Narrative:

A C152 was in left closed traffic runway 27. A BE23 'sport' was in left closed traffic runway 34 runway 27 is 5400 ft and runway 34 is 2200 ft crossing runway 27 4000 ft from runway 27 threshold. Runway 34 crosses runway 27 about 1500 ft from runway 34 threshold. Uga X was cleared for touch and go from left downwind runway 27. Cga Y was extended downwind runway 34 to increase separation from uga Y with uga X on 3/4 mi final runway 27, I told cga Y base was at his discretion and cleared for option runway 34. 2 other aircraft called at this time inbound. I observed uga X flaring for landing runway 27 and B. Cga X turning 1 mi final runway 34. At this time, 1 of the 2 inbounds corrected me on his call sign. I observed cga X short final runway 34 (about 600 ft to threshold) and uga X pwring up runway 27 (about 1000 ft to runway intersection) completing touch and go. I told cga X to 'go around.' uga X never responded but as it lifted off it immediately started to descend (from about 10-20 ft AGL) which I assumed to mean the aircraft was landing. Cga Y was still very low so I told him 'turn left as soon as able.' as fast as uga X had started its descent, uga X was now climbing, so I told to 'turn right,' with no response. I said nothing more from this point until they had passed. At this point let me tell you my thoughts on what was happening. Both aircraft are based at the field and one is operated by a flight school (CX52). The beech is privately owned, but its owner and operator is believed to be a student pilot. I did not want to issue complex instructions to either aircraft but wanted to issue only basic instructions. I sent cga X 'around' to get him pwred up and climbing. I wanted to stop uga X on the ground. Cga Y was going around but not climbing. I thought he probably still had his flaps down and that is why I issued the 'left turn when able.' at that second I thought uga X was basically no factor and I did not want cga Y making an abrupt turn possibly causing a stall and crash. When uga X started lifting again (and realizing my abort had not been received) I issued a right turn believing cga Y was about to start a left turn. Cga Y never turned and uga X suddenly descended from about 40 ft to about 20 ft. That led me to assume with confidence uga X had the beech in sight and any further calls on my part might have made the situation worse. I was never sure until after they passed, if cga Y might be confused and still might try to land. The problem wasn't the near miss at the crossing runways. The problem was earlier, when I let myself be distraction from my intersecting runways. Timing looked good when the beech turned his base. Timing looked ok when he turned final, and that's when I should have either watched closer or corrected that situation. I have worked intersecting runways many times over the last 4 1/2 yrs and have always made it work. Contributing factors: 1) traffic at airport over the last 2 yrs has died off considerably. 2) it was a typical slow day. 3) I was not using headset and using speaker. 4) tower cabin backgnd noise. 5) I was relaxed and over confident. Other factors: 1) leaving situation alone. Sending cga Y 'around sped him up to the intersection. Operator error still would have happened but not as close, maybe? 2) relying on cga too much. I still think the aircraft was capable of going around and making a complete left turn prior to reaching other runway. 3) cga Y repeating the 'abort takeoff' made uga X disregard message believing message for another aircraft. 4) uga X not being issued runway 34 traffic and taking extra time on 'touch and go.' 5) distances and wind. Uga X had about 1.5 mi from intersection while cga Y had 2.25 mi (1 mi base and 1 mi final). All that was needed was cga Y to cross the threshold with uga X passed the intersection (1500 ft). I estimate without sending cga Y around that he might have had about 500 ft from the intersection. This operational error has been investigated, and as this controller rethinks and rethinks this ordeal out, the several complications are being made into personal lessons for future experience.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OPERATOR ERROR NMAC.

