Narrative:

We were on the last leg of a 4 leg day. This trip sequence was from ord to pvd and on to portland, maine. The approach into pvd was uneventful and we briefed on construction at pvd with numerous txwys and ramps closed and temporary closing of portions of the ramps and txwys. While unloading the passenger at pvd the first officer went out to do the preflight while I did the cockpit setup and computer programming for the next leg. I loaded the weights into the computer and reviewed the runway weights for the takeoff. We were well under our maximum limits for the full length and I also noted the intersection was well under limits with 6000 ft remaining, good for maximum or reduced thrust. This was really a light weight takeoff so I did not review the weights and takeoff path as thoroughly as I normally do nor did I make an effort to review the data with the first officer. This was a quick ground stop and I allowed the time constraints to change my habit pattern of always reviewing the data with the first officer. When the first officer returned to the cockpit we completed our checklists and engine start. On taxi out the tower cleared us to taxi to runway 05 via taxiway 'south.' normally taxiway 'south' leads to a parallel taxiway that leads to the full length of the runway but the parallel was closed due to construction. Taxiway 'south' leads straight onto runway 05. We switched to tower frequency and they cleared us for an immediate takeoff due to traffic on a 6-7 mi final. The first officer offered to check the weights for the intersection but I told him that I had reviewed them and we were ok from the intersection. We completed the final checklist items and had an uneventful takeoff but it just didn't feel right. At the end of the trip sequence I rechked the airport diagram and the computer takeoff data and discovered that I had taken off from a taxiway that we did not have data for and that instead of 6000 plus ft we only had 5000 plus ft of runway. All of the factors for a mistake were there, I did not pay attention to the clues: quick turn (time factor), strange airport, lots of construction, barricades, flashing lights, closed txwys. I also had unused resources: diagrams, computer weights, tower personnel, and most of all a first officer, if only I had given him the chance to help.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC DOES NOT TAKE TIME TO ASSURE RWY INTXN IS THE SAME ONE THAT IS IN THE FLT MGMNT COMPUTER TO HAVE PROPER RWY LENGTH FOR TKOF. RWY USED IS SHORTER THAN WHAT IS REQUIRED. FLC ESTABLISHED DATA AFTER THE FLT, VERIFYING THEIR WORST FEARS, THE RWY LENGTH WAS NOT WHAT THEY THOUGHT IT WAS.

Narrative: WE WERE ON THE LAST LEG OF A 4 LEG DAY. THIS TRIP SEQUENCE WAS FROM ORD TO PVD AND ON TO PORTLAND, MAINE. THE APCH INTO PVD WAS UNEVENTFUL AND WE BRIEFED ON CONSTRUCTION AT PVD WITH NUMEROUS TXWYS AND RAMPS CLOSED AND TEMPORARY CLOSING OF PORTIONS OF THE RAMPS AND TXWYS. WHILE UNLOADING THE PAX AT PVD THE FO WENT OUT TO DO THE PREFLT WHILE I DID THE COCKPIT SETUP AND COMPUTER PROGRAMMING FOR THE NEXT LEG. I LOADED THE WTS INTO THE COMPUTER AND REVIEWED THE RWY WTS FOR THE TKOF. WE WERE WELL UNDER OUR MAX LIMITS FOR THE FULL LENGTH AND I ALSO NOTED THE INTXN WAS WELL UNDER LIMITS WITH 6000 FT REMAINING, GOOD FOR MAX OR REDUCED THRUST. THIS WAS REALLY A LIGHT WT TKOF SO I DID NOT REVIEW THE WTS AND TKOF PATH AS THOROUGHLY AS I NORMALLY DO NOR DID I MAKE AN EFFORT TO REVIEW THE DATA WITH THE FO. THIS WAS A QUICK GND STOP AND I ALLOWED THE TIME CONSTRAINTS TO CHANGE MY HABIT PATTERN OF ALWAYS REVIEWING THE DATA WITH THE FO. WHEN THE FO RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT WE COMPLETED OUR CHKLISTS AND ENG START. ON TAXI OUT THE TWR CLRED US TO TAXI TO RWY 05 VIA TXWY 'S.' NORMALLY TXWY 'S' LEADS TO A PARALLEL TXWY THAT LEADS TO THE FULL LENGTH OF THE RWY BUT THE PARALLEL WAS CLOSED DUE TO CONSTRUCTION. TXWY 'S' LEADS STRAIGHT ONTO RWY 05. WE SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ AND THEY CLRED US FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF DUE TO TFC ON A 6-7 MI FINAL. THE FO OFFERED TO CHK THE WTS FOR THE INTXN BUT I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD REVIEWED THEM AND WE WERE OK FROM THE INTXN. WE COMPLETED THE FINAL CHKLIST ITEMS AND HAD AN UNEVENTFUL TKOF BUT IT JUST DIDN'T FEEL RIGHT. AT THE END OF THE TRIP SEQUENCE I RECHKED THE ARPT DIAGRAM AND THE COMPUTER TKOF DATA AND DISCOVERED THAT I HAD TAKEN OFF FROM A TXWY THAT WE DID NOT HAVE DATA FOR AND THAT INSTEAD OF 6000 PLUS FT WE ONLY HAD 5000 PLUS FT OF RWY. ALL OF THE FACTORS FOR A MISTAKE WERE THERE, I DID NOT PAY ATTN TO THE CLUES: QUICK TURN (TIME FACTOR), STRANGE ARPT, LOTS OF CONSTRUCTION, BARRICADES, FLASHING LIGHTS, CLOSED TXWYS. I ALSO HAD UNUSED RESOURCES: DIAGRAMS, COMPUTER WTS, TWR PERSONNEL, AND MOST OF ALL A FO, IF ONLY I HAD GIVEN HIM THE CHANCE TO HELP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.