Narrative:

Our flight diverted into sps, after an extensive hold for WX at dfw. On the ground at sps, we began the required steps to refuel the aircraft and continue to dfw. After landing at sps, the ACARS began to work intermittently with a no communication light 70-80 percent of the time. This is not an unusual situation when many flts are holding or diverting. I informed the captain of this situation and requested he obtain a load closeout for our release. I suspected that we could not obtain a load closeout through the ACARS. Upon his return to the aircraft, he mentioned that he had talked to load control. I understood that he had obtained the required load closeout information and it was the same as printed on the tps sheet. We called our out time to the station personnel due to the unreliable ACARS data link. The ACARS no communication light persisted until after takeoff. After takeoff, the ACARS began to work normally and transmitted all of our stored messages including out time that would trigger the load closeout request. At takeoff I believed that we had a valid load closeout for the flight. Several factors were present in this situation. First, the divert station was not a normal company station increasing crew workload. Second, our normal means of obtaining a load closeout was not working properly. Third, the load specialist may not have understood that we needed a verbal closeout in this situation. Finally, the tps information transmitted matched the passenger, cargo and fuel load on the aircraft. Potential solutions are emphasis in cockpit resource management courses on the coordination required between the crew members, dispatcher, and load specialist in irregular or off-line operation. The emphasis be placed on what we require when the normal communications chain is broken. Improve the ACARS data links to eliminate the no communication sits when many flts are diverting and insure all possible divert airports have adequate ACARS ground coverage. Supplemental information from acn 300070: obtained flight paper work including planned takeoff performance numbers (tps) from air carrier B operations. During taxi, the before takeoff checklist was completed. 2 days later, we were informed that we departed sps without our final load closeout. We had the same aircraft, same passenger cargo load, and new fuel load as was presented on the planned tps. I was unaware the first officer had not received the final load closeout via ACARS or via radio. On our before takeoff checklist, there is a challenge/response item calling for 'flight instrument and bugs.' I asked him how our weight came out reference our planned load. His response was 'we're 200 pounds light.' in my mind we had received our final load closeout. If the first officer was unable to obtain numbers, then the correct response would have been 'awaiting load.' it is possible that he could have confused my phone call to load control in operations as a final load confirmation. There was a breakdown in communication between pilots reference the final load closeout. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies the md-80 for a major united states air carrier. He was very familiar with the routing, but had never been through sps before. Normally, all load information is sent through ACARS, but there is very poor ACARS coverage on the ground at sps. As the captain had to get his flight plan through a computer terminal from an affiliate commuter air carrier, the first officer apparently thought that the captain had also received the load information at the same time. Apparently the load control center could determine that the aircraft had taken off without an ACARS load form, so, to cover themselves, load control passed this information on the air carrier's flight department. The flight department 'took care of this in-house' and suggested to the crewmen that they send a report to the ASRS. Better ACARS coverage could have prevented this as could better communication within the flight crew and better attention to the checklist item that addressed the load.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INADEQUATE ACARS COVERAGE LEADS TO A TKOF WITHOUT LOAD INFO.

