Narrative:

WX was not a factor in this flight. I elected a single engine taxi and we joined a long line of aircraft proceeding for takeoff. During taxi, at a time that I could not readily confirm it, the copilot announced 'this will be a 1 degree flap takeoff' and set the flap handle at the same time. Hearing this statement created a mindset that neither of us was able to overcome while attempting to reconcile the confign horn we would hear later. The second engine was started and the after start and before takeoff checklists were accomplished. It is my habit to release the parking brake after both flaps and trim are set for takeoff and advance a throttle to assure proper confign. We received the takeoff warning horn. I directed the copilot to run the entire taxi checklist, including flipping through the ACARS weight and balance pages. Unfortunately, we did not pick the correct information. I selected flaps 5 and the confign horn silenced. The copilot asked if we could take off with flaps 5 and my reply was that the confign horn must be reconciled prior to attempting takeoff. I elected to pull out of the line and proceed back to the gate. The copilot reviewed the weight and balance and discovered our oversight. A maintenance representative entered the cockpit at the gate and we informed him that we had discovered our oversight. There are no obvious cues on the captain's panel to distinguish a 300 from a 400 series aircraft. The gross weight of the aircraft approximated that of a heavily loaded 300 series aircraft. Confign problems on 400 series aircraft due to close stabilizer trim tolerances are a common occurrence so hearing the confign horn is not unusual. Prevention of recurrence: make no pronouncements prior to running checklists unless part of a briefing involving both pilots. Leave enough time during single engine taxi to consider the non-routine item which occur from time to time. Make a notation on the flap setting page of the ACARS weight and balance page designating the series aircraft. Don't keep secrets about operational incidents of a recurring nature. A smart man learns from his mistakes -- a wise man learns from the mistakes of others.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CREW ATTEMPTED TO USE 1 DEG FLAPS FOR TKOF ON A B- 737-400.

Narrative: WX WAS NOT A FACTOR IN THIS FLT. I ELECTED A SINGLE ENG TAXI AND WE JOINED A LONG LINE OF ACFT PROCEEDING FOR TKOF. DURING TAXI, AT A TIME THAT I COULD NOT READILY CONFIRM IT, THE COPLT ANNOUNCED 'THIS WILL BE A 1 DEG FLAP TKOF' AND SET THE FLAP HANDLE AT THE SAME TIME. HEARING THIS STATEMENT CREATED A MINDSET THAT NEITHER OF US WAS ABLE TO OVERCOME WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RECONCILE THE CONFIGN HORN WE WOULD HEAR LATER. THE SECOND ENG WAS STARTED AND THE AFTER START AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED. IT IS MY HABIT TO RELEASE THE PARKING BRAKE AFTER BOTH FLAPS AND TRIM ARE SET FOR TKOF AND ADVANCE A THROTTLE TO ASSURE PROPER CONFIGN. WE RECEIVED THE TKOF WARNING HORN. I DIRECTED THE COPLT TO RUN THE ENTIRE TAXI CHKLIST, INCLUDING FLIPPING THROUGH THE ACARS WT AND BAL PAGES. UNFORTUNATELY, WE DID NOT PICK THE CORRECT INFO. I SELECTED FLAPS 5 AND THE CONFIGN HORN SILENCED. THE COPLT ASKED IF WE COULD TAKE OFF WITH FLAPS 5 AND MY REPLY WAS THAT THE CONFIGN HORN MUST BE RECONCILED PRIOR TO ATTEMPTING TKOF. I ELECTED TO PULL OUT OF THE LINE AND PROCEED BACK TO THE GATE. THE COPLT REVIEWED THE WT AND BAL AND DISCOVERED OUR OVERSIGHT. A MAINT REPRESENTATIVE ENTERED THE COCKPIT AT THE GATE AND WE INFORMED HIM THAT WE HAD DISCOVERED OUR OVERSIGHT. THERE ARE NO OBVIOUS CUES ON THE CAPT'S PANEL TO DISTINGUISH A 300 FROM A 400 SERIES ACFT. THE GROSS WT OF THE ACFT APPROXIMATED THAT OF A HEAVILY LOADED 300 SERIES ACFT. CONFIGN PROBS ON 400 SERIES ACFT DUE TO CLOSE STABILIZER TRIM TOLERANCES ARE A COMMON OCCURRENCE SO HEARING THE CONFIGN HORN IS NOT UNUSUAL. PREVENTION OF RECURRENCE: MAKE NO PRONOUNCEMENTS PRIOR TO RUNNING CHKLISTS UNLESS PART OF A BRIEFING INVOLVING BOTH PLTS. LEAVE ENOUGH TIME DURING SINGLE ENG TAXI TO CONSIDER THE NON-ROUTINE ITEM WHICH OCCUR FROM TIME TO TIME. MAKE A NOTATION ON THE FLAP SETTING PAGE OF THE ACARS WT AND BAL PAGE DESIGNATING THE SERIES ACFT. DON'T KEEP SECRETS ABOUT OPERATIONAL INCIDENTS OF A RECURRING NATURE. A SMART MAN LEARNS FROM HIS MISTAKES -- A WISE MAN LEARNS FROM THE MISTAKES OF OTHERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.