Narrative:

My copilot slowed down to 210 KIAS at 6000 ft MSL and 22 mi from runway 4R at bos. He wanted to configure for the approach. Under the circumstances, VMC, busy airport, position from runway, I thought it premature. An idle descent to localizer/GS capture in clean configuration would have been safe, expeditious, efficient and routine. He subsequently wound up too fast and too high to comfortably make a routine landing. Not wanting to aggravate the situation I suggested in plenty of time that we abandon the approach and smoothly bring it back around for another approach. All this was done uneventfully. On the request for a missed approach to bos tower I did not want to alarm them so I stated I just wanted to look at a circuit breaker, that everything was ok, and that we were requesting a return right back to the runway and no assistance (ground) was necessary. The problem arose several days later when there was no maintenance write-up to go along with the missed approach callback check. There was no maintenance problem however. I just didn't want to make an adverse remark over the radio that my copilot might construe as a critique on his aviating. The missed approach and subsequent approach were done smoothly and properly. The best interests of my passenger and copilot were served. The balance of the trip -- 7 legs in next 2 days -- was accomplished professionally with good crew coordination in spite of tropical storm related WX. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that he received a call from maintenance operations chief who indicated there was no logbook regarding the callback situation causing the go around. It seems that the tower had logged the reason for the go around and company checks those logs for maintenance problems. Had reporter known this procedure he would not have made up that excuse. He was trying desperately not to undermine his first officer's confidence and came up with what he thought was a simple reason. Reporter states that he was watching for commuter traffic on the left parallel approach and when he turned back inside he could see they were too high and fast. He felt it was much wiser to do the go around than to try and salvage a bad approach. Reporter feels that in the glass cockpits these days, many of the pilots are trying so hard to program the aircraft that they spend less time flying the aircraft. Not healthy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG MAKES GAR DUE TO HIGH AND FAST APCH.

Narrative: MY COPLT SLOWED DOWN TO 210 KIAS AT 6000 FT MSL AND 22 MI FROM RWY 4R AT BOS. HE WANTED TO CONFIGURE FOR THE APCH. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, VMC, BUSY ARPT, POS FROM RWY, I THOUGHT IT PREMATURE. AN IDLE DSCNT TO LOC/GS CAPTURE IN CLEAN CONFIGURATION WOULD HAVE BEEN SAFE, EXPEDITIOUS, EFFICIENT AND ROUTINE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY WOUND UP TOO FAST AND TOO HIGH TO COMFORTABLY MAKE A ROUTINE LNDG. NOT WANTING TO AGGRAVATE THE SIT I SUGGESTED IN PLENTY OF TIME THAT WE ABANDON THE APCH AND SMOOTHLY BRING IT BACK AROUND FOR ANOTHER APCH. ALL THIS WAS DONE UNEVENTFULLY. ON THE REQUEST FOR A MISSED APCH TO BOS TWR I DID NOT WANT TO ALARM THEM SO I STATED I JUST WANTED TO LOOK AT A CIRCUIT BREAKER, THAT EVERYTHING WAS OK, AND THAT WE WERE REQUESTING A RETURN RIGHT BACK TO THE RWY AND NO ASSISTANCE (GND) WAS NECESSARY. THE PROB AROSE SEVERAL DAYS LATER WHEN THERE WAS NO MAINT WRITE-UP TO GO ALONG WITH THE MISSED APCH CALLBACK CHK. THERE WAS NO MAINT PROB HOWEVER. I JUST DIDN'T WANT TO MAKE AN ADVERSE REMARK OVER THE RADIO THAT MY COPLT MIGHT CONSTRUE AS A CRITIQUE ON HIS AVIATING. THE MISSED APCH AND SUBSEQUENT APCH WERE DONE SMOOTHLY AND PROPERLY. THE BEST INTERESTS OF MY PAX AND COPLT WERE SERVED. THE BAL OF THE TRIP -- 7 LEGS IN NEXT 2 DAYS -- WAS ACCOMPLISHED PROFESSIONALLY WITH GOOD CREW COORD IN SPITE OF TROPICAL STORM RELATED WX. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT HE RECEIVED A CALL FROM MAINT OPS CHIEF WHO INDICATED THERE WAS NO LOGBOOK REGARDING THE CALLBACK SIT CAUSING THE GAR. IT SEEMS THAT THE TWR HAD LOGGED THE REASON FOR THE GAR AND COMPANY CHECKS THOSE LOGS FOR MAINT PROBS. HAD RPTR KNOWN THIS PROC HE WOULD NOT HAVE MADE UP THAT EXCUSE. HE WAS TRYING DESPERATELY NOT TO UNDERMINE HIS FO'S CONFIDENCE AND CAME UP WITH WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS A SIMPLE REASON. RPTR STATES THAT HE WAS WATCHING FOR COMMUTER TFC ON THE L PARALLEL APCH AND WHEN HE TURNED BACK INSIDE HE COULD SEE THEY WERE TOO HIGH AND FAST. HE FELT IT WAS MUCH WISER TO DO THE GAR THAN TO TRY AND SALVAGE A BAD APCH. RPTR FEELS THAT IN THE GLASS COCKPITS THESE DAYS, MANY OF THE PLTS ARE TRYING SO HARD TO PROGRAM THE ACFT THAT THEY SPEND LESS TIME FLYING THE ACFT. NOT HEALTHY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.