Narrative: OUR FLT DIVERTED INTO SPS, AFTER AN EXTENSIVE HOLD FOR WX AT DFW. ON THE GND AT SPS, WE BEGAN THE REQUIRED STEPS TO REFUEL THE ACFT AND CONTINUE TO DFW. AFTER LNDG AT SPS, THE ACARS BEGAN TO WORK INTERMITTENTLY WITH A NO COM LIGHT 70-80 PERCENT OF THE TIME. THIS IS NOT AN UNUSUAL SIT WHEN MANY FLTS ARE HOLDING OR DIVERTING. I INFORMED THE CAPT OF THIS SIT AND REQUESTED HE OBTAIN A LOAD CLOSEOUT FOR OUR RELEASE. I SUSPECTED THAT WE COULD NOT OBTAIN A LOAD CLOSEOUT THROUGH THE ACARS. UPON HIS RETURN TO THE ACFT, HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD TALKED TO LOAD CTL. I UNDERSTOOD THAT HE HAD OBTAINED THE REQUIRED LOAD CLOSEOUT INFO AND IT WAS THE SAME AS PRINTED ON THE TPS SHEET. WE CALLED OUR OUT TIME TO THE STATION PERSONNEL DUE TO THE UNRELIABLE ACARS DATA LINK. THE ACARS NO COM LIGHT PERSISTED UNTIL AFTER TKOF. AFTER TKOF, THE ACARS BEGAN TO WORK NORMALLY AND XMITTED ALL OF OUR STORED MESSAGES INCLUDING OUT TIME THAT WOULD TRIGGER THE LOAD CLOSEOUT REQUEST. AT TKOF I BELIEVED THAT WE HAD A VALID LOAD CLOSEOUT FOR THE FLT. SEVERAL FACTORS WERE PRESENT IN THIS SIT. FIRST, THE DIVERT STATION WAS NOT A NORMAL COMPANY STATION INCREASING CREW WORKLOAD. SECOND, OUR NORMAL MEANS OF OBTAINING A LOAD CLOSEOUT WAS NOT WORKING PROPERLY. THIRD, THE LOAD SPECIALIST MAY NOT HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE NEEDED A VERBAL CLOSEOUT IN THIS SIT. FINALLY, THE TPS INFO XMITTED MATCHED THE PAX, CARGO AND FUEL LOAD ON THE ACFT. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS ARE EMPHASIS IN COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT COURSES ON THE COORD REQUIRED BTWN THE CREW MEMBERS, DISPATCHER, AND LOAD SPECIALIST IN IRREGULAR OR OFF-LINE OP. THE EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON WHAT WE REQUIRE WHEN THE NORMAL COMS CHAIN IS BROKEN. IMPROVE THE ACARS DATA LINKS TO ELIMINATE THE NO COM SITS WHEN MANY FLTS ARE DIVERTING AND INSURE ALL POSSIBLE DIVERT ARPTS HAVE ADEQUATE ACARS GND COVERAGE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 300070: OBTAINED FLT PAPER WORK INCLUDING PLANNED TKOF PERFORMANCE NUMBERS (TPS) FROM ACR B OPS. DURING TAXI, THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED. 2 DAYS LATER, WE WERE INFORMED THAT WE DEPARTED SPS WITHOUT OUR FINAL LOAD CLOSEOUT. WE HAD THE SAME ACFT, SAME PAX CARGO LOAD, AND NEW FUEL LOAD AS WAS PRESENTED ON THE PLANNED TPS. I WAS UNAWARE THE FO HAD NOT RECEIVED THE FINAL LOAD CLOSEOUT VIA ACARS OR VIA RADIO. ON OUR BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, THERE IS A CHALLENGE/RESPONSE ITEM CALLING FOR 'FLT INST AND BUGS.' I ASKED HIM HOW OUR WT CAME OUT REF OUR PLANNED LOAD. HIS RESPONSE WAS 'WE'RE 200 LBS LIGHT.' IN MY MIND WE HAD RECEIVED OUR FINAL LOAD CLOSEOUT. IF THE FO WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN NUMBERS, THEN THE CORRECT RESPONSE WOULD HAVE BEEN 'AWAITING LOAD.' IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE COULD HAVE CONFUSED MY PHONE CALL TO LOAD CTL IN OPS AS A FINAL LOAD CONFIRMATION. THERE WAS A BREAKDOWN IN COM BTWN PLTS REF THE FINAL LOAD CLOSEOUT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES THE MD-80 FOR A MAJOR UNITED STATES ACR. HE WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE ROUTING, BUT HAD NEVER BEEN THROUGH SPS BEFORE. NORMALLY, ALL LOAD INFO IS SENT THROUGH ACARS, BUT THERE IS VERY POOR ACARS COVERAGE ON THE GND AT SPS. AS THE CAPT HAD TO GET HIS FLT PLAN THROUGH A COMPUTER TERMINAL FROM AN AFFILIATE COMMUTER ACR, THE FO APPARENTLY THOUGHT THAT THE CAPT HAD ALSO RECEIVED THE LOAD INFO AT THE SAME TIME. APPARENTLY THE LOAD CTL CTR COULD DETERMINE THAT THE ACFT HAD TAKEN OFF WITHOUT AN ACARS LOAD FORM, SO, TO COVER THEMSELVES, LOAD CTL PASSED THIS INFO ON THE ACR'S FLT DEPT. THE FLT DEPT 'TOOK CARE OF THIS IN-HOUSE' AND SUGGESTED TO THE CREWMEN THAT THEY SEND A RPT TO THE ASRS. BETTER ACARS COVERAGE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS AS COULD BETTER COM WITHIN THE FLC AND BETTER ATTN TO THE CHKLIST ITEM THAT ADDRESSED THE LOAD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.