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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 274727 |
Time | |
Date | 199406 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : msy |
State Reference | LA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 28500 msl bound upper : 29000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zhu |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | cruise other descent other |
Route In Use | enroute : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 250 flight time total : 11000 flight time type : 7000 |
ASRS Report | 274727 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : overshoot conflict : airborne less severe inflight encounter : weather non adherence : clearance non adherence : required legal separation other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : insufficient time |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 27000 vertical : 500 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : unspecified |
Narrative:
Many things in a short time, then put it out of mind and fly the airplane, then hours later recount what happened!? During the last part of cruise I returned to the cockpit from using the lavatory. We were at 35000 ft and saw 25000 set in the mode control panel and queried the captain (PF) who said our clearance was 'deviation east around WX at our 12 O'clock then direct msy and to cross....' just then the controller asked us to start down. He then said to turn right to a heading to intercept the msy 355 degree radial and to cross 50 mi south of mei at 290. After the captain set in the new heading he set up the FMC to intercept the radial. I looked up msy frequency and set up raw data as he was setting the computer. I asked him if everything was set up and that I would try to get the ATIS again and call operations. He replied it was all set up. Due to WX the ATIS was intermittent. The controller called traffic to the left of the aircraft nose that was left to right at FL280. (TCASII equipped but radar in a long range setting.) I looked up at the mode control panel and saw 28000. I said to the controller that we were descending to FL290. Controller said to stop our descent at FL290 (we were about 29100 ft and descending in VNAV power off. The captain pushed some buttons on the mode control panel -- don't remember what ones or in what order). The aircraft kept descending and the captain reached for the control wheel as the controller said to turn right to a heading. The captain then reached up and set the new heading in the mode control panel and set 290 in the mode control panel and pressed VNAV. The aircraft continued its descent and we were in pretty heavy turbulence (the first right turn for traffic put us in WX). Again, the captain started reaching for the control wheel and again a further right turn was issued and the captain again set the new heading. On my part, the captain was aware of us going below FL290, so to have verbally said anything to that end I felt would have added to his load. Twice I was about to reach for the control wheel but just as I was about to, he did. As he was setting in the second heading I reached up engaged vertical speed and spun the vertical speed thumb wheel to a large positive rate. I then noticed our turn rate was slow and looked over at the bank limiter and it was set at the second notch! (12 1/2 degrees). I set it at 25 degrees (I didn't go to 30 degrees because of the turbulence). The TCASII never went off but we were told by next controller to call quality assurance on the ground. They said radar showed we had gone to 28500 ft and only had 4.5 mi. Cockpit coordination: double-check everything captain does and why. (This captain was experienced in this aircraft.) company policy: before I acted, twice I almost took over. We need company policies that mandate the variations allowed before the first officer must take over. (I knew in my mind we weren't getting to FL280 at any point). Controller: giving clearance to navigation using 1 NAVAID while giving dscnts based on a different one should be banned. The controller never used the word immediate in our traffic turn clearance.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ALTDEV ALT OVERSHOT IN DSCNT. PROX OF TSTM ACTIVITY. POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH XING TFC.
