Narrative:

Lear preparing to depart seattle boeing field bfi runway 31L on a 135 cargo flight, myself as captain, PIC and an experienced first officer. Copilot was flying aircraft on this leg. Holding short of runway, tower cleared a 757 for takeoff and advised us we would be cleared for takeoff after a hold for wake turbulence separation. After 2-3 mins we were cleared for takeoff (clearance was climb to 2000 ft MSL/runway heading). First officer said he'd like to 'climb out steeply' to avoid the 757 wake turbulence. I agreed and we subsequently took off and climbed steeply to approximately 1800 ft at which point I realized the first officer was not initiating a leveloff control input appropriate to the aircraft's rate of climb. I called out '2000 ft!' while simultaneously pushing forward forcefully on the yoke. As the aircraft's nose was leveled and we reached approximately 2000 ft, I believe. At this point we encountered the wake turbulence of the previously departed 757. The aircraft's pitch and roll modes were upset (characterized as moderate) to the extent that the aircraft's altitude reached approximately 2200 ft before I was able to restore the aircraft to stabilized flight at 2000 ft. Concurrently, while this was happening I responded to an ATC instruction to 'climb and maintain 5000 ft'. However, I kept the aircraft level at 2000 ft (giving ATC time to respond to my readback -- if it were incorrect). ATC responded 'that wasn't for you XXX, I show you leaving 2000 ft -- climb and maintain 9000 ft.' I acknowledged this instruction and we proceeded to climb the aircraft (copilot flying) nearing 9000 ft. It again appeared that the copilot was not going to level the aircraft at 9000 ft. I again interceded on the controls -- resulting in the aircraft reaching approximately 9200 ft before I restored the aircraft to level flight at assigned altitude, 9000 ft (no wake turbulence encounter on this one). ATC then cleared us to 15000 ft and higher -- without incident for the remainder of the trip. I am not sure of the tolerances for an official 'altitude bust' in the terminal environment. But these 2 'saves' were much too close for my personal comfort. I have learned from this that I have to watch the first officer all the time -- no matter how experienced or well regarded his or her flying skills are purported to be. My certificates are on the line every moment of the flight. Even the best of us are capable of making mistakes (with regularity!). In this case my first officer fixated so much on a steep climb to avoid wake turbulence that he forgot to level off -- and then, being so rattled, he committed the same mistake again, shortly thereafter. I must remember that my responsibility for vigilance is not diminished when it's the first officer's turn at the controls. I feel I learned a valuable lesson from this. Also, after discussing this thoroughly with the first officer I have altered my cockpit resource management procedures to include -- in addition to my company standard '1000 ft to go' call, a '5OO ft, 200 ft or 100 ft to go' call anytime I feel the aircraft is not being leveled appropriately or transitioned in a manner reflective of the flying pilot's 'awareness' of the immediate task/requirement. We agreed that any time the PNF has any question of the 'PF's' intent or understanding of the path of flight or incipient event, that a 'prompt response' will be initiated -- such as '2000 ft, right?' 'right!' or 'okay, coming up on 2000 ft.' 'right! 2000 ft! I got it!' -- 'okay, level at 2000 ft -- 300 ft to go!' 'I got it!' sort of a double check before it's too late as well as supporting that constant exchange of information in the cockpit, keeping both pilots 'in the loop'. I operate the cockpit devoid of ego and encourage prompting and questioning at any/all times. It's already saved me big, several times. Also, we fly freight late into the night and I look for any operational methodology that can circumvent the inevitable and unavoidable degradation in human performance associated with the rigors of fatigue and 'backside of the clock' operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALT OVERSHOOT ACCOUNT HIGH RATE CLB TO AVOID WAKE TURB.

