Narrative:

Approach control advised us to expect to hold at atlanta 15 mins prior to landing. Approximately 10 mins prior, we were advised we were #1 and to resume normal speed. Given a downwind vector at 6000 ft. At approximately 12 DME, we were given a 'heading of 150 degrees' to intercept, maintain 3000 ft until intercept, cleared for approach.' captain acknowledged clearance and started descent and turn to new heading. Intercepted localizer 1 1/2 DOT high on GS and continued in on localizer, airspeed remained 250 KTS. At 10 NM copilot stated 'we are 10 DME, I'm going to join you,' there was obvious emphasis in his voice indicating the 10 DME. We crossed the marker at 250 KTS and captain appeared to finally realize he was behind. Deployed full speed brakes and continued 1 DOT above GS. At 1000 ft on radar altimeter we were passing approximately 235 KTS we got GPWS warning 'terrain.' we continued down localizer 1 DOT above GS and GPWS warning changed to 'too low.' at 235 KTS captain called for 'gear, flaps 2 degrees' and stated 'we are going to make it.' 'silence that' (referring to GPWS). The first officer responded with 'we are high, we are hot, flaps 30 degrees?' the flight engineer responded with 'improper confign, it can't be silenced, 500 ft, sink rate 2200 FPM.' confign of gear, flaps 30 degree, checklist complete occurred between 200-100 ft AGL, crossed threshold approximately 50 KTS fast and 100 ft AGL. After passing last touchdown zone block, captain called for flaps 25 degrees and aircraft settled onto runway (about 4000 ft down runway), 164 KTS. Engines were brought to reverse idle, no brakes applied initially. Approaching far end of runway touchdown zone blocks, first officer started to apply brakes and captain then went to full reverse and started braking. Pulled off on last taxiway at hammerhead. Conclusion: I am not sure if captain lacked positional awareness or had bad judgement or subtle incapacitation, either way, the first officer and myself should have commanded 'go around' instead of relying on our subtle statements and cues to get the captain to make the correct decision. We allowed the captain's statement of 'we'll make it' to override proper procedure. We were not stabilized, the call should have been 'go around.' we were lucky.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN LGT MADE AN UNSTABLE ILS APCH RESULTING IN EXCEEDING THE MAX AIRSPD BELOW 2500 FT WITHIN 4 MI OF A CTLED ARPT.

Narrative: APCH CTL ADVISED US TO EXPECT TO HOLD AT ATLANTA 15 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG. APPROX 10 MINS PRIOR, WE WERE ADVISED WE WERE #1 AND TO RESUME NORMAL SPD. GIVEN A DOWNWIND VECTOR AT 6000 FT. AT APPROX 12 DME, WE WERE GIVEN A 'HDG OF 150 DEGS' TO INTERCEPT, MAINTAIN 3000 FT UNTIL INTERCEPT, CLRED FOR APCH.' CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED CLRNC AND STARTED DSCNT AND TURN TO NEW HDG. INTERCEPTED LOC 1 1/2 DOT HIGH ON GS AND CONTINUED IN ON LOC, AIRSPD REMAINED 250 KTS. AT 10 NM COPLT STATED 'WE ARE 10 DME, I'M GOING TO JOIN YOU,' THERE WAS OBVIOUS EMPHASIS IN HIS VOICE INDICATING THE 10 DME. WE CROSSED THE MARKER AT 250 KTS AND CAPT APPEARED TO FINALLY REALIZE HE WAS BEHIND. DEPLOYED FULL SPD BRAKES AND CONTINUED 1 DOT ABOVE GS. AT 1000 FT ON RADAR ALTIMETER WE WERE PASSING APPROX 235 KTS WE GOT GPWS WARNING 'TERRAIN.' WE CONTINUED DOWN LOC 1 DOT ABOVE GS AND GPWS WARNING CHANGED TO 'TOO LOW.' AT 235 KTS CAPT CALLED FOR 'GEAR, FLAPS 2 DEGS' AND STATED 'WE ARE GOING TO MAKE IT.' 'SILENCE THAT' (REFERRING TO GPWS). THE FO RESPONDED WITH 'WE ARE HIGH, WE ARE HOT, FLAPS 30 DEGS?' THE FE RESPONDED WITH 'IMPROPER CONFIGN, IT CAN'T BE SILENCED, 500 FT, SINK RATE 2200 FPM.' CONFIGN OF GEAR, FLAPS 30 DEG, CHKLIST COMPLETE OCCURRED BTWN 200-100 FT AGL, CROSSED THRESHOLD APPROX 50 KTS FAST AND 100 FT AGL. AFTER PASSING LAST TOUCHDOWN ZONE BLOCK, CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS 25 DEGS AND ACFT SETTLED ONTO RWY (ABOUT 4000 FT DOWN RWY), 164 KTS. ENGS WERE BROUGHT TO REVERSE IDLE, NO BRAKES APPLIED INITIALLY. APCHING FAR END OF RWY TOUCHDOWN ZONE BLOCKS, FO STARTED TO APPLY BRAKES AND CAPT THEN WENT TO FULL REVERSE AND STARTED BRAKING. PULLED OFF ON LAST TXWY AT HAMMERHEAD. CONCLUSION: I AM NOT SURE IF CAPT LACKED POSITIONAL AWARENESS OR HAD BAD JUDGEMENT OR SUBTLE INCAPACITATION, EITHER WAY, THE FO AND MYSELF SHOULD HAVE COMMANDED 'GAR' INSTEAD OF RELYING ON OUR SUBTLE STATEMENTS AND CUES TO GET THE CAPT TO MAKE THE CORRECT DECISION. WE ALLOWED THE CAPT'S STATEMENT OF 'WE'LL MAKE IT' TO OVERRIDE PROPER PROC. WE WERE NOT STABILIZED, THE CALL SHOULD HAVE BEEN 'GAR.' WE WERE LUCKY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.