Narrative:

We were direct oak when cleared to sau (sausaulito) direct oak. We were started down too late by ATC, be we didn't make any requests and the captain is inclined to stay high too long for fuel conservation and often complains about ATC instructions. Oak ATIS told us to expect runways 27/29. At approximately sau we were told to expect 'runway 11' at oak. I had a hard time finding the approach plate, which turned out to be stuck to the runway 27R plate, which' is plastic covered. The captain reviewed the plate while calling for checklists. I felt overloaded, but keep in mind I am new to the airplane. We were cleared for the approach. I believe I saw an airspeed of 250 KTS, possibly as late as abeam treasure island. The controller questioned our ability to get down for the crossing restr under the sfo 19 ILS. The captain said we could and I reported that to the controller. The captain was also insisting I get a visual to runway 9 at oak while I advised I didn't believe it would be authority/authorized for a jet aircraft. I don't remember if I made the request. The controller instructed us to make the left turn off the ILS while we were leaning 3000 ft. The captain was reluctant to comply and told me to 'shut up' when I repeated the controllers instructions and pointed to a B747 on the sfo ILS 19. We made the turn and were vectored (for another ILS 11. The controller asked if we had an approach plate. We did and it was out,as I reported. How problem arose: 1) ATC failed to note we didn't have the correct runway information. 2) the crew failed to ask what the vectors were for and what approach to expect. The controller's load was heavy. 3) the captain was unwilling to start down and reduce speed earlier. Human performance: 1) the captain is very assertive, has strong opinions, and has an abnormal tendency for impatience. 2) the captain is usually in a hurry fearing we will have a delay and is more concerned about impressing passenger. We talk safety, but I believe it is given 'lip service.' 3) I failed to be assertive enough to make it clear I was rushed. I have been with the company 5 weeks and have the airplane portion of my 'type ride' remaining. 4) the captain is inclined to complain about the reasonableness of clrncs. 5) the checklists are hard to use. It is easy to lose one's place and hard to develop a flow followed by a checklist. 6) the captain is chief pilot working under an assertive president that is a pilot and owner of a be-55.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LTT MISSES XING RESTR. CTLR ISSUES GAR.

Narrative: WE WERE DIRECT OAK WHEN CLRED TO SAU (SAUSAULITO) DIRECT OAK. WE WERE STARTED DOWN TOO LATE BY ATC, BE WE DIDN'T MAKE ANY REQUESTS AND THE CAPT IS INCLINED TO STAY HIGH TOO LONG FOR FUEL CONSERVATION AND OFTEN COMPLAINS ABOUT ATC INSTRUCTIONS. OAK ATIS TOLD US TO EXPECT RWYS 27/29. AT APPROX SAU WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT 'RWY 11' AT OAK. I HAD A HARD TIME FINDING THE APCH PLATE, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE STUCK TO THE RWY 27R PLATE, WHICH' IS PLASTIC COVERED. THE CAPT REVIEWED THE PLATE WHILE CALLING FOR CHKLISTS. I FELT OVERLOADED, BUT KEEP IN MIND I AM NEW TO THE AIRPLANE. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. I BELIEVE I SAW AN AIRSPD OF 250 KTS, POSSIBLY AS LATE AS ABEAM TREASURE ISLAND. THE CTLR QUESTIONED OUR ABILITY TO GET DOWN FOR THE XING RESTR UNDER THE SFO 19 ILS. THE CAPT SAID WE COULD AND I RPTED THAT TO THE CTLR. THE CAPT WAS ALSO INSISTING I GET A VISUAL TO RWY 9 AT OAK WHILE I ADVISED I DIDN'T BELIEVE IT WOULD BE AUTH FOR A JET ACFT. I DON'T REMEMBER IF I MADE THE REQUEST. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO MAKE THE L TURN OFF THE ILS WHILE WE WERE LEANING 3000 FT. THE CAPT WAS RELUCTANT TO COMPLY AND TOLD ME TO 'SHUT UP' WHEN I REPEATED THE CTLRS INSTRUCTIONS AND POINTED TO A B747 ON THE SFO ILS 19. WE MADE THE TURN AND WERE VECTORED (FOR ANOTHER ILS 11. THE CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD AN APCH PLATE. WE DID AND IT WAS OUT,AS I RPTED. HOW PROB AROSE: 1) ATC FAILED TO NOTE WE DIDN'T HAVE THE CORRECT RWY INFO. 2) THE CREW FAILED TO ASK WHAT THE VECTORS WERE FOR AND WHAT APCH TO EXPECT. THE CTLR'S LOAD WAS HVY. 3) THE CAPT WAS UNWILLING TO START DOWN AND REDUCE SPD EARLIER. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: 1) THE CAPT IS VERY ASSERTIVE, HAS STRONG OPINIONS, AND HAS AN ABNORMAL TENDENCY FOR IMPATIENCE. 2) THE CAPT IS USUALLY IN A HURRY FEARING WE WILL HAVE A DELAY AND IS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT IMPRESSING PAX. WE TALK SAFETY, BUT I BELIEVE IT IS GIVEN 'LIP SVC.' 3) I FAILED TO BE ASSERTIVE ENOUGH TO MAKE IT CLR I WAS RUSHED. I HAVE BEEN WITH THE COMPANY 5 WKS AND HAVE THE AIRPLANE PORTION OF MY 'TYPE RIDE' REMAINING. 4) THE CAPT IS INCLINED TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE REASONABLENESS OF CLRNCS. 5) THE CHKLISTS ARE HARD TO USE. IT IS EASY TO LOSE ONE'S PLACE AND HARD TO DEVELOP A FLOW FOLLOWED BY A CHKLIST. 6) THE CAPT IS CHIEF PLT WORKING UNDER AN ASSERTIVE PRESIDENT THAT IS A PLT AND OWNER OF A BE-55.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.