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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 285855 |
Time | |
Date | 199410 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : bfr |
State Reference | IN |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : mry |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Twin Beech 18 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | None |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | general aviation : instructional |
Make Model Name | Cessna 150 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff landing other other |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | observation : company check pilot |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 12000 flight time type : 7000 |
ASRS Report | 285855 |
Person 2 | |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time total : 4500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took evasive action none taken : insufficient time |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
I had been flying this particular aircraft (be-18) for 15 yrs. My superior sold the aircraft and I was contracted to give the new owners son a chkout in the aircraft. Owner's son was in left seat, he told me he was a 4500 hour pilot and was flying king airs. Another son of owner was in jump seat behind copilot seat in back of aircraft. After about an hour of flying various maneuvers, the pilot was very proficient. I suggested we start lndgs. We were near bedford, in. I was handling the radio and called bedford unicom on 122.8. The response was the wind was 10-12 KTS favoring runway 13. We were at traffic pattern altitude 1500 ft and used an upwind entry for runway 13. I made a radio position report on upwind and again on a mid-field crosswind. A C-150 called downwind for runway 6. The pilot and I were both alarmed, we could be on a collision course with the other aircraft. I called the C-150 pilot and asked him if he had the be-18 in sight. He replied that he did have us in sight. This relieved us somewhat even though we still did not see the C-150. I then asked the C-150 pilot his intentions. The C-150 pilot replied that he was going to make a touch and go. I told my pilot to extend the downwind, which he did. We were both still unnerved about the possible conflict with the c- 150. On about a 1 mi final my pilot pointed out a C-310 coming at us, taking off on runway 31. When I saw the C-310 he was about a quarter mi to our left front and he was banking to the right, away from our aircraft. We did not have to take evasive action. At this moment I was about to give my pilot the command to go around. I asked if he had the C-150 in sight. At this time we saw the C-150 had already completed the touch and go and was over other end of runway 6. Our approach was good so I decided to continue with the landing. The pilot carried power all the way down to the flare. He then reduced the power all the way back. At this time the gear horn sounded. Actually the horn was so loud I didn't know what it was and I was frozen. The aircraft hit the runway and I knew then that we had forgotten to put down the landing gear. We slid straight down the runway and as the aircraft started slowing down, I decided to turn the aircraft to the right to keep from closing the runway. I touched the right rudder and guided the aircraft off of the runway at about a 45 degree angle. I was the last to evacuate the aircraft and when I did I noticed the right engine was on fire. I re-entered the aircraft and activated the engine fire extinguisher and put the fire out. I feel this was a text book example of a gear up landing. We not only had 1 distraction, we had 2 distrs. In the future, in a training situation the pilot and check pilot should discuss before the flight that the pilot fly the airplane and the check pilot handle the radio and traffic. And when the distrs become too many for the check pilot to handle to make the decision to abort the approach and landing. Also, maybe it would be a good idea to reduce power all the way off at 200 or 300 ft, then if the landing gear horn sounded you would have ample time to make a go around.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SMT ON TRAINING FLT LANDS GEAR UP.
