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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 272487 |
Time | |
Date | 199405 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : cos |
State Reference | CO |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 16000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : cos |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-100 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : missed approach landing other |
Route In Use | approach : visual |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time total : 9000 flight time type : 4000 |
ASRS Report | 272487 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | inflight encounter : weather non adherence : clearance other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Weather |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
En route from stl to den we arrived in the traffic control area by circumventing a line of WX to the south of den and line of WX to the north of den all progressing east. We were set up to shoot the approach to runway 17L at den, however, ATC issued a holding clearance at casse intersection south of the airport at 16000 ft because of level 6 thunderstorm in progress at the den airport. There had been several missed approachs. We entered the holding pattern at casse and, through analyzing the radar, determined the width of the cell approximately 8 mi in diameter over the airport. To our west was another cell 5 mi away approximately the same size and the same intensity. The mountains obscured any analysis of WX following the cell to our west. Air traffic issued an expect further clearance of approximately 20 mins. I advised him that we would need a lower altitude, that 16000 would put is in the overhang for the WX over the altitude. Upon entering the hold flying wbound, I observed a clear corridor to csp. After entering the first turn, the intensity of the cell to the was increasing and it was progressing towards the holding pattern. I asked the air traffic controller about the speed of movement of this thunderstorm over the airport, and he advised that it was a level 6 and it was moving less than 3 mi an hour. At that rate, it would take approximately 50 mins to give adequate clearance for an approach. I advised that we would like to exit from the holding pattern and proceed to colorado springs. He asked if holding on the 150 degree radial would help and I responded no. Upon that advice, the air carrier traffic above us and traffic below us in the holding pattern and traffic approaching from the west immediately advised that they also would like to csp. So, 3 or maybe 4 of us were going to departure for csp. It was obvious that the controller was overloaded at that time. No traffic was landing and there was too much confusion and too many people in the holding pattern at the low altitude. So, rather than face rapidly moving severe WX with no way to see what was coming off the mountains behind it, I elected to divert to csp. Upon making that decision, the copilot inadvertently removed himself from the loop and became preoccupied with making a company diversion report, which was unnecessary at the time. I think we were third in traffic going to csp. We were handed off to a controller who obviously was startled by the onslaught of inbound traffic. The copilot came back on line and asked me what I wanted him to do. I advised him to get the ATIS, and he came back with 'there's a thunderstorm in progress also at csp. I told him that it didn't look quite as bad as the one at den, so we were going to progress in that direction. After crossing the csp VOR, behind another air carrier airplane which was behind another air carrier airplane, we were issued a turn left to 170 degrees from the controller. We turned right to 170 degrees because the left turn was a wrong direction turn of 270 degrees. We were entering a right downwind to 35L with a thunderstorm in progress over the