Narrative:

We were approaching cos on IFR flight plan and were being vectored for the ILS 17R, approaching from the east. The WX at cos was reported on ATIS to be 1900 overcast with visibility more than 10 mi. ATC provided a vector for localizer intercept at approximately a 30 degree angle. As the non-flying first officer on this flight, I was busy with checklists, monitoring heading, altitude and other non-flying pilot duties including radio communications. ATC advised us to increase our turn rate to intercept so I advised the captain to steepen the bank. We flew through the localizer so ATC then gave us a new heading to again intercept the localizer. I think I then focused on the interception of the localizer. We were instructed to maintain 9000 ft until established and were cleared for the ILS 17R approach. At approximately 14 mi from the airport, 4 mi from the LOM (lacki), we were flying in VMC below the cloud bases, now established on the localizer. The aircraft was still in cruise confign. The captain had not yet called for flaps or the 'before landing' checklist. At that time, ATC advised 'altitude alert' with an admonishment to 'climb immediately' and informed us that the minimum crossing altitude for lacki was 8778 ft. I looked at the altimeter and noted we were at approximately 7700 ft and told the captain to climb. He was slow to respond so I pointed to the altimeter in front of him and more forcefully told him to climb to 8700 ft. ATC asked if we were going to break off the approach or continue. I advised we could continue the approach. ATC again stated that the minimum crossing altitude for lacki, the LOM, was 8778 ft and asked if we were climbing. By then we were climbing and I answered to that fact. As we climbed to 8000 ft we were in and out of the ragged bases of the clouds but did remain basically in visual conditions. The remainder of the approach went without incident. At the time we were at 7700 ft and ATC advised of the altitude alert, the minimum GS intercept depicted on the approach plate was 9000 ft. In my opinion, the factors contributing to this incident were twofold: 1) my own preoccupation with other duties at a busy time and my failure to monitor our altitude. 2) the captain's overall cavalier attitude and demeanor and his apparent lack of situational awareness. I base this conclusion upon his delay in calling for flaps and the 'before landing' checklist even after being reminded by me. I did ask 'are you ready for flaps 8?' and did state 'standing by with the before landing checklist.' when he did call for flaps and gear, he did so in an unorthodox manner not consistent with our training. In retrospect, I think I should have noted the altitude deviation prior to being informed by ATC and should have been more assertive on my first instruction to climb. As it was, the captain was very slow to respond, possibly due to the fact we were in VMC at the time and visibility was good. Corrective action on my own part will be to use the lessons learned in cockpit resource management classes and be quicker and more assertive when I am aware of a problem going unresolved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC DSNDED THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT. APCH CTLR ADVISED OF LOW ALT ALERT AND TO CLB IMMEDIATELY.

Narrative: WE WERE APCHING COS ON IFR FLT PLAN AND WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE ILS 17R, APCHING FROM THE E. THE WX AT COS WAS RPTED ON ATIS TO BE 1900 OVCST WITH VISIBILITY MORE THAN 10 MI. ATC PROVIDED A VECTOR FOR LOC INTERCEPT AT APPROX A 30 DEG ANGLE. AS THE NON-FLYING FO ON THIS FLT, I WAS BUSY WITH CHKLISTS, MONITORING HDG, ALT AND OTHER NON-FLYING PLT DUTIES INCLUDING RADIO COMS. ATC ADVISED US TO INCREASE OUR TURN RATE TO INTERCEPT SO I ADVISED THE CAPT TO STEEPEN THE BANK. WE FLEW THROUGH THE LOC SO ATC THEN GAVE US A NEW HDG TO AGAIN INTERCEPT THE LOC. I THINK I THEN FOCUSED ON THE INTERCEPTION OF THE LOC. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN 9000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED AND WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS 17R APCH. AT APPROX 14 MI FROM THE ARPT, 4 MI FROM THE LOM (LACKI), WE WERE FLYING IN VMC BELOW THE CLOUD BASES, NOW ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC. THE ACFT WAS STILL IN CRUISE CONFIGN. THE CAPT HAD NOT YET CALLED FOR FLAPS OR THE 'BEFORE LNDG' CHKLIST. AT THAT TIME, ATC ADVISED 'ALT ALERT' WITH AN ADMONISHMENT TO 'CLB IMMEDIATELY' AND INFORMED US THAT THE MINIMUM XING ALT FOR LACKI WAS 8778 FT. I LOOKED AT THE ALTIMETER AND NOTED WE WERE AT APPROX 7700 FT AND TOLD THE CAPT TO CLB. HE WAS SLOW TO RESPOND SO I POINTED TO THE ALTIMETER IN FRONT OF HIM AND MORE FORCEFULLY TOLD HIM TO CLB TO 8700 FT. ATC ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO BREAK OFF THE APCH OR CONTINUE. I ADVISED WE COULD CONTINUE THE APCH. ATC AGAIN STATED THAT THE MINIMUM XING ALT FOR LACKI, THE LOM, WAS 8778 FT AND ASKED IF WE WERE CLBING. BY THEN WE WERE CLBING AND I ANSWERED TO THAT FACT. AS WE CLBED TO 8000 FT WE WERE IN AND OUT OF THE RAGGED BASES OF THE CLOUDS BUT DID REMAIN BASICALLY IN VISUAL CONDITIONS. THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH WENT WITHOUT INCIDENT. AT THE TIME WE WERE AT 7700 FT AND ATC ADVISED OF THE ALT ALERT, THE MINIMUM GS INTERCEPT DEPICTED ON THE APCH PLATE WAS 9000 FT. IN MY OPINION, THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WERE TWOFOLD: 1) MY OWN PREOCCUPATION WITH OTHER DUTIES AT A BUSY TIME AND MY FAILURE TO MONITOR OUR ALT. 2) THE CAPT'S OVERALL CAVALIER ATTITUDE AND DEMEANOR AND HIS APPARENT LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I BASE THIS CONCLUSION UPON HIS DELAY IN CALLING FOR FLAPS AND THE 'BEFORE LNDG' CHKLIST EVEN AFTER BEING REMINDED BY ME. I DID ASK 'ARE YOU READY FOR FLAPS 8?' AND DID STATE 'STANDING BY WITH THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST.' WHEN HE DID CALL FOR FLAPS AND GEAR, HE DID SO IN AN UNORTHODOX MANNER NOT CONSISTENT WITH OUR TRAINING. IN RETROSPECT, I THINK I SHOULD HAVE NOTED THE ALTDEV PRIOR TO BEING INFORMED BY ATC AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE ON MY FIRST INSTRUCTION TO CLB. AS IT WAS, THE CAPTAIN WAS VERY SLOW TO RESPOND, POSSIBLY DUE TO THE FACT WE WERE IN VMC AT THE TIME AND VISIBILITY WAS GOOD. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON MY OWN PART WILL BE TO USE THE LESSONS LEARNED IN COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT CLASSES AND BE QUICKER AND MORE ASSERTIVE WHEN I AM AWARE OF A PROB GOING UNRESOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.