Narrative:

We were en route from jfk to orf on a routine scheduled passenger flight. We had just finished deviating around some buildups just a few mins before and had just been cleared direct to orf. At about 80-85 NM north of orf the first officer and I were alerted by a very brief master warning chime that only lasted a fraction of a second. I looked around the cockpit and saw nothing. The first officer said to look at the #1 engine oil pressure because it was fluctuating. I asked him how he had noticed the problem so quickly and he replied that he had seen it happen quite intermittently on the previous leg but didn't bother to tell me. The oil pressure stayed just below the normal pressure range (50 psi instead of 55-65) and would occasionally fluctuate and then drop for a fraction of a second into the red, setting off the master warning chime and then return to around 50 psi. We tried different power settings and cycled the gauge circuit breaker, finding no changes and all of the other engine indications rock solid. The checklist of course said to shut the engine down, but the pressure was so close below the normal range and so intermittently cycled into the red (about once every 2 mins) that it seemed premature to do so. We finally called maintenance via arinc and jointly decided to shut the engine down. We began a normal drift down into orf and landed without further incident. Maintenance found a leak in the seal from the starter/generator into the accessory drive box and that the oil was about 3 quarts low. Apparently the oil was beginning to foam and occasionally cavitate in the oil pump causing the low pressure reading and occasional drop into the red. After landing I questioned why my first officer had not told me about the intermittent fluctuating oil pressure on the last leg. He just shrugged his shoulders and said he didn't think it was important because it was so intermittent and slight that he thought is was the typical quirks that cause the gauges to sometimes jump in what we sometimes call the 'electric airplane' because of the EFIS, and allthe automated and electronic system. After landing and in retrospect, my only other concern, other than my first officer's lack of communication, was my decision to drift down into my intended destination of orf. 121.565 states that you are to land at the nearest 'suitable' airport. Sby (one of our listed alternates) was just behind us by only 20 mi and fit that definition while RF was still 80 mi ahead when the problem came to our attention. I felt that because we were at FL200 and that I was just about to begin a 1000 FPM en route descent into orf at 255 KTS that it seemed reasonable to continue. I had also just finished deviating around buildups and there was an undercast below with fairly thick layers that I knew of because I had broken out on top somewhere around FL180. Although the WX at sby was about 4000 broken with descent visibility below, I did not have a desire to complicate my problem by entering IFR and start deviating around cells into an unfamiliar alternate, single engine, when I could see it was clear to the south, the terrain was flat, and I knew orf was clear and landing to the south. And at our weight, the airplane could fly all day with an engine out at 16000 ft. From a 'time to touchdown' standpoint it seemed nearly a wash. My logic was that it would take at least 7 or 8 mins to descend into sby without scarring the daylights out of the passenger with a totally unnecessary dive, plus another 3 or 4 mins to work our way around any possible WX, plus another 5 or 6 mins to setup on final and land once below the clouds. Total time to sby in my mind, 15-18 mins. From a 'time to touchdown' standpoint at orf I figured 75-80 mi at 4 mi a min, straight in, 19-20 mins. But I failed to note that we had roughly 20 KTS of headwind and that I wasn't able to maintain much more than 220 KTS with the engine out, even in the descent. And when I saw that last 20 mi across the chesapeake bay into orf, it looked more like an ocean than a bay with the good engine still running near maximum continuous power just to maintain our descent profile. We landed in 30 mins.all things reconsidered however (WX, precautionary nature of the shutdown, etc.), I still don't know if I landed at the correct airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INFLT ENG FAILURE.

