Narrative:

ZNY cleared flight to cross a point 25 NM northeast of lancaster VOR at FL200. First officer set the crossing point in the FMC and set the aircraft up to automatically descend. For reasons unknown, the aircraft did not descend as scheduled. When discovered that nothing had happened at the descent point, a manual descent with speed brakes was initiated by the first officer. Both of us thought the crossing point would still be made at FL200. In the last 3000 ft of the descent, the headwinds decreased extending the descent distance. The result was to cross the point at FL210, 1000 ft high. The 767/757 computers work so well, complacency sets in and one has a tendency to set up a flight path and go on to other tasks. It is obvious glitches happen, either in the programming or in the computer itself. It is critical that the computer be monitored at all times to ensure proper operation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies the B-767 on european rtes as a reserve captain. The reporter had never seen the first officer that was flying before, and the relief first officer was out of the cockpit at the time of the incident. The situational awareness was 'my fault,' the captain believes that he should have been more aware. Neither crewman was watching carefully enough. The captain believes that the FMC was not properly programmed. 'There is always one more button to push.' ARTCC did not seem to notice this episode. The reporter admits that this is nothing more than a 'cya.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: XING RESTR NOT MET ON DSCNT.

Narrative: ZNY CLRED FLT TO CROSS A POINT 25 NM NE OF LANCASTER VOR AT FL200. FO SET THE XING POINT IN THE FMC AND SET THE ACFT UP TO AUTOMATICALLY DSND. FOR REASONS UNKNOWN, THE ACFT DID NOT DSND AS SCHEDULED. WHEN DISCOVERED THAT NOTHING HAD HAPPENED AT THE DSCNT POINT, A MANUAL DSCNT WITH SPD BRAKES WAS INITIATED BY THE FO. BOTH OF US THOUGHT THE XING POINT WOULD STILL BE MADE AT FL200. IN THE LAST 3000 FT OF THE DSCNT, THE HEADWINDS DECREASED EXTENDING THE DSCNT DISTANCE. THE RESULT WAS TO CROSS THE POINT AT FL210, 1000 FT HIGH. THE 767/757 COMPUTERS WORK SO WELL, COMPLACENCY SETS IN AND ONE HAS A TENDENCY TO SET UP A FLT PATH AND GO ON TO OTHER TASKS. IT IS OBVIOUS GLITCHES HAPPEN, EITHER IN THE PROGRAMMING OR IN THE COMPUTER ITSELF. IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE COMPUTER BE MONITORED AT ALL TIMES TO ENSURE PROPER OP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES THE B-767 ON EUROPEAN RTES AS A RESERVE CAPT. THE RPTR HAD NEVER SEEN THE FO THAT WAS FLYING BEFORE, AND THE RELIEF FO WAS OUT OF THE COCKPIT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS 'MY FAULT,' THE CAPT BELIEVES THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AWARE. NEITHER CREWMAN WAS WATCHING CAREFULLY ENOUGH. THE CAPT BELIEVES THAT THE FMC WAS NOT PROPERLY PROGRAMMED. 'THERE IS ALWAYS ONE MORE BUTTON TO PUSH.' ARTCC DID NOT SEEM TO NOTICE THIS EPISODE. THE RPTR ADMITS THAT THIS IS NOTHING MORE THAN A 'CYA.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.