airport, following visually another air carrier aircraft who was on base leg turning final. He continued his approach with heavy rain in progress at the airport and landed on runway 35L and rolled to the end obviously because of braking action. There wasn't an extensive amount of time to brief an ILS approach to csp airport because we were maneuvering around thunderstorms at the csp airport and the VOR, we were in a visual traffic pattern flying a visual approach. The controller made 2 attempts on our aircraft to have us shoot a visual to runway 30. I elected not to because of the heavy rain and the possibility of hydroplaning on a shorter runway. The copilot then placed the ILS on my side and his side for reference. Approaching petty OM on a 270 degree heading, we were slow, flaps 10 speed of 170 KTS with the gear down preparing to turn final and intercept the localizer to runway 35L. At that time, the controller issued a wind shear alert stating values that I think were 'south boundary field 170 at 19, north boundary field 350 at 10.' this aircraft can't land with more than a 10 KT tailwind and somewhere from where we were to the airport was a 30 KT change in wind speed. Anything with a 15 KT gain or loss of airspeed is considered by company flight operations manual as severe windshear. It just so happens that we were in the same spot that a previous aircraft had an 'unresolved cause' crash under similar conditions. However, we seemed to be more vulnerable. Our speed was 170 where his was 200 in the same position making a turn onto final. It was obvious that the copilot was shaken by the wind shear report and was reaching for the gear handle to retract the gear. That report was enough for me to abandon the approach. I also have learned from experience in the past that it's best to avoid sits where crew members are uncomfortable, and I called for gear up. Rather than turn and execute a runway 35L IFR missed approach into a thunderstorm that we were avoiding on the airport and between the csp VOR or turn visually into the traffic lane for the right runway, I advised the controller that air carrier is turning left to 180 degrees to extend conditions. We were on a visual approach and turning to the left was the safest course to fly away from all hazards. I.e. High terrain to the northwest of our position, thunderstorm to the northeast of us, and conditions that indicated wind shear on the final. Controller came back with, 'air carrier are you familiar with right and a list of numbers?' I didn't have time to look down at the approach plate to see if the norad restr areas were the numbers that she was reading, however, I know there was a restr area south and west of the OM. I came back with, 'no, however, rather than being advised of a restr area, it would be more appropriate for a direction to fly. She then came back with, 'fly 140 degrees.' we had started a turn south and would be clear of the restr area on the 180 heading. I advised her 'turning right to 140 degrees.' to note, in our right turn, we executed the start of a standard rate turn, ended up in a 45 degree bank, lost 20 KTS from our reference speed of 170 KTS, with unstable atmospheric conditions and approximately full power for 15 seconds. We flew visually sebound for approximately 15 mi. The comment I made to the copilot was, 'lets' clean this unstable expletive up.' we went to flaps up, speed 210 KTS. We advised the controller after proceeding southeast that we would like to come back and take another look at the approach at runway 35L. We came back, there was no wind shear alert. She advised that the airport was now IFR, climb to 8100 ft. We then intercepted the ILS to runway 35L, used maximum braking, shot the approach at 160 KTS and then slowed to the maximum correction of reference plus 20. The tower controller issued that heavy rain was in progress. The aircraft in front of us landed and rolled to the end, obviously because of braking action. We had a normal touchdown with a rapid deceleration, braking action was poor towards the end of the runway because of standing water. The controller asked if the rain was heavy or not. We advised that it was light on our approach. He said that we could make 180 degree turn on the runway and taxi by A4 to a spot on the south end of the ramp. We entered at A3. The tower controller advised that we took the wrong taxiway, and I responded, 'it's been a long day.'
