Narrative:

We were on the rome arrival, initially assigned runway 8L. After initial vectors, atl approach changed our runway to runway 9R. We were vectored to intercept runway 9R localizer at an assigned altitude of 5000 ft. The intercept heading was given a bit late, and was updated to runway heading by approach control as we were going through the localizer. The autoplt was armed in VOR/localizer and captured as we passed through the localizer. Although this should have been easily handled by the autoplt, we were about 1 DOT high on the GS at this point. Shortly thereafter, we were told to reduce our speed further to 170 KTS, and I asked for lower. We were given 4000 ft, and we started down, fairly aggressively due to the fact that we were now almost full scale high. Subsequently we were given 2500 ft and cleared for the approach. We were about 2 1/2 mi behind an L-1011, and I was concerned that we may get too close to that aircraft. Atl approach issued a speed of 160 KTS, and although I thought it was for us, another air carrier a flight answered. I inquired as to what speed the controller wanted us to fly. He replied 160 KTS, and we began slowing. We were actually about 180 KTS at the time in our effort to get down to the GS. I then crosschecked my instruments, and noticed that my HSI showed that we had drifted significantly north of the localizer. My comment to first officer about this was interrupted by a blocked transmission with a loud squeal. Approach immediately returned with a request for us to 'abandon approach, turn right to 180 degrees, climb to 3500 ft.' first officer is sure that his localizer remained centered, and the autoplt was engaged following HSI on his side at that time. Due to the request to turn to 180 degrees and climb to 3500 ft, my concern switched to flying that profile, and I did not have time to pursue the possible differences in our indicators. We were vectored around for another approach, and had no problems or unusual indications on that approach. I am not sure whether atl approach pulled us out due to a spacing problem on the aircraft in front of us, or in fact we did get off the localizer to the north. I am also not sure why we may have had different indications on our HSI indicators, and they worked perfectly on the next approach. Although I did not think of this until I was on my way home, the first officer's HSI course needle stuck full scale right once while we were on departure from tul. First officer tapped the indicator which remedied the problem, and we had no further problems with that indicator, however, in retrospect this may have been related to our possible CDI differences. While the vectoring from atl approach may not have been perfect, I feel that it was handleable, and we should have been able to make it work. I feel badly that I was unable to make it work, and am bothered by the difference in CDI indications we may have had. Normally, differences in cockpit indications are quickly picked up, but in this case my concern with the high and close situation occupied my attention and did not leave me my normal time for xchking indicators. In the end, atl approach was there to insure that safety was not further compromised for whatever reason, and I thank them for that. Perhaps the best lesson here is that while any unusual circumstance in itself may not cause a problem, the combined problems of runway change, above GS intercept, close spacing, etc, greatly increases the need for extra vigilance on the part of everybody. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter is a brand new captain on the B-737 for a major united states air carrier. This is his first captain job, and march was his second month flying as captain. The reporter talked to his chief pilot about this incident who talked to a friend in ATC. The ATC person was not able to ascertain if the flight crew had fouled up by not being on track. The ATC person was willing for ATC to take a good part of the blame for having the aircraft too close together. This was 'a learning experience for me' says the reporter. It appears to this grizzled veteran analyst that the reporter is fretting about nothing. The reporter does not know why, or if, one of his HSI's stuck.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EVASIVE ACTION GAR.