Narrative: MANY THINGS IN A SHORT TIME, THEN PUT IT OUT OF MIND AND FLY THE AIRPLANE, THEN HRS LATER RECOUNT WHAT HAPPENED!? DURING THE LAST PART OF CRUISE I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT FROM USING THE LAVATORY. WE WERE AT 35000 FT AND SAW 25000 SET IN THE MODE CTL PANEL AND QUERIED THE CAPT (PF) WHO SAID OUR CLRNC WAS 'DEV E AROUND WX AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK THEN DIRECT MSY AND TO CROSS....' JUST THEN THE CTLR ASKED US TO START DOWN. HE THEN SAID TO TURN R TO A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE MSY 355 DEG RADIAL AND TO CROSS 50 MI S OF MEI AT 290. AFTER THE CAPT SET IN THE NEW HDG HE SET UP THE FMC TO INTERCEPT THE RADIAL. I LOOKED UP MSY FREQ AND SET UP RAW DATA AS HE WAS SETTING THE COMPUTER. I ASKED HIM IF EVERYTHING WAS SET UP AND THAT I WOULD TRY TO GET THE ATIS AGAIN AND CALL OPS. HE REPLIED IT WAS ALL SET UP. DUE TO WX THE ATIS WAS INTERMITTENT. THE CTLR CALLED TFC TO THE L OF THE ACFT NOSE THAT WAS L TO R AT FL280. (TCASII EQUIPPED BUT RADAR IN A LONG RANGE SETTING.) I LOOKED UP AT THE MODE CTL PANEL AND SAW 28000. I SAID TO THE CTLR THAT WE WERE DSNDING TO FL290. CTLR SAID TO STOP OUR DSCNT AT FL290 (WE WERE ABOUT 29100 FT AND DSNDING IN VNAV PWR OFF. THE CAPT PUSHED SOME BUTTONS ON THE MODE CTL PANEL -- DON'T REMEMBER WHAT ONES OR IN WHAT ORDER). THE ACFT KEPT DSNDING AND THE CAPT REACHED FOR THE CTL WHEEL AS THE CTLR SAID TO TURN R TO A HDG. THE CAPT THEN REACHED UP AND SET THE NEW HDG IN THE MODE CTL PANEL AND SET 290 IN THE MODE CTL PANEL AND PRESSED VNAV. THE ACFT CONTINUED ITS DSCNT AND WE WERE IN PRETTY HVY TURB (THE FIRST R TURN FOR TFC PUT US IN WX). AGAIN, THE CAPT STARTED REACHING FOR THE CTL WHEEL AND AGAIN A FURTHER R TURN WAS ISSUED AND THE CAPT AGAIN SET THE NEW HDG. ON MY PART, THE CAPT WAS AWARE OF US GOING BELOW FL290, SO TO HAVE VERBALLY SAID ANYTHING TO THAT END I FELT WOULD HAVE ADDED TO HIS LOAD. TWICE I WAS ABOUT TO REACH FOR THE CTL WHEEL BUT JUST AS I WAS ABOUT TO, HE DID. AS HE WAS SETTING IN THE SECOND HDG I REACHED UP ENGAGED VERT SPD AND SPUN THE VERT SPD THUMB WHEEL TO A LARGE POSITIVE RATE. I THEN NOTICED OUR TURN RATE WAS SLOW AND LOOKED OVER AT THE BANK LIMITER AND IT WAS SET AT THE SECOND NOTCH! (12 1/2 DEGS). I SET IT AT 25 DEGS (I DIDN'T GO TO 30 DEGS BECAUSE OF THE TURB). THE TCASII NEVER WENT OFF BUT WE WERE TOLD BY NEXT CTLR TO CALL QUALITY ASSURANCE ON THE GND. THEY SAID RADAR SHOWED WE HAD GONE TO 28500 FT AND ONLY HAD 4.5 MI. COCKPIT COORD: DOUBLE-CHK EVERYTHING CAPT DOES AND WHY. (THIS CAPT WAS EXPERIENCED IN THIS ACFT.) COMPANY POLICY: BEFORE I ACTED, TWICE I ALMOST TOOK OVER. WE NEED COMPANY POLICIES THAT MANDATE THE VARIATIONS ALLOWED BEFORE THE FO MUST TAKE OVER. (I KNEW IN MY MIND WE WEREN'T GETTING TO FL280 AT ANY POINT). CTLR: GIVING CLRNC TO NAV USING 1 NAVAID WHILE GIVING DSCNTS BASED ON A DIFFERENT ONE SHOULD BE BANNED. THE CTLR NEVER USED THE WORD IMMEDIATE IN OUR TFC TURN CLRNC.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.