Narrative: I HAD BEEN FLYING THIS PARTICULAR ACFT (BE-18) FOR 15 YRS. MY SUPERIOR SOLD THE ACFT AND I WAS CONTRACTED TO GIVE THE NEW OWNERS SON A CHKOUT IN THE ACFT. OWNER'S SON WAS IN L SEAT, HE TOLD ME HE WAS A 4500 HR PLT AND WAS FLYING KING AIRS. ANOTHER SON OF OWNER WAS IN JUMP SEAT BEHIND COPLT SEAT IN BACK OF ACFT. AFTER ABOUT AN HR OF FLYING VARIOUS MANEUVERS, THE PLT WAS VERY PROFICIENT. I SUGGESTED WE START LNDGS. WE WERE NEAR BEDFORD, IN. I WAS HANDLING THE RADIO AND CALLED BEDFORD UNICOM ON 122.8. THE RESPONSE WAS THE WIND WAS 10-12 KTS FAVORING RWY 13. WE WERE AT TFC PATTERN ALT 1500 FT AND USED AN UPWIND ENTRY FOR RWY 13. I MADE A RADIO POS RPT ON UPWIND AND AGAIN ON A MID-FIELD XWIND. A C-150 CALLED DOWNWIND FOR RWY 6. THE PLT AND I WERE BOTH ALARMED, WE COULD BE ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH THE OTHER ACFT. I CALLED THE C-150 PLT AND ASKED HIM IF HE HAD THE BE-18 IN SIGHT. HE REPLIED THAT HE DID HAVE US IN SIGHT. THIS RELIEVED US SOMEWHAT EVEN THOUGH WE STILL DID NOT SEE THE C-150. I THEN ASKED THE C-150 PLT HIS INTENTIONS. THE C-150 PLT REPLIED THAT HE WAS GOING TO MAKE A TOUCH AND GO. I TOLD MY PLT TO EXTEND THE DOWNWIND, WHICH HE DID. WE WERE BOTH STILL UNNERVED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH THE C- 150. ON ABOUT A 1 MI FINAL MY PLT POINTED OUT A C-310 COMING AT US, TAKING OFF ON RWY 31. WHEN I SAW THE C-310 HE WAS ABOUT A QUARTER MI TO OUR L FRONT AND HE WAS BANKING TO THE R, AWAY FROM OUR ACFT. WE DID NOT HAVE TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION. AT THIS MOMENT I WAS ABOUT TO GIVE MY PLT THE COMMAND TO GAR. I ASKED IF HE HAD THE C-150 IN SIGHT. AT THIS TIME WE SAW THE C-150 HAD ALREADY COMPLETED THE TOUCH AND GO AND WAS OVER OTHER END OF RWY 6. OUR APCH WAS GOOD SO I DECIDED TO CONTINUE WITH THE LNDG. THE PLT CARRIED PWR ALL THE WAY DOWN TO THE FLARE. HE THEN REDUCED THE PWR ALL THE WAY BACK. AT THIS TIME THE GEAR HORN SOUNDED. ACTUALLY THE HORN WAS SO LOUD I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT IT WAS AND I WAS FROZEN. THE ACFT HIT THE RWY AND I KNEW THEN THAT WE HAD FORGOTTEN TO PUT DOWN THE LNDG GEAR. WE SLID STRAIGHT DOWN THE RWY AND AS THE ACFT STARTED SLOWING DOWN, I DECIDED TO TURN THE ACFT TO THE R TO KEEP FROM CLOSING THE RWY. I TOUCHED THE R RUDDER AND GUIDED THE ACFT OFF OF THE RWY AT ABOUT A 45 DEG ANGLE. I WAS THE LAST TO EVACUATE THE ACFT AND WHEN I DID I NOTICED THE R ENG WAS ON FIRE. I RE-ENTERED THE ACFT AND ACTIVATED THE ENG FIRE EXTINGUISHER AND PUT THE FIRE OUT. I FEEL THIS WAS A TEXT BOOK EXAMPLE OF A GEAR UP LNDG. WE NOT ONLY HAD 1 DISTR, WE HAD 2 DISTRS. IN THE FUTURE, IN A TRAINING SIT THE PLT AND CHK PLT SHOULD DISCUSS BEFORE THE FLT THAT THE PLT FLY THE AIRPLANE AND THE CHK PLT HANDLE THE RADIO AND TFC. AND WHEN THE DISTRS BECOME TOO MANY FOR THE CHK PLT TO HANDLE TO MAKE THE DECISION TO ABORT THE APCH AND LNDG. ALSO, MAYBE IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO REDUCE PWR ALL THE WAY OFF AT 200 OR 300 FT, THEN IF THE LNDG GEAR HORN SOUNDED YOU WOULD HAVE AMPLE TIME TO MAKE A GAR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.