Narrative:

There was obvious controller training in progress on jan/fri/95, both at geg tower and TRACON. After takeoff from runway 21, we were given a heading for inbound traffic on J3, our clearance altitude was 12000 ft. At approximately 10000 ft or 11000 ft we were given a left turn to intercept J3 being clear of the aforementioned traffic but we did not read back. The first officer missed the call, so I asked him to reconfirm the clearance but he could not raise the controller's attention. About this time the controller pointed out traffic at our altitude passing behind us. That traffic rapidly created a TA followed by an RA on our TCASII. We followed those warnings with a climb to almost 13000 ft before returning to our clearance altitude of 12000 ft. Almost immediately we were switched to ZLC and reported our altitude deviation. Remarks: better supervision of controller training with emphasis on listening for the correct readback and on our part a more dedicated monitoring of the frequency. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies as captain on the B-737-300. He believes that there was controller training in progress, both in the tower and TRACON. The first officer did not read back a turn for traffic and the reporter could not get a word in to confirm as the controller was busy with ftr traffic. The command bars did not command a leveloff and the approaching altitude warning did not sound. They both worked fine later. First officer did not give a '1000 ft to go' call. The reporter says that 'we must be aware of the good old habits when flying the glass.' apparently the TCASII was caused by the missed turn.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MISSED VECTOR TURN.

Narrative: THERE WAS OBVIOUS CTLR TRAINING IN PROGRESS ON JAN/FRI/95, BOTH AT GEG TWR AND TRACON. AFTER TKOF FROM RWY 21, WE WERE GIVEN A HDG FOR INBOUND TFC ON J3, OUR CLRNC ALT WAS 12000 FT. AT APPROX 10000 FT OR 11000 FT WE WERE GIVEN A L TURN TO INTERCEPT J3 BEING CLR OF THE AFOREMENTIONED TFC BUT WE DID NOT READ BACK. THE FO MISSED THE CALL, SO I ASKED HIM TO RECONFIRM THE CLRNC BUT HE COULD NOT RAISE THE CTLR'S ATTN. ABOUT THIS TIME THE CTLR POINTED OUT TFC AT OUR ALT PASSING BEHIND US. THAT TFC RAPIDLY CREATED A TA FOLLOWED BY AN RA ON OUR TCASII. WE FOLLOWED THOSE WARNINGS WITH A CLB TO ALMOST 13000 FT BEFORE RETURNING TO OUR CLRNC ALT OF 12000 FT. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WE WERE SWITCHED TO ZLC AND RPTED OUR ALTDEV. REMARKS: BETTER SUPERVISION OF CTLR TRAINING WITH EMPHASIS ON LISTENING FOR THE CORRECT READBACK AND ON OUR PART A MORE DEDICATED MONITORING OF THE FREQ. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES AS CAPT ON THE B-737-300. HE BELIEVES THAT THERE WAS CTLR TRAINING IN PROGRESS, BOTH IN THE TWR AND TRACON. THE FO DID NOT READ BACK A TURN FOR TFC AND THE RPTR COULD NOT GET A WORD IN TO CONFIRM AS THE CTLR WAS BUSY WITH FTR TFC. THE COMMAND BARS DID NOT COMMAND A LEVELOFF AND THE APCHING ALT WARNING DID NOT SOUND. THEY BOTH WORKED FINE LATER. FO DID NOT GIVE A '1000 FT TO GO' CALL. THE RPTR SAYS THAT 'WE MUST BE AWARE OF THE GOOD OLD HABITS WHEN FLYING THE GLASS.' APPARENTLY THE TCASII WAS CAUSED BY THE MISSED TURN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.