Narrative: LEAR PREPARING TO DEPART SEATTLE BOEING FIELD BFI RWY 31L ON A 135 CARGO FLT, MYSELF AS CAPT, PIC AND AN EXPERIENCED FO. COPLT WAS FLYING ACFT ON THIS LEG. HOLDING SHORT OF RWY, TWR CLRED A 757 FOR TKOF AND ADVISED US WE WOULD BE CLRED FOR TKOF AFTER A HOLD FOR WAKE TURB SEPARATION. AFTER 2-3 MINS WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF (CLRNC WAS CLB TO 2000 FT MSL/RWY HDG). FO SAID HE'D LIKE TO 'CLB OUT STEEPLY' TO AVOID THE 757 WAKE TURB. I AGREED AND WE SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK OFF AND CLBED STEEPLY TO APPROX 1800 FT AT WHICH POINT I REALIZED THE FO WAS NOT INITIATING A LEVELOFF CTL INPUT APPROPRIATE TO THE ACFT'S RATE OF CLB. I CALLED OUT '2000 FT!' WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PUSHING FORWARD FORCEFULLY ON THE YOKE. AS THE ACFT'S NOSE WAS LEVELED AND WE REACHED APPROX 2000 FT, I BELIEVE. AT THIS POINT WE ENCOUNTERED THE WAKE TURB OF THE PREVIOUSLY DEPARTED 757. THE ACFT'S PITCH AND ROLL MODES WERE UPSET (CHARACTERIZED AS MODERATE) TO THE EXTENT THAT THE ACFT'S ALT REACHED APPROX 2200 FT BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO RESTORE THE ACFT TO STABILIZED FLT AT 2000 FT. CONCURRENTLY, WHILE THIS WAS HAPPENING I RESPONDED TO AN ATC INSTRUCTION TO 'CLB AND MAINTAIN 5000 FT'. HOWEVER, I KEPT THE ACFT LEVEL AT 2000 FT (GIVING ATC TIME TO RESPOND TO MY READBACK -- IF IT WERE INCORRECT). ATC RESPONDED 'THAT WASN'T FOR YOU XXX, I SHOW YOU LEAVING 2000 FT -- CLB AND MAINTAIN 9000 FT.' I ACKNOWLEDGED THIS INSTRUCTION AND WE PROCEEDED TO CLB THE ACFT (COPLT FLYING) NEARING 9000 FT. IT AGAIN APPEARED THAT THE COPLT WAS NOT GOING TO LEVEL THE ACFT AT 9000 FT. I AGAIN INTERCEDED ON THE CTLS -- RESULTING IN THE ACFT REACHING APPROX 9200 FT BEFORE I RESTORED THE ACFT TO LEVEL FLT AT ASSIGNED ALT, 9000 FT (NO WAKE TURB ENCOUNTER ON THIS ONE). ATC THEN CLRED US TO 15000 FT AND HIGHER -- WITHOUT INCIDENT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TRIP. I AM NOT SURE OF THE TOLERANCES FOR AN OFFICIAL 'ALT BUST' IN THE TERMINAL ENVIRONMENT. BUT THESE 2 'SAVES' WERE MUCH TOO CLOSE FOR MY PERSONAL COMFORT. I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS THAT I HAVE TO WATCH THE FO ALL THE TIME -- NO MATTER HOW EXPERIENCED OR WELL REGARDED HIS OR HER FLYING SKILLS ARE PURPORTED TO BE. MY CERTIFICATES ARE ON THE LINE EVERY MOMENT OF THE FLT. EVEN THE BEST OF US ARE CAPABLE OF MAKING MISTAKES (WITH REGULARITY!). IN THIS CASE MY FO FIXATED SO MUCH ON A STEEP CLB TO AVOID WAKE TURB THAT HE FORGOT TO LEVEL OFF -- AND THEN, BEING SO RATTLED, HE COMMITTED THE SAME MISTAKE AGAIN, SHORTLY THEREAFTER. I MUST REMEMBER THAT MY RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIGILANCE IS NOT DIMINISHED WHEN IT'S THE FO'S TURN AT THE CTLS. I FEEL I LEARNED A VALUABLE LESSON FROM THIS. ALSO, AFTER DISCUSSING THIS THOROUGHLY WITH THE FO I HAVE ALTERED MY COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT PROCS TO INCLUDE -- IN ADDITION TO MY COMPANY STANDARD '1000 FT TO GO' CALL, A '5OO FT, 200 FT OR 100 FT TO GO' CALL ANYTIME I FEEL THE ACFT IS NOT BEING LEVELED APPROPRIATELY OR TRANSITIONED IN A MANNER REFLECTIVE OF THE FLYING PLT'S 'AWARENESS' OF THE IMMEDIATE TASK/REQUIREMENT. WE AGREED THAT ANY TIME THE PNF HAS ANY QUESTION OF THE 'PF'S' INTENT OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PATH OF FLT OR INCIPIENT EVENT, THAT A 'PROMPT RESPONSE' WILL BE INITIATED -- SUCH AS '2000 FT, RIGHT?' 'RIGHT!' OR 'OKAY, COMING UP ON 2000 FT.' 'RIGHT! 2000 FT! I GOT IT!' -- 'OKAY, LEVEL AT 2000 FT -- 300 FT TO GO!' 'I GOT IT!' SORT OF A DOUBLE CHK BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE AS WELL AS SUPPORTING THAT CONSTANT EXCHANGE OF INFO IN THE COCKPIT, KEEPING BOTH PLTS 'IN THE LOOP'. I OPERATE THE COCKPIT DEVOID OF EGO AND ENCOURAGE PROMPTING AND QUESTIONING AT ANY/ALL TIMES. IT'S ALREADY SAVED ME BIG, SEVERAL TIMES. ALSO, WE FLY FREIGHT LATE INTO THE NIGHT AND I LOOK FOR ANY OPERATIONAL METHODOLOGY THAT CAN CIRCUMVENT THE INEVITABLE AND UNAVOIDABLE DEGRADATION IN HUMAN PERFORMANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THE RIGORS OF FATIGUE AND 'BACKSIDE OF THE CLOCK' OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.