Narrative:

After the agent closed out the flight, and the flight attendant advised us that all passenger were seated, and all luggage stowed, the first officer and I prepared for engine start. Gate at buf doesn't utilize pushback equipment, so we planned to 'power- out' of the gate, and taxi. As the mechanic strolled over to the aircraft and gave the 'remove chocks' hand signal, I mentally noted a general lack of use of standardized procedures as prescribed in the flight operations manual, with regards to use of approved hand signals. Many capts know that the quality of the first hand signals received from a mechanic is not unlike a 'first impression,' either good or bad, and that the pilot has a pretty good idea of the professionalism of the mechanic at that point, and what quality of hand signals will follow. This point is significant because it sets up the expectation that any hand signals the mechanic sends from that point on, will also be of a 'lax' and unapproved nature. After both engines were started, and the after-start checklist completed, I gave the mechanic a professional military style 'salute' indicating the aircraft was ready to power-out of the gate. At this point a captain expects 1 of 2 things to happen: 1) the mechanic will give a military style salute, and indicate the direction of the power-out. 2) the mechanic will cross his hands above his head, to indicate to the pilot that there is equipment/personnel nearby, do not move! The mechanic was now leaning backwards against a piece of ground equipment with his head tilted back, and arms laid across his lower chest, almost as if her were resting. After receiving my signal, he then looked at me and raised his right arm half- heartedly, and lowered his left arm from his chest, indicating to me his approval to begin pwring out of the gate. As I increased engine power, I remember saying to the first officer something to the effect of 'this mechanic is not the least interested in what's going on here.' significant at this moment is the fact that I kept my eyes riveted on the mechanic and at no time did he make any attempt to signal that any hint of danger existed! He just stood there leaning against that piece of equipment. After a few seconds we felt a jolt, and I immediately stopped the aircraft fearing that some personnel or equipment had been injured or damaged. We shut down the engines, and I opened my side cockpit window to see what happened, and then realized that the left wing-tip had struck the gate jetway. I then made an announcement over the PA system to the passenger stating a minor incident had occurred involving no immediate danger, and asked that they please remain in their seats until portable stairs were in place to deplane the aircraft. After the passenger had deplaned without incident, I confronted the mechanic in question. I said 'you cleared us out of the gate, what happened?' the very first words out of his mouth were 'I'm sick and tired of you pilots taxiing out of the gate without my permission.' I replied that I was not aware of what other capts do, but that I don not taxi out until cleared to do so! In frustration I asked 'even if a miscom had occurred, why did you make no attempt to give me the stop/danger crossed-arms signal, to alert me to stop the aircraft?' his reply was again 'I'm sick and tired of you pilots taxiing out of the gate without my permission.' afterwards he made an attempt to say that he did give me the crossed-arms danger signal, which of course is not true! The lead mechanic then walked over to me to discuss what had occurred. In my opinion, he didn't seem at all surprised that that mechanic was involved in the incident, but he remained neutral with no additional information about the attitude of this mechanic. All of the passenger booked on flight continued to their destination (lga) after a 2 hour delay, on another ship, with another cockpit crew. After numerous phone calls to system control, pit and bwi chief pilot offices (through captain, and the alpa field office, it was determined that since the incident occurred while the aircraft was under it's own power, the cockpit crew should report to a drug-testing facility before continuing further flight duties. While waiting for the drug testing arrangements to be completed, a bwi based captain introduced himself to me. He asked to be pardoned for his intrusion, but felt strongly compelled to extend his sympathy to me, and to display his frustration over an incident of this same magnitude that almost occurred to him only weeks earlier at buf. So frustrated about the station's mechanics general lack of professionalism with regards to pilot/mechanic hand signals, that he brought it to the attention of a station supervisor verbally in a short meeting! A short time later, the buf customer service manager drove the first officer and myself to the drug testing facility. Without any provocation on my part, the csm stated at great length his high frustration with the mechanic involved in the incident. He stated that he receives a constant stream of negative reports involving this mechanic, but was disgusted that he was pwrless to take action, other than writing up the mechanic, and complaining loudly to the lead mechanic, and union representatives about his extremely poor attitude and poor job performance! Also at this point I made a mental note of the fact that the mechanic did not report to the drug testing facility, or wondered whether he was even required to do so. Upon returning to the airport, the first officer and I reported for additional duty, and were assigned to fly air carrier flight (buf-lga), and ended our duty period. Summary: during ground operations where radio communications are not used, the only safe and effective mode of communication is through proper and professional use of company approved hand signals. As this incident shows, any complacency, unprofessionalism, or lack of a team attitude on the part of either the pilot or ground personnel, can result in unwanted miscom. The danger resulting from that miscom cannot be overstated, and should be stressed continually to all pilots and ground personnel. Supplemental information from acn 272350 we talked to 2 or 3 other people at the station who said this mechanic has a horrible reputation.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT DAMAGED. FLC DEV FROM AIRLINE MGMNT POLICY IN GND FLC COCKPIT COORD MGMNT.