Narrative: WE WERE ON THE ROME ARR, INITIALLY ASSIGNED RWY 8L. AFTER INITIAL VECTORS, ATL APCH CHANGED OUR RWY TO RWY 9R. WE WERE VECTORED TO INTERCEPT RWY 9R LOC AT AN ASSIGNED ALT OF 5000 FT. THE INTERCEPT HDG WAS GIVEN A BIT LATE, AND WAS UPDATED TO RWY HDG BY APCH CTL AS WE WERE GOING THROUGH THE LOC. THE AUTOPLT WAS ARMED IN VOR/LOC AND CAPTURED AS WE PASSED THROUGH THE LOC. ALTHOUGH THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EASILY HANDLED BY THE AUTOPLT, WE WERE ABOUT 1 DOT HIGH ON THE GS AT THIS POINT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE WERE TOLD TO REDUCE OUR SPD FURTHER TO 170 KTS, AND I ASKED FOR LOWER. WE WERE GIVEN 4000 FT, AND WE STARTED DOWN, FAIRLY AGGRESSIVELY DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE WERE NOW ALMOST FULL SCALE HIGH. SUBSEQUENTLY WE WERE GIVEN 2500 FT AND CLRED FOR THE APCH. WE WERE ABOUT 2 1/2 MI BEHIND AN L-1011, AND I WAS CONCERNED THAT WE MAY GET TOO CLOSE TO THAT ACFT. ATL APCH ISSUED A SPD OF 160 KTS, AND ALTHOUGH I THOUGHT IT WAS FOR US, ANOTHER ACR A FLT ANSWERED. I INQUIRED AS TO WHAT SPD THE CTLR WANTED US TO FLY. HE REPLIED 160 KTS, AND WE BEGAN SLOWING. WE WERE ACTUALLY ABOUT 180 KTS AT THE TIME IN OUR EFFORT TO GET DOWN TO THE GS. I THEN XCHKED MY INSTS, AND NOTICED THAT MY HSI SHOWED THAT WE HAD DRIFTED SIGNIFICANTLY N OF THE LOC. MY COMMENT TO FO ABOUT THIS WAS INTERRUPTED BY A BLOCKED XMISSION WITH A LOUD SQUEAL. APCH IMMEDIATELY RETURNED WITH A REQUEST FOR US TO 'ABANDON APCH, TURN R TO 180 DEGS, CLB TO 3500 FT.' FO IS SURE THAT HIS LOC REMAINED CTRED, AND THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED FOLLOWING HSI ON HIS SIDE AT THAT TIME. DUE TO THE REQUEST TO TURN TO 180 DEGS AND CLB TO 3500 FT, MY CONCERN SWITCHED TO FLYING THAT PROFILE, AND I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO PURSUE THE POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES IN OUR INDICATORS. WE WERE VECTORED AROUND FOR ANOTHER APCH, AND HAD NO PROBS OR UNUSUAL INDICATIONS ON THAT APCH. I AM NOT SURE WHETHER ATL APCH PULLED US OUT DUE TO A SPACING PROB ON THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US, OR IN FACT WE DID GET OFF THE LOC TO THE N. I AM ALSO NOT SURE WHY WE MAY HAVE HAD DIFFERENT INDICATIONS ON OUR HSI INDICATORS, AND THEY WORKED PERFECTLY ON THE NEXT APCH. ALTHOUGH I DID NOT THINK OF THIS UNTIL I WAS ON MY WAY HOME, THE FO'S HSI COURSE NEEDLE STUCK FULL SCALE R ONCE WHILE WE WERE ON DEP FROM TUL. FO TAPPED THE INDICATOR WHICH REMEDIED THE PROB, AND WE HAD NO FURTHER PROBS WITH THAT INDICATOR, HOWEVER, IN RETROSPECT THIS MAY HAVE BEEN RELATED TO OUR POSSIBLE CDI DIFFERENCES. WHILE THE VECTORING FROM ATL APCH MAY NOT HAVE BEEN PERFECT, I FEEL THAT IT WAS HANDLEABLE, AND WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE IT WORK. I FEEL BADLY THAT I WAS UNABLE TO MAKE IT WORK, AND AM BOTHERED BY THE DIFFERENCE IN CDI INDICATIONS WE MAY HAVE HAD. NORMALLY, DIFFERENCES IN COCKPIT INDICATIONS ARE QUICKLY PICKED UP, BUT IN THIS CASE MY CONCERN WITH THE HIGH AND CLOSE SIT OCCUPIED MY ATTN AND DID NOT LEAVE ME MY NORMAL TIME FOR XCHKING INDICATORS. IN THE END, ATL APCH WAS THERE TO INSURE THAT SAFETY WAS NOT FURTHER COMPROMISED FOR WHATEVER REASON, AND I THANK THEM FOR THAT. PERHAPS THE BEST LESSON HERE IS THAT WHILE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE IN ITSELF MAY NOT CAUSE A PROB, THE COMBINED PROBS OF RWY CHANGE, ABOVE GS INTERCEPT, CLOSE SPACING, ETC, GREATLY INCREASES THE NEED FOR EXTRA VIGILANCE ON THE PART OF EVERYBODY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS A BRAND NEW CAPT ON THE B-737 FOR A MAJOR UNITED STATES ACR. THIS IS HIS FIRST CAPT JOB, AND MARCH WAS HIS SECOND MONTH FLYING AS CAPT. THE RPTR TALKED TO HIS CHIEF PLT ABOUT THIS INCIDENT WHO TALKED TO A FRIEND IN ATC. THE ATC PERSON WAS NOT ABLE TO ASCERTAIN IF THE FLC HAD FOULED UP BY NOT BEING ON TRACK. THE ATC PERSON WAS WILLING FOR ATC TO TAKE A GOOD PART OF THE BLAME FOR HAVING THE ACFT TOO CLOSE TOGETHER. THIS WAS 'A LEARNING EXPERIENCE FOR ME' SAYS THE RPTR. IT APPEARS TO THIS GRIZZLED VETERAN ANALYST THAT THE RPTR IS FRETTING ABOUT NOTHING. THE RPTR DOES NOT KNOW WHY, OR IF, ONE OF HIS HSI'S STUCK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.