Narrative:

I prepared the dispatch release with a planned passenger load of 105 people and fuel of 38000 pounds. The station added 42 people and an extra 1000 pounds of fuel was also added. I was not informed. As I released the flight, it was 1000 pounds below maximum landing. The extra passenger and fuel caused the flight to land 7000 pounds overweight. In theory, stations are supposed to inform us of increases of more than 10 passenger. The capts are supposed to inform us of increases in fuel. When the station did the weight and balance, they did not notice the takeoff gross weight was higher than the landing weight restr gross takeoff weight. If the station or the crew had looked at the paperwork before takeoff, it would have been obvious the plane was too heavy. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter did not know about the overweight landing until the next day when she found out that the crew had requested an overweight inspection. The correct numbers were given to the cockpit crew, who did not realize that they would be overweight until they were nearing their destination. The computer program that this air carrier uses will not make up a flight plan if the proposed landing weight is more than the maximum allowable landing weight. The reporter has heard nothing from the FAA on this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OVERWT LNDG.

Narrative: I PREPARED THE DISPATCH RELEASE WITH A PLANNED PAX LOAD OF 105 PEOPLE AND FUEL OF 38000 LBS. THE STATION ADDED 42 PEOPLE AND AN EXTRA 1000 LBS OF FUEL WAS ALSO ADDED. I WAS NOT INFORMED. AS I RELEASED THE FLT, IT WAS 1000 LBS BELOW MAX LNDG. THE EXTRA PAX AND FUEL CAUSED THE FLT TO LAND 7000 LBS OVERWT. IN THEORY, STATIONS ARE SUPPOSED TO INFORM US OF INCREASES OF MORE THAN 10 PAX. THE CAPTS ARE SUPPOSED TO INFORM US OF INCREASES IN FUEL. WHEN THE STATION DID THE WT AND BAL, THEY DID NOT NOTICE THE TKOF GROSS WT WAS HIGHER THAN THE LNDG WT RESTR GROSS TKOF WT. IF THE STATION OR THE CREW HAD LOOKED AT THE PAPERWORK BEFORE TKOF, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN OBVIOUS THE PLANE WAS TOO HVY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE OVERWT LNDG UNTIL THE NEXT DAY WHEN SHE FOUND OUT THAT THE CREW HAD REQUESTED AN OVERWT INSPECTION. THE CORRECT NUMBERS WERE GIVEN TO THE COCKPIT CREW, WHO DID NOT REALIZE THAT THEY WOULD BE OVERWT UNTIL THEY WERE NEARING THEIR DEST. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM THAT THIS ACR USES WILL NOT MAKE UP A FLT PLAN IF THE PROPOSED LNDG WT IS MORE THAN THE MAX ALLOWABLE LNDG WT. THE RPTR HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM THE FAA ON THIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.