Narrative: AFTER THE AGENT CLOSED OUT THE FLT, AND THE FLT ATTENDANT ADVISED US THAT ALL PAX WERE SEATED, AND ALL LUGGAGE STOWED, THE FO AND I PREPARED FOR ENG START. GATE AT BUF DOESN'T UTILIZE PUSHBACK EQUIP, SO WE PLANNED TO 'PWR- OUT' OF THE GATE, AND TAXI. AS THE MECH STROLLED OVER TO THE ACFT AND GAVE THE 'REMOVE CHOCKS' HAND SIGNAL, I MENTALLY NOTED A GENERAL LACK OF USE OF STANDARDIZED PROCS AS PRESCRIBED IN THE FLT OPS MANUAL, WITH REGARDS TO USE OF APPROVED HAND SIGNALS. MANY CAPTS KNOW THAT THE QUALITY OF THE FIRST HAND SIGNALS RECEIVED FROM A MECH IS NOT UNLIKE A 'FIRST IMPRESSION,' EITHER GOOD OR BAD, AND THAT THE PLT HAS A PRETTY GOOD IDEA OF THE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE MECH AT THAT POINT, AND WHAT QUALITY OF HAND SIGNALS WILL FOLLOW. THIS POINT IS SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE IT SETS UP THE EXPECTATION THAT ANY HAND SIGNALS THE MECH SENDS FROM THAT POINT ON, WILL ALSO BE OF A 'LAX' AND UNAPPROVED NATURE. AFTER BOTH ENGS WERE STARTED, AND THE AFTER-START CHKLIST COMPLETED, I GAVE THE MECH A PROFESSIONAL MIL STYLE 'SALUTE' INDICATING THE ACFT WAS READY TO PWR-OUT OF THE GATE. AT THIS POINT A CAPT EXPECTS 1 OF 2 THINGS TO HAPPEN: 1) THE MECH WILL GIVE A MIL STYLE SALUTE, AND INDICATE THE DIRECTION OF THE PWR-OUT. 2) THE MECH WILL CROSS HIS HANDS ABOVE HIS HEAD, TO INDICATE TO THE PLT THAT THERE IS EQUIP/PERSONNEL NEARBY, DO NOT MOVE! THE MECH WAS NOW LEANING BACKWARDS AGAINST A PIECE OF GND EQUIP WITH HIS HEAD TILTED BACK, AND ARMS LAID ACROSS HIS LOWER CHEST, ALMOST AS IF HER WERE RESTING. AFTER RECEIVING MY SIGNAL, HE THEN LOOKED AT ME AND RAISED HIS RIGHT ARM HALF- HEARTEDLY, AND LOWERED HIS L ARM FROM HIS CHEST, INDICATING TO ME HIS APPROVAL TO BEGIN PWRING OUT OF THE GATE. AS I INCREASED ENG PWR, I REMEMBER SAYING TO THE FO SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'THIS MECHANIC IS NOT THE LEAST INTERESTED IN WHAT'S GOING ON HERE.' SIGNIFICANT AT THIS MOMENT IS THE FACT THAT I KEPT MY EYES RIVETED ON THE MECH AND AT NO TIME DID HE MAKE ANY ATTEMPT TO SIGNAL THAT ANY HINT OF DANGER EXISTED! HE JUST STOOD THERE LEANING AGAINST THAT PIECE OF EQUIP. AFTER A FEW SECONDS WE FELT A JOLT, AND I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE ACFT FEARING THAT SOME PERSONNEL OR EQUIP HAD BEEN INJURED OR DAMAGED. WE SHUT DOWN THE ENGS, AND I OPENED MY SIDE COCKPIT WINDOW TO SEE WHAT HAPPENED, AND THEN REALIZED THAT THE L WING-TIP HAD STRUCK THE GATE JETWAY. I THEN MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT OVER THE PA SYS TO THE PAX STATING A MINOR INCIDENT HAD OCCURRED INVOLVING NO IMMEDIATE DANGER, AND ASKED THAT THEY PLEASE REMAIN IN THEIR SEATS UNTIL PORTABLE STAIRS WERE IN PLACE TO DEPLANE THE ACFT. AFTER THE PAX HAD DEPLANED WITHOUT INCIDENT, I CONFRONTED THE MECH IN QUESTION. I SAID 'YOU CLRED US OUT OF THE GATE, WHAT HAPPENED?' THE VERY FIRST WORDS OUT OF HIS MOUTH WERE 'I'M SICK AND TIRED OF YOU PLTS TAXIING OUT OF THE GATE WITHOUT MY PERMISSION.' I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT AWARE OF WHAT OTHER CAPTS DO, BUT THAT I DON NOT TAXI OUT UNTIL CLRED TO DO SO! IN FRUSTRATION I ASKED 'EVEN IF A MISCOM HAD OCCURRED, WHY