Narrative:

While conducting a training flight in an upper level flight course designed to teach the use of cockpit resource management and 2-PLT crew operation, my instructor (right seat, first officer, PNF) and I departed cgz to return to prc. We departed VFR and headed northbound and contacted ZAB to pick up our IFR clearance. In our climb, we headed northwest to intercept V105, when I asked my instructor (first officer, PNF) how close we were to the class B airspace. Because I thought the whole flight would be conducted in IFR, I did not bring any VFR charts. My instructor referenced the only chart that was out at the time, an government low altitude en route chart. We were at 25 DME from phx when my instructor said that 25 mi was the edge of the class B. We had no indication of the floor of the class B, but my instructor told me to continue wbound and not to worry, 'we're right on the edge.' although I did not notice what altitude we were climbing through while we were waiting for ZAB to identify us on radar and give us our IFR clearance, we must have climbed through the floor of 8000 ft. At that point, ZAB told us to contact phx approach and identify ourselves because we were in his airspace, and he would give us our IFR clearance. We were still at 25 DME wbound when we contacted phx approach. He asked us if we knew that we had entered the class B without a clearance. We said we did not. He gave us our IFR clearance as filed and we continued our climb without further incident to 15000 ft. I guess that my instructor did not know the seriousness of entering class B without a clearance. Looking back, I think that I used good cockpit resource management in alerting him to my concerns and reminding him of the consequences, but I did not follow through by taking the action I thought would be necessary to keep us away from that airspace. As the PF, I should have kept the aircraft at least 27 DME from phx, but due to my instructor's comments to not worry about it, I continued. I think that because of his experience and the fact that I did not yet get a signoff to act as PIC of this high altitude aircraft (61.31(F)) I did not have the responsibility that he had. I can equate this to someday being a first officer where my captain is more experienced and has more responsibility than me. I have learned through this incident that I, too, have experiences and knowledge to share, and that I need to better advocate my position more strongly and act when needed. I also think that in the future, I will carry a chart that describes the class B airspace when operating near class B. It might have been good if the government low chart showed the floors of the class B.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH PENETRATION OF CLASS B AIRSPACE.

Narrative: WHILE CONDUCTING A TRAINING FLT IN AN UPPER LEVEL FLT COURSE DESIGNED TO TEACH THE USE OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT AND 2-PLT CREW OP, MY INSTRUCTOR (R SEAT, FO, PNF) AND I DEPARTED CGZ TO RETURN TO PRC. WE DEPARTED VFR AND HEADED NBOUND AND CONTACTED ZAB TO PICK UP OUR IFR CLRNC. IN OUR CLB, WE HEADED NW TO INTERCEPT V105, WHEN I ASKED MY INSTRUCTOR (FO, PNF) HOW CLOSE WE WERE TO THE CLASS B AIRSPACE. BECAUSE I THOUGHT THE WHOLE FLT WOULD BE CONDUCTED IN IFR, I DID NOT BRING ANY VFR CHARTS. MY INSTRUCTOR REFERENCED THE ONLY CHART THAT WAS OUT AT THE TIME, AN GOV LOW ALT ENRTE CHART. WE WERE AT 25 DME FROM PHX WHEN MY INSTRUCTOR SAID THAT 25 MI WAS THE EDGE OF THE CLASS B. WE HAD NO INDICATION OF THE FLOOR OF THE CLASS B, BUT MY INSTRUCTOR TOLD ME TO CONTINUE WBOUND AND NOT TO WORRY, 'WE'RE RIGHT ON THE EDGE.' ALTHOUGH I DID NOT NOTICE WHAT ALT WE WERE CLBING THROUGH WHILE WE WERE WAITING FOR ZAB TO IDENT US ON RADAR AND GIVE US OUR IFR CLRNC, WE MUST HAVE CLBED THROUGH THE FLOOR OF 8000 FT. AT THAT POINT, ZAB TOLD US TO CONTACT PHX APCH AND IDENT OURSELVES BECAUSE WE WERE IN HIS AIRSPACE, AND HE WOULD GIVE US OUR IFR CLRNC. WE WERE STILL AT 25 DME WBOUND WHEN WE CONTACTED PHX APCH. HE ASKED US IF WE KNEW THAT WE HAD ENTERED THE CLASS B WITHOUT A CLRNC. WE SAID WE DID NOT. HE GAVE US OUR IFR CLRNC AS FILED AND WE CONTINUED OUR CLB WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT TO 15000 FT. I GUESS THAT MY INSTRUCTOR DID NOT KNOW THE SERIOUSNESS OF ENTERING CLASS B WITHOUT A CLRNC. LOOKING BACK, I THINK THAT I USED GOOD COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT IN ALERTING HIM TO MY CONCERNS AND REMINDING HIM OF THE CONSEQUENCES, BUT I DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH BY TAKING THE ACTION I THOUGHT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KEEP US AWAY FROM THAT AIRSPACE. AS THE PF, I SHOULD HAVE KEPT THE ACFT AT LEAST 27 DME FROM PHX, BUT DUE TO MY INSTRUCTOR'S COMMENTS TO NOT WORRY ABOUT IT, I CONTINUED. I THINK THAT BECAUSE OF HIS EXPERIENCE AND THE FACT THAT I DID NOT YET GET A SIGNOFF TO ACT AS PIC OF THIS HIGH ALT ACFT (61.31(F)) I DID NOT HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY THAT HE HAD. I CAN EQUATE THIS TO SOMEDAY BEING A FO WHERE MY CAPT IS MORE EXPERIENCED AND HAS MORE RESPONSIBILITY THAN ME. I HAVE LEARNED THROUGH THIS INCIDENT THAT I, TOO, HAVE EXPERIENCES AND KNOWLEDGE TO SHARE, AND THAT I NEED TO BETTER ADVOCATE MY POS MORE STRONGLY AND ACT WHEN NEEDED. I ALSO THINK THAT IN THE FUTURE, I WILL CARRY A CHART THAT DESCRIBES THE CLASS B AIRSPACE WHEN OPERATING NEAR CLASS B. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN GOOD IF THE GOV LOW CHART SHOWED THE FLOORS OF THE CLASS B.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.