Narrative:

En route from phx to slc, ZLA advised us jammn 1 arrival landing south, approximately around the bce VOR area. At dta VOR we were still advised by ZLC, jammn 1 arrival and landing south. After, or as descent was started, ZLC advises jammn 1 arrival landing north and cross jammn at 14000 ft at 250 KTS. Descent was planned for jammn at 17000 ft and 320 KTS, plus there was a 100 KT tailwind at FL330. Jammn at 14000 ft and 250 KTS was not feasible and advised ZLC. He said, speed of 250 KTS at jammn and the best we could on the altitude. I tuned in ffu and the 211 degree radial for the turn at jammn. I left the frequency to acquire latest WX. WX was WX8 1/4 swf, wind 270/08 landing ILS runways 34R or 35, 34L was closed. Approach descent checklist was started, finished, and the approach briefing was started for the ILS runway 34R. Frequency change to slc approach control occurred during the approach briefing. Called approach control, his first words were 'turn right to heading of 050 degrees.' I looked at my CDI and in fact we had crossed the ffu 211 degree radial flying northbound. I advised the captain of our mistake and corrective action was taken. Once on the 050 degree heading, remainder of operations to the ILS runway 34R and subsequent landing were normal and uneventful. Jammn was crossed at approximately 16000 ft and 270 KTS. Factors for the above deviation: 1) changing runways from south flow to a north flow and also being #1 for the runway 34R approach. ZLC said we were the first aircraft for landing north. I assume he wanted 250 KTS at jammn so all aircraft landing south could complete their approach without conflict from us (note: the STAR says nothing about 250 KTS at jammn when landing north). 2) workload increased for me because landing north meant new WX, call company (early arrival), and start the approach descent checklist with an approach briefing, all to be completed prior to 10000 ft. Obtaining WX earlier wouldn't have helped, for the reason that runway confign changed. 3) captain's concern was compounded by jammn at 250 KTS, the WX reported at 1/4 mi swf (were we legal to do the ILS 34R approach), and the 100 KT tailwind. ATIS did not give any RVR readings, which would have helped somewhat. Captain was trying to do his best to make the restr and totally forgot the flow had changed from south to north. I was engrossed in obtaining WX, company call, approach descent checklist, and most importantly ILS runway 34R approach briefing. I was absolutely zero help to the captain with regard to aircraft situation awareness while on the arrival route.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG FLC UNABLE TO MEET XING RESTR. ALSO HAS HDG DEV AND ALTDEV ON DSCNT.

Narrative: ENRTE FROM PHX TO SLC, ZLA ADVISED US JAMMN 1 ARR LNDG S, APPROX AROUND THE BCE VOR AREA. AT DTA VOR WE WERE STILL ADVISED BY ZLC, JAMMN 1 ARR AND LNDG S. AFTER, OR AS DSCNT WAS STARTED, ZLC ADVISES JAMMN 1 ARR LNDG N AND CROSS JAMMN AT 14000 FT AT 250 KTS. DSCNT WAS PLANNED FOR JAMMN AT 17000 FT AND 320 KTS, PLUS THERE WAS A 100 KT TAILWIND AT FL330. JAMMN AT 14000 FT AND 250 KTS WAS NOT FEASIBLE AND ADVISED ZLC. HE SAID, SPD OF 250 KTS AT JAMMN AND THE BEST WE COULD ON THE ALT. I TUNED IN FFU AND THE 211 DEG RADIAL FOR THE TURN AT JAMMN. I LEFT THE FREQ TO ACQUIRE LATEST WX. WX WAS WX8 1/4 SWF, WIND 270/08 LNDG ILS RWYS 34R OR 35, 34L WAS CLOSED. APCH DSCNT CHKLIST WAS STARTED, FINISHED, AND THE APCH BRIEFING WAS STARTED FOR THE ILS RWY 34R. FREQ CHANGE TO SLC APCH CTL OCCURRED DURING THE APCH BRIEFING. CALLED APCH CTL, HIS FIRST WORDS WERE 'TURN R TO HDG OF 050 DEGS.' I LOOKED AT MY CDI AND IN FACT WE HAD CROSSED THE FFU 211 DEG RADIAL FLYING NBOUND. I ADVISED THE CAPT OF OUR MISTAKE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN. ONCE ON THE 050 DEG HDG, REMAINDER OF OPS TO THE ILS RWY 34R AND SUBSEQUENT LNDG WERE NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL. JAMMN WAS CROSSED AT APPROX 16000 FT AND 270 KTS. FACTORS FOR THE ABOVE DEV: 1) CHANGING RWYS FROM S FLOW TO A N FLOW AND ALSO BEING #1 FOR THE RWY 34R APCH. ZLC SAID WE WERE THE FIRST ACFT FOR LNDG N. I ASSUME HE WANTED 250 KTS AT JAMMN SO ALL ACFT LNDG S COULD COMPLETE THEIR APCH WITHOUT CONFLICT FROM US (NOTE: THE STAR SAYS NOTHING ABOUT 250 KTS AT JAMMN WHEN LNDG N). 2) WORKLOAD INCREASED FOR ME BECAUSE LNDG N MEANT NEW WX, CALL COMPANY (EARLY ARR), AND START THE APCH DSCNT CHKLIST WITH AN APCH BRIEFING, ALL TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO 10000 FT. OBTAINING WX EARLIER WOULDN'T HAVE HELPED, FOR THE REASON THAT RWY CONFIGN CHANGED. 3) CAPT'S CONCERN WAS COMPOUNDED BY JAMMN AT 250 KTS, THE WX RPTED AT 1/4 MI SWF (WERE WE LEGAL TO DO THE ILS 34R APCH), AND THE 100 KT TAILWIND. ATIS DID NOT GIVE ANY RVR READINGS, WHICH WOULD HAVE HELPED SOMEWHAT. CAPT WAS TRYING TO DO HIS BEST TO MAKE THE RESTR AND TOTALLY FORGOT THE FLOW HAD CHANGED FROM S TO N. I WAS ENGROSSED IN OBTAINING WX, COMPANY CALL, APCH DSCNT CHKLIST, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY ILS RWY 34R APCH BRIEFING. I WAS ABSOLUTELY ZERO HELP TO THE CAPT WITH REGARD TO ACFT SIT AWARENESS WHILE ON THE ARR RTE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.