Narrative:

Our flight pushed back for departure. We started the #2 engine. Our 'a' flight attendant entered the cockpit and informed me there was light showing through the forward cabin door. He asked if he should recycle the main forward cabin door. I checked the door annunciator warning lights. I pressed to test the annunciator lights. The lights indicated the door was locked. I assumed that, when the aircraft was pressurized, the door seal would go flush against the fuselage thus creating a pressurized cabin. This was not an abnormal event in this aircraft where light would show through until pressurization. We taxied to the runway. After we were airborne, the aircraft would not pressurize. The first officer went into the cabin to determine our problem and discovered the forward main entry door had not sealed properly. We were at 7700 ft, told ATC of our problem, and landed without further incident. The door was difficult to open. Our flight attendants now informed us there was a large gap when the door was closed and that at least 1 passenger had notified them of the large gap between the door and fuselage. This unfortunately was not information they had supplied earlier. It would probably have inclined me to return to the gate initially. This incident points out how necessary and critical information between cabin and cockpit crews must be continuously exchanged. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies the B-737 for a second tier air carrier. The flight attendant that came to the cockpit was not very aggressive in his statement about the door problem, so the flight crew deck crew thought that the problem had solved itself when they found that the door annunciator lights checked 'ok.' the flight attendant did not pass on the passenger's concern about the door until after returning. The flight attendants could not operate the door on the ground, maintenance had to come aboard to operate the door. Maintenance did nothing to correct the problem -- just cycle the door. The captain is concerned that the gate agent made no mention of the door. The captain has heard nothing from either the FAA or his chief pilot about this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RETURN LAND.

Narrative: OUR FLT PUSHED BACK FOR DEP. WE STARTED THE #2 ENG. OUR 'A' FLT ATTENDANT ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND INFORMED ME THERE WAS LIGHT SHOWING THROUGH THE FORWARD CABIN DOOR. HE ASKED IF HE SHOULD RECYCLE THE MAIN FORWARD CABIN DOOR. I CHKED THE DOOR ANNUNCIATOR WARNING LIGHTS. I PRESSED TO TEST THE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHTS. THE LIGHTS INDICATED THE DOOR WAS LOCKED. I ASSUMED THAT, WHEN THE ACFT WAS PRESSURIZED, THE DOOR SEAL WOULD GO FLUSH AGAINST THE FUSELAGE THUS CREATING A PRESSURIZED CABIN. THIS WAS NOT AN ABNORMAL EVENT IN THIS ACFT WHERE LIGHT WOULD SHOW THROUGH UNTIL PRESSURIZATION. WE TAXIED TO THE RWY. AFTER WE WERE AIRBORNE, THE ACFT WOULD NOT PRESSURIZE. THE FO WENT INTO THE CABIN TO DETERMINE OUR PROB AND DISCOVERED THE FORWARD MAIN ENTRY DOOR HAD NOT SEALED PROPERLY. WE WERE AT 7700 FT, TOLD ATC OF OUR PROB, AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE DOOR WAS DIFFICULT TO OPEN. OUR FLT ATTENDANTS NOW INFORMED US THERE WAS A LARGE GAP WHEN THE DOOR WAS CLOSED AND THAT AT LEAST 1 PAX HAD NOTIFIED THEM OF THE LARGE GAP BTWN THE DOOR AND FUSELAGE. THIS UNFORTUNATELY WAS NOT INFO THEY HAD SUPPLIED EARLIER. IT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE INCLINED ME TO RETURN TO THE GATE INITIALLY. THIS INCIDENT POINTS OUT HOW NECESSARY AND CRITICAL INFO BTWN CABIN AND COCKPIT CREWS MUST BE CONTINUOUSLY EXCHANGED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES THE B-737 FOR A SECOND TIER ACR. THE FLT ATTENDANT THAT CAME TO THE COCKPIT WAS NOT VERY AGGRESSIVE IN HIS STATEMENT ABOUT THE DOOR PROB, SO THE FLC DECK CREW THOUGHT THAT THE PROB HAD SOLVED ITSELF WHEN THEY FOUND THAT THE DOOR ANNUNCIATOR LIGHTS CHKED 'OK.' THE FLT ATTENDANT DID NOT PASS ON THE PAX'S CONCERN ABOUT THE DOOR UNTIL AFTER RETURNING. THE FLT ATTENDANTS COULD NOT OPERATE THE DOOR ON THE GND, MAINT HAD TO COME ABOARD TO OPERATE THE DOOR. MAINT DID NOTHING TO CORRECT THE PROB -- JUST CYCLE THE DOOR. THE CAPT IS CONCERNED THAT THE GATE AGENT MADE NO MENTION OF THE DOOR. THE CAPT HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM EITHER THE FAA OR HIS CHIEF PLT ABOUT THIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.