DID YOU MAKE NO ATTEMPT TO GIVE ME THE STOP/DANGER CROSSED-ARMS SIGNAL, TO ALERT ME TO STOP THE ACFT?' HIS REPLY WAS AGAIN 'I'M SICK AND TIRED OF YOU PLTS TAXIING OUT OF THE GATE WITHOUT MY PERMISSION.' AFTERWARDS HE MADE AN ATTEMPT TO SAY THAT HE DID GIVE ME THE CROSSED-ARMS DANGER SIGNAL, WHICH OF COURSE IS NOT TRUE! THE LEAD MECH THEN WALKED OVER TO ME TO DISCUSS WHAT HAD OCCURRED. IN MY OPINION, HE DIDN'T SEEM AT ALL SURPRISED THAT THAT MECH WAS INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT, BUT HE REMAINED NEUTRAL WITH NO ADDITIONAL INFO ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THIS MECH. ALL OF THE PAX BOOKED ON FLT CONTINUED TO THEIR DEST (LGA) AFTER A 2 HR DELAY, ON ANOTHER SHIP, WITH ANOTHER COCKPIT CREW. AFTER NUMEROUS PHONE CALLS TO SYS CTL, PIT AND BWI CHIEF PLT OFFICES (THROUGH CAPT, AND THE ALPA FIELD OFFICE, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT SINCE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE THE ACFT WAS UNDER IT'S OWN PWR, THE COCKPIT CREW SHOULD RPT TO A DRUG-TESTING FACILITY BEFORE CONTINUING FURTHER FLT DUTIES. WHILE WAITING FOR THE DRUG TESTING ARRANGEMENTS TO BE COMPLETED, A BWI BASED CAPT INTRODUCED HIMSELF TO ME. HE ASKED TO BE PARDONED FOR HIS INTRUSION, BUT FELT STRONGLY COMPELLED TO EXTEND HIS SYMPATHY TO ME, AND TO DISPLAY HIS FRUSTRATION OVER AN INCIDENT OF THIS SAME MAGNITUDE THAT ALMOST OCCURRED TO HIM ONLY WEEKS EARLIER AT BUF. SO FRUSTRATED ABOUT THE STATION'S MECHS GENERAL LACK OF PROFESSIONALISM WITH REGARDS TO PLT/MECH HAND SIGNALS, THAT HE BROUGHT IT TO THE ATTN OF A STATION SUPVR VERBALLY IN A SHORT MEETING! A SHORT TIME LATER, THE BUF CUSTOMER SVC MGR DROVE THE FO AND MYSELF TO THE DRUG TESTING FACILITY. WITHOUT ANY PROVOCATION ON MY PART, THE CSM STATED AT GREAT LENGTH HIS HIGH FRUSTRATION WITH THE MECH INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT. HE STATED THAT HE RECEIVES A CONSTANT STREAM OF NEGATIVE RPTS INVOLVING THIS MECH, BUT WAS DISGUSTED THAT HE WAS PWRLESS TO TAKE ACTION, OTHER THAN WRITING UP THE MECH, AND COMPLAINING LOUDLY TO THE LEAD MECH, AND UNION REPRESENTATIVES ABOUT HIS EXTREMELY POOR ATTITUDE AND POOR JOB PERFORMANCE! ALSO AT THIS POINT I MADE A MENTAL NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE MECH DID NOT RPT TO THE DRUG TESTING FACILITY, OR WONDERED WHETHER HE WAS EVEN REQUIRED TO DO SO. UPON RETURNING TO THE ARPT, THE FO AND I RPTED FOR ADDITIONAL DUTY, AND WERE ASSIGNED TO FLY ACR FLT (BUF-LGA), AND ENDED OUR DUTY PERIOD. SUMMARY: DURING GND OPS WHERE RADIO COMS ARE NOT USED, THE ONLY SAFE AND EFFECTIVE MODE OF COM IS THROUGH PROPER AND PROFESSIONAL USE OF COMPANY APPROVED HAND SIGNALS. AS THIS INCIDENT SHOWS, ANY COMPLACENCY, UNPROFESSIONALISM, OR LACK OF A TEAM ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF EITHER THE PLT OR GND PERSONNEL, CAN RESULT IN UNWANTED MISCOM. THE DANGER RESULTING FROM THAT MISCOM CANNOT BE OVERSTATED, AND SHOULD BE STRESSED CONTINUALLY TO ALL PLTS AND GND PERSONNEL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 272350 WE TALKED TO 2 OR 3 OTHER PEOPLE AT THE STATION WHO SAID THIS MECH HAS A HORRIBLE REPUTATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.