Narrative:

The flight was a routine scheduled flight from bos to btv in VMC with an IFR flight plan. Upon being cleared the visual approach we were switched to tower. Tower told us to enter left downwind runway 15 and we would be #3 following a mig (yes, mig) turning left base. A few seconds later a cessna, who was #1, reported he had lost his engine on his landing roll. We had just picked up the mig on his left base when the tower told us to make a right 360 degree turn and return to the downwind. The captain initiated the turn and stopped the descent at pattern altitude. We lost sight of the mig as we made the turn and never heard anything about him again. The local controller was questioning the cessna pilot as to what assistance he would need to get off the runway. The cessna pilot responded that he had just restarted his engine and was exiting the runway. At this point we were 3/4 of the way through our turn (perpendicular to the runway). The captain looked out his window, yelled something and dove the airplane. At about the same time, I looked towards his window and saw the mig fly right across our nose. He was close enough to clearly see the red flag on the side of his fuselage. Just after the mig passed, the tower called him out as traffic (too little, too late). I responded that we had him in sight and the tower mentioned he was doing 450 KTS. We were then cleared to land behind the mig (who as it turned out was doing low approachs). Upon arrival at the gate I called the local controller on the phone to discuss the situation. He told me we had been spun because of the cessna, which we already knew and understood, and that his radar had failed and that was why he never told us about the mig until he had passed us. He said he knew the speed of the mig because his radar suddenly came back. When I questioned him as to why the mig was going so fast in the first place, he correctly explained that the mig was exempt from the normal 250 KT restr due to its stall characteristics. I can understand the mig exceeding the 250 KT restr but I doubt he needed to be doing 450 KTS in the traffic pattern. As pilots, we are taught in the event of an emergency, fly the aircraft first, then address the emergency. I don't know what controllers are taught but this local controller was obviously fixating on the aircraft on the ground and apparently forgot about the 2 aircraft in his pattern. As far as the radar failure, there is a reason they build control towers with big windows. As far as my captain and I are concerned we have learned to pay extra attention any time we are in a traffic pattern.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POTENTIAL CONFLICT IN THE TFC PATTERN.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS A ROUTINE SCHEDULED FLT FROM BOS TO BTV IN VMC WITH AN IFR FLT PLAN. UPON BEING CLRED THE VISUAL APCH WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR. TWR TOLD US TO ENTER L DOWNWIND RWY 15 AND WE WOULD BE #3 FOLLOWING A MIG (YES, MIG) TURNING L BASE. A FEW SECONDS LATER A CESSNA, WHO WAS #1, RPTED HE HAD LOST HIS ENG ON HIS LNDG ROLL. WE HAD JUST PICKED UP THE MIG ON HIS L BASE WHEN THE TWR TOLD US TO MAKE A R 360 DEG TURN AND RETURN TO THE DOWNWIND. THE CAPT INITIATED THE TURN AND STOPPED THE DSCNT AT PATTERN ALT. WE LOST SIGHT OF THE MIG AS WE MADE THE TURN AND NEVER HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT HIM AGAIN. THE LCL CTLR WAS QUESTIONING THE CESSNA PLT AS TO WHAT ASSISTANCE HE WOULD NEED TO GET OFF THE RWY. THE CESSNA PLT RESPONDED THAT HE HAD JUST RESTARTED HIS ENG AND WAS EXITING THE RWY. AT THIS POINT WE WERE 3/4 OF THE WAY THROUGH OUR TURN (PERPENDICULAR TO THE RWY). THE CAPT LOOKED OUT HIS WINDOW, YELLED SOMETHING AND DOVE THE AIRPLANE. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, I LOOKED TOWARDS HIS WINDOW AND SAW THE MIG FLY RIGHT ACROSS OUR NOSE. HE WAS CLOSE ENOUGH TO CLRLY SEE THE RED FLAG ON THE SIDE OF HIS FUSELAGE. JUST AFTER THE MIG PASSED, THE TWR CALLED HIM OUT AS TFC (TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE). I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD HIM IN SIGHT AND THE TWR MENTIONED HE WAS DOING 450 KTS. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO LAND BEHIND THE MIG (WHO AS IT TURNED OUT WAS DOING LOW APCHS). UPON ARR AT THE GATE I CALLED THE LCL CTLR ON THE PHONE TO DISCUSS THE SIT. HE TOLD ME WE HAD BEEN SPUN BECAUSE OF THE CESSNA, WHICH WE ALREADY KNEW AND UNDERSTOOD, AND THAT HIS RADAR HAD FAILED AND THAT WAS WHY HE NEVER TOLD US ABOUT THE MIG UNTIL HE HAD PASSED US. HE SAID HE KNEW THE SPD OF THE MIG BECAUSE HIS RADAR SUDDENLY CAME BACK. WHEN I QUESTIONED HIM AS TO WHY THE MIG WAS GOING SO FAST IN THE FIRST PLACE, HE CORRECTLY EXPLAINED THAT THE MIG WAS EXEMPT FROM THE NORMAL 250 KT RESTR DUE TO ITS STALL CHARACTERISTICS. I CAN UNDERSTAND THE MIG EXCEEDING THE 250 KT RESTR BUT I DOUBT HE NEEDED TO BE DOING 450 KTS IN THE TFC PATTERN. AS PLTS, WE ARE TAUGHT IN THE EVENT OF AN EMER, FLY THE ACFT FIRST, THEN ADDRESS THE EMER. I DON'T KNOW WHAT CTLRS ARE TAUGHT BUT THIS LCL CTLR WAS OBVIOUSLY FIXATING ON THE ACFT ON THE GND AND APPARENTLY FORGOT ABOUT THE 2 ACFT IN HIS PATTERN. AS FAR AS THE RADAR FAILURE, THERE IS A REASON THEY BUILD CTL TWRS WITH BIG WINDOWS. AS FAR AS MY CAPT AND I ARE CONCERNED WE HAVE LEARNED TO PAY EXTRA ATTN ANY TIME WE ARE IN A TFC PATTERN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.