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MLG FLC WAS WX ENCOUNTER, RESULTING IN HDG DEV AND WRONG TXWY TURNOFF.
Narrative: ENRTE FROM STL TO DEN WE ARRIVED IN THE TFC CTL AREA BY CIRCUMVENTING A LINE OF WX TO THE S OF DEN AND LINE OF WX TO THE N OF DEN ALL PROGRESSING E. WE WERE SET UP TO SHOOT THE APCH TO RWY 17L AT DEN, HOWEVER, ATC ISSUED A HOLDING CLRNC AT CASSE INTXN S OF THE ARPT AT 16000 FT BECAUSE OF LEVEL 6 TSTM IN PROGRESS AT THE DEN ARPT. THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL MISSED APCHS. WE ENTERED THE HOLDING PATTERN AT CASSE AND, THROUGH ANALYZING THE RADAR, DETERMINED THE WIDTH OF THE CELL APPROX 8 MI IN DIAMETER OVER THE ARPT. TO OUR W WAS ANOTHER CELL 5 MI AWAY APPROX THE SAME SIZE AND THE SAME INTENSITY. THE MOUNTAINS OBSCURED ANY ANALYSIS OF WX FOLLOWING THE CELL TO OUR WEST. AIR TFC ISSUED AN EXPECT FURTHER CLRNC OF APPROX 20 MINS. I ADVISED HIM THAT WE WOULD NEED A LOWER ALT, THAT 16000 WOULD PUT IS IN THE OVERHANG FOR THE WX OVER THE ALT. UPON ENTERING THE HOLD FLYING WBOUND, I OBSERVED A CLR CORRIDOR TO CSP. AFTER ENTERING THE FIRST TURN, THE INTENSITY OF THE CELL TO THE WAS INCREASING AND IT WAS PROGRESSING TOWARDS THE HOLDING PATTERN. I ASKED THE AIR TFC CTLR ABOUT THE SPD OF MOVEMENT OF THIS TSTM OVER THE ARPT, AND HE ADVISED THAT IT WAS A LEVEL 6 AND IT WAS MOVING LESS THAN 3 MI AN HR. AT THAT RATE, IT WOULD TAKE APPROX 50 MINS TO GIVE ADEQUATE CLRNC FOR AN APCH. I ADVISED THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO EXIT FROM THE HOLDING PATTERN AND PROCEED TO COLORADO SPRINGS. HE ASKED IF HOLDING ON THE 150 DEG RADIAL WOULD HELP AND I RESPONDED NO. UPON THAT ADVICE, THE ACR TFC ABOVE US AND TFC BELOW US IN THE HOLDING PATTERN AND TFC APCHING FROM THE W IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THAT THEY ALSO WOULD LIKE TO CSP. SO, 3 OR MAYBE 4 OF US WERE GOING TO DEP FOR CSP. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE CTLR WAS OVERLOADED AT THAT TIME. NO TFC WAS LNDG AND THERE WAS TOO MUCH CONFUSION AND TOO MANY PEOPLE IN THE HOLDING PATTERN AT THE LOW ALT. SO, RATHER THAN FACE RAPIDLY MOVING SEVERE WX WITH NO WAY TO SEE WHAT WAS COMING OFF THE MOUNTAINS BEHIND IT, I ELECTED TO DIVERT TO CSP. UPON MAKING THAT DECISION, THE COPLT INADVERTENTLY REMOVED HIMSELF FROM THE LOOP AND BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH MAKING A COMPANY DIVERSION RPT, WHICH WAS UNNECESSARY AT THE TIME. I THINK WE WERE THIRD IN TFC GOING TO CSP. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO A CTLR WHO OBVIOUSLY WAS STARTLED BY THE ONSLAUGHT OF INBOUND TFC. THE COPLT CAME BACK ON LINE AND ASKED ME WHAT I WANTED HIM TO DO. I ADVISED HIM TO GET THE ATIS, AND HE CAME BACK WITH 'THERE'S A TSTM IN PROGRESS ALSO AT CSP. I TOLD HIM THAT IT DIDN'T LOOK QUITE AS BAD AS THE ONE AT DEN, SO WE WERE GOING TO PROGRESS IN THAT DIRECTION. AFTER XING THE CSP VOR, BEHIND ANOTHER ACR AIRPLANE WHICH WAS BEHIND ANOTHER ACR AIRPLANE, WE WERE ISSUED A TURN L TO 170 DEGS FROM THE CTLR. WE TURNED R TO 170 DEGS BECAUSE THE L TURN WAS A WRONG DIRECTION TURN OF 270 DEGS. WE WERE ENTERING A R DOWNWIND TO 35L WITH A TSTM IN PROGRESS OVER THE ARPT, FOLLOWING VISUALLY ANOTHER ACR ACFT WHO WAS ON BASE LEG TURNING FINAL. HE CONTINUED HIS APCH WITH HVY RAIN IN PROGRESS AT THE ARPT AND LANDED ON RWY 35L AND ROLLED TO THE END OBVIOUSLY BECAUSE OF BRAKING ACTION. THERE WASN'T AN EXTENSIVE AMOUNT OF TIME TO BRIEF AN ILS APCH TO CSP ARPT BECAUSE WE WERE MANEUVERING AROUND TSTMS AT THE CSP ARPT AND THE VOR, WE WERE IN A