKE ALL PRECAUTIONS TO ALLOW A CONTINUED APCH WITH AS MUCH SAFETY AS POSSIBLE. THIS WAS A 'NIGHTMARE' ARR TO SFO, SOMETHING I HAVE BEEN DOING FOR 27 PLUS YRS. ATC IS OVERBURDENED TRYING TO GET TOO MANY ACFT INTO AND OUT OF SFO WITH INADEQUATE GND FACILITIES. TOO MANY RULES OF SAFETY WERE DISREGARDED BY EVERYONE CONCERNED JUST TO 'MAKE IT WORK.' PARALLEL VISUAL APCHS TO CLOSELY SPACED PARALLEL RWYS, WITH 750 FT BTWN RWY CTRLINES, WITH NO STAGGER AND INADEQUATE WAKE TURB SEPARATION IS JUST 'PLANE' DANGEROUS!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.