Narrative:

We were advised early on the downwind leg that we would receive a short approach. The first officer was flying. On base leg, we were cleared for a visual approach. I don't remember if we were also told to contact tower at the OM as is usually the case. I presume we were. As we overheaded the OM, we were high and fast. The first officer called for final flaps 15 KTS above the structural limit. I told him to level off until we were slow enough to extend final flaps which he did. We were stabilized on glide path and speed between 800-1000 ft AGL with landing checklist complete except for the flight attendants notifying us that they were out of the lower galley. (We would have to make a go around if notification not received.) after stabilizing on glide path, I concentrated on the flight instruments, airspeed and runway environment for the rest of the approach. There was a lot of talk on the frequency, but I never hear our call sign used again. The first officer was concerned about the galley status and asked the so 2 or 3 times if the galley was clear. The notification came via interphone about 20 seconds before landing. After clearing the runway and taxiing inbound I commented that we hadn't received any taxi instructions. I glanced down at the radio and was shocked to see that I was still on approach control frequency. Possible factors: not being stabilized on approach sooner. Being preoccupied with speed and flaps at the OM where I normally would check in with tower. The concern or focus on the flight attendants in the lower galley requiring us to contemplate a go around at the last moment. Corrective action: maybe put 'landing clearance' on checklist, if not, 'think landing clearance' after checklist complete.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH LNDG. LNDG WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: WE WERE ADVISED EARLY ON THE DOWNWIND LEG THAT WE WOULD RECEIVE A SHORT APCH. THE FO WAS FLYING. ON BASE LEG, WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. I DON'T REMEMBER IF WE WERE ALSO TOLD TO CONTACT TWR AT THE OM AS IS USUALLY THE CASE. I PRESUME WE WERE. AS WE OVERHEADED THE OM, WE WERE HIGH AND FAST. THE FO CALLED FOR FINAL FLAPS 15 KTS ABOVE THE STRUCTURAL LIMIT. I TOLD HIM TO LEVEL OFF UNTIL WE WERE SLOW ENOUGH TO EXTEND FINAL FLAPS WHICH HE DID. WE WERE STABILIZED ON GLIDE PATH AND SPD BTWN 800-1000 FT AGL WITH LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETE EXCEPT FOR THE FLT ATTENDANTS NOTIFYING US THAT THEY WERE OUT OF THE LOWER GALLEY. (WE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A GAR IF NOTIFICATION NOT RECEIVED.) AFTER STABILIZING ON GLIDE PATH, I CONCENTRATED ON THE FLT INSTS, AIRSPD AND RWY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE REST OF THE APCH. THERE WAS A LOT OF TALK ON THE FREQ, BUT I NEVER HEAR OUR CALL SIGN USED AGAIN. THE FO WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE GALLEY STATUS AND ASKED THE SO 2 OR 3 TIMES IF THE GALLEY WAS CLR. THE NOTIFICATION CAME VIA INTERPHONE ABOUT 20 SECONDS BEFORE LNDG. AFTER CLRING THE RWY AND TAXIING INBOUND I COMMENTED THAT WE HADN'T RECEIVED ANY TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. I GLANCED DOWN AT THE RADIO AND WAS SHOCKED TO SEE THAT I WAS STILL ON APCH CTL FREQ. POSSIBLE FACTORS: NOT BEING STABILIZED ON APCH SOONER. BEING PREOCCUPIED WITH SPD AND FLAPS AT THE OM WHERE I NORMALLY WOULD CHK IN WITH TWR. THE CONCERN OR FOCUS ON THE FLT ATTENDANTS IN THE LOWER GALLEY REQUIRING US TO CONTEMPLATE A GAR AT THE LAST MOMENT. CORRECTIVE ACTION: MAYBE PUT 'LNDG CLRNC' ON CHKLIST, IF NOT, 'THINK LNDG CLRNC' AFTER CHKLIST COMPLETE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.