Narrative:

Air carrier X had been cleared for takeoff runway 5 at clt. Simultaneous operations were taking place on 36R, 36L while we were in position and holding on runway 5, a dc-9 was landing on 36R. The tower told the dc-9 to hold short of runway 5 for departing traffic when given the landing clearance. On his rollout he told the tower he could hold short of runway 5, so tower cleared us for takeoff. The dc-9 missed the taxiway off of 36R (C6) which enables him to clear 36R short of the intersection of 5. Therefore, the dc-9 was still on 36R while we were on the takeoff roll on 5. A 737 Y was on short final 36 right and was told to go around because the dc-9 was still on the runway. As the 737 went around, we were halfway to our Y(1) speed. Tower informed us of the go around. We did not abort our takeoff at that time like we should have. We were not accelerating quickly. There was time for the airborne 737 to cross our intersection at 300 ft altitude before we achieved V(1). However, had we had a better performing aircraft or if we were closer to V(1) when the incident took place, we could have been faced with 2 converging aircraft, both under 500 ft AGL, and at takeoff power for a potential mid-air collision over the airport. When the 737 crossed our nose, we were 2000 ft from it horizontal, on the ground while he was 300 ft in the air. Factors: poor judgement in not aborting when we could have. Poor judgement on part of the controller to clear us for takeoff if he was not sure the dc-9 could clear 36R, thus avoiding the go around of the 737 in front of our takeoff path. Be situationally aware of this type of problem when using simultaneous crossing landing and departure operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X TKOF HAD CONFLICT WITH ACR Y ON GAR.

Narrative: ACR X HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF RWY 5 AT CLT. SIMULTANEOUS OPS WERE TAKING PLACE ON 36R, 36L WHILE WE WERE IN POS AND HOLDING ON RWY 5, A DC-9 WAS LNDG ON 36R. THE TWR TOLD THE DC-9 TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 5 FOR DEPARTING TFC WHEN GIVEN THE LNDG CLRNC. ON HIS ROLLOUT HE TOLD THE TWR HE COULD HOLD SHORT OF RWY 5, SO TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF. THE DC-9 MISSED THE TXWY OFF OF 36R (C6) WHICH ENABLES HIM TO CLR 36R SHORT OF THE INTXN OF 5. THEREFORE, THE DC-9 WAS STILL ON 36R WHILE WE WERE ON THE TKOF ROLL ON 5. A 737 Y WAS ON SHORT FINAL 36 R AND WAS TOLD TO GAR BECAUSE THE DC-9 WAS STILL ON THE RWY. AS THE 737 WENT AROUND, WE WERE HALFWAY TO OUR Y(1) SPD. TWR INFORMED US OF THE GAR. WE DID NOT ABORT OUR TKOF AT THAT TIME LIKE WE SHOULD HAVE. WE WERE NOT ACCELERATING QUICKLY. THERE WAS TIME FOR THE AIRBORNE 737 TO CROSS OUR INTXN AT 300 FT ALT BEFORE WE ACHIEVED V(1). HOWEVER, HAD WE HAD A BETTER PERFORMING ACFT OR IF WE WERE CLOSER TO V(1) WHEN THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE, WE COULD HAVE BEEN FACED WITH 2 CONVERGING ACFT, BOTH UNDER 500 FT AGL, AND AT TKOF PWR FOR A POTENTIAL MID-AIR COLLISION OVER THE ARPT. WHEN THE 737 CROSSED OUR NOSE, WE WERE 2000 FT FROM IT HORIZ, ON THE GND WHILE HE WAS 300 FT IN THE AIR. FACTORS: POOR JUDGEMENT IN NOT ABORTING WHEN WE COULD HAVE. POOR JUDGEMENT ON PART OF THE CTLR TO CLR US FOR TKOF IF HE WAS NOT SURE THE DC-9 COULD CLR 36R, THUS AVOIDING THE GAR OF THE 737 IN FRONT OF OUR TKOF PATH. BE SITUATIONALLY AWARE OF THIS TYPE OF PROB WHEN USING SIMULTANEOUS XING LNDG AND DEP OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.