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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 266655 |
Time | |
Date | 199403 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : vrb |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 300 agl bound upper : 300 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : vrb tower : tyr |
Operator | general aviation : instructional |
Make Model Name | Helicopter |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : go around other |
Route In Use | approach : visual |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : go around |
Route In Use | approach : straight in |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot instruction : trainee |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 20 flight time total : 316 flight time type : 97 |
ASRS Report | 266655 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : first officer instruction : instructor oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : atp pilot : cfi |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : nmac non adherence : far other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took evasive action |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 200 vertical : 100 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Event took place during my initial CFI r-hand check ride. I was in closed traffic (left) for runway 11L. I had been 'cleared for the option' at an earlier phase of the pattern. I believe at crosswind or early downwind, and neither the examiner nor I recall receiving an update on our position or sequence in the pattern. The traffic, a mooney M20J, was sighted almost simultaneously by myself and the examiner. I then performed a left turn to evade traffic, and the mooney made a right climbing go around. At this point, we queried the tower as to who was cleared for landing. The controller informed us that the mooney was in fact cleared ahead of us. The controller then cleared us to land. As I stated earlier, the clearance we received was not updated to '#2 following mooney,' or any similar statement. Flying as the instructor in the left seat, I found it interesting that the traffic, which was at 2 O'clock low, was seen by both myself and the examiner at the same time. I feel that one contributing factor of this experience is the lack of education controllers receive regarding the capabilities and preferred method of operation of helicopters. Because a helicopter pattern is relatively close, short, and steep, fixed wing traffic on final may be hard to see. In regards to our proximity to the traffic, no excessive control inputs were needed to avoid a collision. I believe that this incident shows how careful pilots must be in avoiding traffic in airport environments. Even at a point when I was doing my very best to demonstrate safe operation, and put my 'best foot forward,' it is very easy to miss traffic in a busy training environment.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: NMAC ON FINAL APCH BTWN ROTARY WINGED TFC AND A MOONEY.
Narrative: EVENT TOOK PLACE DURING MY INITIAL CFI R-HAND CHK RIDE. I WAS IN CLOSED TFC (L) FOR RWY 11L. I HAD BEEN 'CLRED FOR THE OPTION' AT AN EARLIER PHASE OF THE PATTERN. I BELIEVE AT XWIND OR EARLY DOWNWIND, AND NEITHER THE EXAMINER NOR I RECALL RECEIVING AN UPDATE ON OUR POS OR SEQUENCE IN THE PATTERN. THE TFC, A MOONEY M20J, WAS SIGHTED ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY BY MYSELF AND THE EXAMINER. I THEN PERFORMED A L TURN TO EVADE TFC, AND THE MOONEY MADE A R CLBING GAR. AT THIS POINT, WE QUERIED THE TWR AS TO WHO WAS CLRED FOR LNDG. THE CTLR INFORMED US THAT THE MOONEY WAS IN FACT CLRED AHEAD OF US. THE CTLR THEN CLRED US TO LAND. AS I STATED EARLIER, THE CLRNC WE RECEIVED WAS NOT UPDATED TO '#2 FOLLOWING MOONEY,' OR ANY SIMILAR STATEMENT. FLYING AS THE INSTRUCTOR IN THE L SEAT, I FOUND IT INTERESTING THAT THE TFC, WHICH WAS AT 2 O'CLOCK LOW, WAS SEEN BY BOTH MYSELF AND THE EXAMINER AT THE SAME TIME. I FEEL THAT ONE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR OF THIS EXPERIENCE IS THE LACK OF EDUCATION CTLRS RECEIVE REGARDING THE CAPABILITIES AND PREFERRED METHOD OF OP OF HELIS. BECAUSE A HELI PATTERN IS RELATIVELY CLOSE, SHORT, AND STEEP, FIXED WING TFC ON FINAL MAY BE HARD TO SEE. IN REGARDS TO OUR PROX TO THE TFC, NO EXCESSIVE CTL INPUTS WERE NEEDED TO AVOID A COLLISION. I BELIEVE THAT THIS INCIDENT SHOWS HOW CAREFUL PLTS MUST BE IN AVOIDING TFC IN ARPT ENVIRONMENTS. EVEN AT A POINT WHEN I WAS DOING MY VERY BEST TO DEMONSTRATE SAFE OP, AND PUT MY 'BEST FOOT FORWARD,' IT IS VERY EASY TO MISS TFC IN A BUSY TRAINING ENVIRONMENT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.