Narrative:

As first officer applied power for takeoff I noticed the autofeather arm annunciator did not illuminate and we heard the aural takeoff warning 'autofeather.' I called 'abort' and we discontinued takeoff. Realizing that the airplane was cold soaked (outside air temperature minus 10 degrees F) I thought it possible that a switch might not have made contact. The first officer had done an autofeather test before takeoff but as I was watching for traffic on the taxi out I had not observed the test. So I then proceeded to conduct the test as per the airport facilities manual. All tested normal. 3 things were required to arm the autofeather -- switch on, power lever angle 62 degrees or more and a torque gauge indication of 50 percent or more on both gauges. I elected to attempt another takeoff with the intention to stand on the brakes and apply power to see if the autofeather would arm -- and it did. We continued the takeoff without incident and the autofeather worked normal for the rest of the day (4 takeoffs). I have since learned that the FAA feels this incident was a 'mechanical interruption' of flight and required a release by a mechanic. Our company operations manual has no procedure for such an incident and the definition of a mechanical interruption of flight is not clear. Somewhere it seems that common sense and awareness of cold WX glitches does not come into play in this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED.

Narrative: AS FO APPLIED PWR FOR TKOF I NOTICED THE AUTOFEATHER ARM ANNUNCIATOR DID NOT ILLUMINATE AND WE HEARD THE AURAL TKOF WARNING 'AUTOFEATHER.' I CALLED 'ABORT' AND WE DISCONTINUED TKOF. REALIZING THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS COLD SOAKED (OUTSIDE AIR TEMP MINUS 10 DEGS F) I THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT A SWITCH MIGHT NOT HAVE MADE CONTACT. THE FO HAD DONE AN AUTOFEATHER TEST BEFORE TKOF BUT AS I WAS WATCHING FOR TFC ON THE TAXI OUT I HAD NOT OBSERVED THE TEST. SO I THEN PROCEEDED TO CONDUCT THE TEST AS PER THE ARPT FACILITIES MANUAL. ALL TESTED NORMAL. 3 THINGS WERE REQUIRED TO ARM THE AUTOFEATHER -- SWITCH ON, PWR LEVER ANGLE 62 DEGS OR MORE AND A TORQUE GAUGE INDICATION OF 50 PERCENT OR MORE ON BOTH GAUGES. I ELECTED TO ATTEMPT ANOTHER TKOF WITH THE INTENTION TO STAND ON THE BRAKES AND APPLY PWR TO SEE IF THE AUTOFEATHER WOULD ARM -- AND IT DID. WE CONTINUED THE TKOF WITHOUT INCIDENT AND THE AUTOFEATHER WORKED NORMAL FOR THE REST OF THE DAY (4 TKOFS). I HAVE SINCE LEARNED THAT THE FAA FEELS THIS INCIDENT WAS A 'MECHANICAL INTERRUPTION' OF FLT AND REQUIRED A RELEASE BY A MECH. OUR COMPANY OPS MANUAL HAS NO PROC FOR SUCH AN INCIDENT AND THE DEFINITION OF A MECHANICAL INTERRUPTION OF FLT IS NOT CLR. SOMEWHERE IT SEEMS THAT COMMON SENSE AND AWARENESS OF COLD WX GLITCHES DOES NOT COME INTO PLAY IN THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.