Narrative: A C152 WAS IN L CLOSED TFC RWY 27. A BE23 'SPORT' WAS IN L CLOSED TFC RWY 34 RWY 27 IS 5400 FT AND RWY 34 IS 2200 FT XING RWY 27 4000 FT FROM RWY 27 THRESHOLD. RWY 34 CROSSES RWY 27 ABOUT 1500 FT FROM RWY 34 THRESHOLD. UGA X WAS CLRED FOR TOUCH AND GO FROM L DOWNWIND RWY 27. CGA Y WAS EXTENDED DOWNWIND RWY 34 TO INCREASE SEPARATION FROM UGA Y WITH UGA X ON 3/4 MI FINAL RWY 27, I TOLD CGA Y BASE WAS AT HIS DISCRETION AND CLRED FOR OPTION RWY 34. 2 OTHER ACFT CALLED AT THIS TIME INBOUND. I OBSERVED UGA X FLARING FOR LNDG RWY 27 AND B. CGA X TURNING 1 MI FINAL RWY 34. AT THIS TIME, 1 OF THE 2 INBOUNDS CORRECTED ME ON HIS CALL SIGN. I OBSERVED CGA X SHORT FINAL RWY 34 (ABOUT 600 FT TO THRESHOLD) AND UGA X PWRING UP RWY 27 (ABOUT 1000 FT TO RWY INTXN) COMPLETING TOUCH AND GO. I TOLD CGA X TO 'GAR.' UGA X NEVER RESPONDED BUT AS IT LIFTED OFF IT IMMEDIATELY STARTED TO DSND (FROM ABOUT 10-20 FT AGL) WHICH I ASSUMED TO MEAN THE ACFT WAS LNDG. CGA Y WAS STILL VERY LOW SO I TOLD HIM 'TURN L AS SOON AS ABLE.' AS FAST AS UGA X HAD STARTED ITS DSCNT, UGA X WAS NOW CLBING, SO I TOLD TO 'TURN R,' WITH NO RESPONSE. I SAID NOTHING MORE FROM THIS POINT UNTIL THEY HAD PASSED. AT THIS POINT LET ME TELL YOU MY THOUGHTS ON WHAT WAS HAPPENING. BOTH ACFT ARE BASED AT THE FIELD AND ONE IS OPERATED BY A FLT SCHOOL (CX52). THE BEECH IS PRIVATELY OWNED, BUT ITS OWNER AND OPERATOR IS BELIEVED TO BE A STUDENT PLT. I DID NOT WANT TO ISSUE COMPLEX INSTRUCTIONS TO EITHER ACFT BUT WANTED TO ISSUE ONLY BASIC INSTRUCTIONS. I SENT CGA X 'AROUND' TO GET HIM PWRED UP AND CLBING. I WANTED TO STOP UGA X ON THE GND. CGA Y WAS GOING AROUND BUT NOT CLBING. I THOUGHT HE PROBABLY STILL HAD HIS FLAPS DOWN AND THAT IS WHY I ISSUED THE 'L TURN WHEN ABLE.' AT THAT SECOND I THOUGHT UGA X WAS BASICALLY NO FACTOR AND I DID NOT WANT CGA Y MAKING AN ABRUPT TURN POSSIBLY CAUSING A STALL AND CRASH. WHEN UGA X STARTED LIFTING AGAIN (AND REALIZING MY ABORT HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED) I ISSUED A R TURN BELIEVING CGA Y WAS ABOUT TO START A L TURN. CGA Y NEVER TURNED AND UGA X SUDDENLY DSNDED FROM ABOUT 40 FT TO ABOUT 20 FT. THAT LED ME TO ASSUME WITH CONFIDENCE UGA X HAD THE BEECH IN SIGHT AND ANY FURTHER CALLS ON MY PART MIGHT HAVE MADE THE SIT WORSE. I WAS NEVER SURE UNTIL AFTER THEY PASSED, IF CGA Y MIGHT BE CONFUSED AND STILL MIGHT TRY TO LAND. THE PROB WASN'T THE NEAR MISS AT THE XING RWYS. THE PROB WAS EARLIER, WHEN I LET MYSELF BE DISTR FROM MY INTERSECTING RWYS. TIMING LOOKED GOOD WHEN THE BEECH TURNED HIS BASE. TIMING LOOKED OK WHEN HE TURNED FINAL, AND THAT'S WHEN I SHOULD HAVE EITHER WATCHED CLOSER OR CORRECTED THAT SIT. I HAVE WORKED INTERSECTING RWYS MANY TIMES OVER THE LAST 4 1/2 YRS AND HAVE ALWAYS MADE IT WORK. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) TFC AT ARPT OVER THE LAST 2 YRS HAS DIED OFF CONSIDERABLY. 2) IT WAS A TYPICAL SLOW DAY. 3) I WAS NOT USING HEADSET AND USING SPEAKER. 4) TWR CABIN BACKGND NOISE. 5) I WAS RELAXED AND OVER CONFIDENT. OTHER FACTORS: 1) LEAVING SIT ALONE. SENDING CGA Y 'AROUND SPED HIM UP TO THE INTXN. OPERATOR ERROR STILL WOULD HAVE HAPPENED BUT NOT AS CLOSE, MAYBE? 2) RELYING ON CGA TOO MUCH. I STILL THINK THE ACFT WAS CAPABLE OF GOING AROUND AND MAKING A COMPLETE L TURN PRIOR TO REACHING OTHER RWY. 3) CGA Y REPEATING THE 'ABORT TKOF' MADE UGA X DISREGARD MESSAGE BELIEVING MESSAGE FOR ANOTHER ACFT. 4) UGA X NOT BEING ISSUED RWY 34 TFC AND TAKING EXTRA TIME ON 'TOUCH AND GO.' 5) DISTANCES AND WIND. UGA X HAD ABOUT 1.5 MI FROM INTXN WHILE CGA Y HAD 2.25 MI (1 MI BASE AND 1 MI FINAL). ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS CGA Y TO CROSS THE THRESHOLD WITH UGA X PASSED THE INTXN (1500 FT). I ESTIMATE WITHOUT SENDING CGA Y AROUND THAT HE MIGHT HAVE HAD ABOUT 500 FT FROM THE INTXN. THIS OPERATIONAL ERROR HAS BEEN INVESTIGATED, AND AS THIS CTLR RETHINKS AND RETHINKS THIS ORDEAL OUT, THE SEVERAL COMPLICATIONS ARE BEING MADE INTO PERSONAL LESSONS FOR FUTURE EXPERIENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.