VISUAL TFC PATTERN FLYING A VISUAL APCH. THE CTLR MADE 2 ATTEMPTS ON OUR ACFT TO HAVE US SHOOT A VISUAL TO RWY 30. I ELECTED NOT TO BECAUSE OF THE HVY RAIN AND THE POSSIBILITY OF HYDROPLANING ON A SHORTER RWY. THE COPLT THEN PLACED THE ILS ON MY SIDE AND HIS SIDE FOR REF. APCHING PETTY OM ON A 270 DEG HDG, WE WERE SLOW, FLAPS 10 SPD OF 170 KTS WITH THE GEAR DOWN PREPARING TO TURN FINAL AND INTERCEPT THE LOC TO RWY 35L. AT THAT TIME, THE CTLR ISSUED A WIND SHEAR ALERT STATING VALUES THAT I THINK WERE 'S BOUNDARY FIELD 170 AT 19, N BOUNDARY FIELD 350 AT 10.' THIS ACFT CAN'T LAND WITH MORE THAN A 10 KT TAILWIND AND SOMEWHERE FROM WHERE WE WERE TO THE ARPT WAS A 30 KT CHANGE IN WIND SPD. ANYTHING WITH A 15 KT GAIN OR LOSS OF AIRSPEED IS CONSIDERED BY COMPANY FLT OPS MANUAL AS SEVERE WINDSHEAR. IT JUST SO HAPPENS THAT WE WERE IN THE SAME SPOT THAT A PREVIOUS ACFT HAD AN 'UNRESOLVED CAUSE' CRASH UNDER SIMILAR CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, WE SEEMED TO BE MORE VULNERABLE. OUR SPD WAS 170 WHERE HIS WAS 200 IN THE SAME POS MAKING A TURN ONTO FINAL. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE COPLT WAS SHAKEN BY THE WIND SHEAR RPT AND WAS REACHING FOR THE GEAR HANDLE TO RETRACT THE GEAR. THAT RPT WAS ENOUGH FOR ME TO ABANDON THE APCH. I ALSO HAVE LEARNED FROM EXPERIENCE IN THE PAST THAT IT'S BEST TO AVOID SITS WHERE CREW MEMBERS ARE UNCOMFORTABLE, AND I CALLED FOR GEAR UP. RATHER THAN TURN AND EXECUTE A RWY 35L IFR MISSED APCH INTO A TSTM THAT WE WERE AVOIDING ON THE ARPT AND BTWN THE CSP VOR OR TURN VISUALLY INTO THE TFC LANE FOR THE R RWY, I ADVISED THE CTLR THAT ACR IS TURNING L TO 180 DEGS TO EXTEND CONDITIONS. WE WERE ON A VISUAL APCH AND TURNING TO THE L WAS THE SAFEST COURSE TO FLY AWAY FROM ALL HAZARDS. I.E. HIGH TERRAIN TO THE NW OF OUR POS, TSTM TO THE NE OF US, AND CONDITIONS THAT INDICATED WIND SHEAR ON THE FINAL. CTLR CAME BACK WITH, 'ACR ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH R AND A LIST OF NUMBERS?' I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO LOOK DOWN AT THE APCH PLATE TO SEE IF THE NORAD RESTR AREAS WERE THE NUMBERS THAT SHE WAS READING, HOWEVER, I KNOW THERE WAS A RESTR AREA S AND W OF THE OM. I CAME BACK WITH, 'NO, HOWEVER, RATHER THAN BEING ADVISED OF A RESTR AREA, IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR A DIRECTION TO FLY. SHE THEN CAME BACK WITH, 'FLY 140 DEGS.' WE HAD STARTED A TURN S AND WOULD BE CLR OF THE RESTR AREA ON THE 180 HDG. I ADVISED HER 'TURNING RIGHT TO 140 DEGS.' TO NOTE, IN OUR R TURN, WE EXECUTED THE START OF A STANDARD RATE TURN, ENDED UP IN A 45 DEG BANK, LOST 20 KTS FROM OUR REF SPD OF 170 KTS, WITH UNSTABLE ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS AND APPROX FULL PWR FOR 15 SECONDS. WE FLEW VISUALLY SEBOUND FOR APPROX 15 MI. THE COMMENT I MADE TO THE COPLT WAS, 'LETS' CLEAN THIS UNSTABLE EXPLETIVE UP.' WE WENT TO FLAPS UP, SPD 210 KTS. WE ADVISED THE CTLR AFTER PROCEEDING SE THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO COME BACK AND TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE APCH AT RWY 35L. WE CAME BACK, THERE WAS NO WIND SHEAR ALERT. SHE ADVISED THAT THE ARPT WAS NOW IFR, CLB TO 8100 FT. WE THEN INTERCEPTED THE ILS TO RWY 35L, USED MAXIMUM BRAKING, SHOT THE APCH AT 160 KTS AND THEN SLOWED TO THE MAX CORRECTION OF REF PLUS 20. THE TWR CTLR ISSUED THAT HVY RAIN WAS IN PROGRESS. THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US LANDED AND ROLLED TO THE END, OBVIOUSLY BECAUSE OF BRAKING ACTION. WE HAD A NORMAL TOUCHDOWN WITH A RAPID DECELERATION, BRAKING ACTION WAS POOR TOWARDS THE END OF THE RWY BECAUSE OF STANDING WATER. THE CTLR ASKED IF THE RAIN WAS HVY OR NOT. WE ADVISED THAT IT WAS LIGHT ON OUR APCH. HE SAID THAT WE COULD MAKE 180 DEG TURN ON THE RWY AND TAXI BY A4 TO A SPOT ON THE S END OF THE RAMP. WE ENTERED AT A3. THE TWR CTLR ADVISED THAT WE TOOK THE WRONG TXWY, AND I RESPONDED, 'IT'S BEEN A LONG DAY.'
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.