Narrative: WE WERE ENRTE FROM JFK TO ORF ON A ROUTINE SCHEDULED PAX FLT. WE HAD JUST FINISHED DEVIATING AROUND SOME BUILDUPS JUST A FEW MINS BEFORE AND HAD JUST BEEN CLRED DIRECT TO ORF. AT ABOUT 80-85 NM N OF ORF THE FO AND I WERE ALERTED BY A VERY BRIEF MASTER WARNING CHIME THAT ONLY LASTED A FRACTION OF A SECOND. I LOOKED AROUND THE COCKPIT AND SAW NOTHING. THE FO SAID TO LOOK AT THE #1 ENG OIL PRESSURE BECAUSE IT WAS FLUCTUATING. I ASKED HIM HOW HE HAD NOTICED THE PROB SO QUICKLY AND HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD SEEN IT HAPPEN QUITE INTERMITTENTLY ON THE PREVIOUS LEG BUT DIDN'T BOTHER TO TELL ME. THE OIL PRESSURE STAYED JUST BELOW THE NORMAL PRESSURE RANGE (50 PSI INSTEAD OF 55-65) AND WOULD OCCASIONALLY FLUCTUATE AND THEN DROP FOR A FRACTION OF A SECOND INTO THE RED, SETTING OFF THE MASTER WARNING CHIME AND THEN RETURN TO AROUND 50 PSI. WE TRIED DIFFERENT PWR SETTINGS AND CYCLED THE GAUGE CIRCUIT BREAKER, FINDING NO CHANGES AND ALL OF THE OTHER ENG INDICATIONS ROCK SOLID. THE CHKLIST OF COURSE SAID TO SHUT THE ENG DOWN, BUT THE PRESSURE WAS SO CLOSE BELOW THE NORMAL RANGE AND SO INTERMITTENTLY CYCLED INTO THE RED (ABOUT ONCE EVERY 2 MINS) THAT IT SEEMED PREMATURE TO DO SO. WE FINALLY CALLED MAINT VIA ARINC AND JOINTLY DECIDED TO SHUT THE ENG DOWN. WE BEGAN A NORMAL DRIFT DOWN INTO ORF AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. MAINT FOUND A LEAK IN THE SEAL FROM THE STARTER/GENERATOR INTO THE ACCESSORY DRIVE BOX AND THAT THE OIL WAS ABOUT 3 QUARTS LOW. APPARENTLY THE OIL WAS BEGINNING TO FOAM AND OCCASIONALLY CAVITATE IN THE OIL PUMP CAUSING THE LOW PRESSURE READING AND OCCASIONAL DROP INTO THE RED. AFTER LNDG I QUESTIONED WHY MY FO HAD NOT TOLD ME ABOUT THE INTERMITTENT FLUCTUATING OIL PRESSURE ON THE LAST LEG. HE JUST SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS AND SAID HE DIDN'T THINK IT WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT WAS SO INTERMITTENT AND SLIGHT THAT HE THOUGHT IS WAS THE TYPICAL QUIRKS THAT CAUSE THE GAUGES TO SOMETIMES JUMP IN WHAT WE SOMETIMES CALL THE 'ELECTRIC AIRPLANE' BECAUSE OF THE EFIS, AND ALLTHE AUTOMATED AND ELECTRONIC SYS. AFTER LNDG AND IN RETROSPECT, MY ONLY OTHER CONCERN, OTHER THAN MY FO'S LACK OF COM, WAS MY DECISION TO DRIFT DOWN INTO MY INTENDED DEST OF ORF. 121.565 STATES THAT YOU ARE TO LAND AT THE NEAREST 'SUITABLE' ARPT. SBY (ONE OF OUR LISTED ALTERNATES) WAS JUST BEHIND US BY ONLY 20 MI AND FIT THAT DEFINITION WHILE RF WAS STILL 80 MI AHEAD WHEN THE PROB CAME TO OUR ATTN. I FELT THAT BECAUSE WE WERE AT FL200 AND THAT I WAS JUST ABOUT TO BEGIN A 1000 FPM ENRTE DSCNT INTO ORF AT 255 KTS THAT IT SEEMED REASONABLE TO CONTINUE. I HAD ALSO JUST FINISHED DEVIATING AROUND BUILDUPS AND THERE WAS AN UNDERCAST BELOW WITH FAIRLY THICK LAYERS THAT I KNEW OF BECAUSE I HAD BROKEN OUT ON TOP SOMEWHERE AROUND FL180. ALTHOUGH THE WX AT SBY WAS ABOUT 4000 BROKEN WITH DSCNT VISIBILITY BELOW, I DID NOT HAVE A DESIRE TO COMPLICATE MY PROB BY ENTERING IFR AND START DEVIATING AROUND CELLS INTO AN UNFAMILIAR ALTERNATE, SINGLE ENG, WHEN I COULD SEE IT WAS CLR TO THE S, THE TERRAIN WAS FLAT, AND I KNEW ORF WAS CLR AND LNDG TO THE S. AND AT OUR WT, THE AIRPLANE COULD FLY ALL DAY WITH AN ENG OUT AT 16000 FT. FROM A 'TIME TO TOUCHDOWN' STANDPOINT IT SEEMED NEARLY A WASH. MY LOGIC WAS THAT IT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST 7 OR 8 MINS TO DSND INTO SBY WITHOUT SCARRING THE DAYLIGHTS OUT OF THE PAX WITH A TOTALLY UNNECESSARY DIVE, PLUS ANOTHER 3 OR 4 MINS TO WORK OUR WAY AROUND ANY POSSIBLE WX, PLUS ANOTHER 5 OR 6 MINS TO SETUP ON FINAL AND LAND ONCE BELOW THE CLOUDS. TOTAL TIME TO SBY IN MY MIND, 15-18 MINS. FROM A 'TIME TO TOUCHDOWN' STANDPOINT AT ORF I FIGURED 75-80 MI AT 4 MI A MIN, STRAIGHT IN, 19-20 MINS. BUT I FAILED TO NOTE THAT WE HAD ROUGHLY 20 KTS OF HEADWIND AND THAT I WASN'T ABLE TO MAINTAIN MUCH MORE THAN 220 KTS WITH THE ENG OUT, EVEN IN THE DSCNT. AND WHEN I SAW THAT LAST 20 MI ACROSS THE CHESAPEAKE BAY INTO ORF, IT LOOKED MORE LIKE AN OCEAN THAN A BAY WITH THE GOOD ENG STILL RUNNING NEAR MAXIMUM CONTINUOUS PWR JUST TO MAINTAIN OUR DSCNT PROFILE. WE LANDED IN 30 MINS.ALL THINGS RECONSIDERED HOWEVER (WX, PRECAUTIONARY NATURE OF THE SHUTDOWN, ETC.), I STILL DON'T KNOW IF I LANDED AT THE CORRECT ARPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.