Narrative:

After doing more research on the corrosion limits of the main rotor blade in question, I learned of some serious errors I had made. They are as follows: the area of the main rotor blade where the corrosion is, is considered by bell helicopter to be critical. Any corrosion in this area has to be considered by bell on a case by case basis to determine the blade's serviceability. Any weight added to or subtracted from the tip block has to be authority/authorized by bell. I added weight to the blade. I found out oct/fri/95, about the weight change in the tip block having to be approved by a bell technical representative. As stated in acn 316711, because of being pressured by mr Y that I didn't have clear thoughts and a chance to completely research all that was necessary to make sure everything was as per the maintenance and overhaul. Tip block weight changes are not mentioned in the maintenance and overhaul manual that I could find. I would like to add that the tip weights on bell 206L series helicopter are very seldom touched and, in being pressured into not checking into the corrosion, I lost my concentration of the problem. In the past, I have seen other people add or subtract weights to tip blocks, and nothing is written down. That comes close to what the problem is (like don't say anything about removing the tipcap). My maintenance manager, mr Y, violated company policy by pressuring me instead of trying to help me, he was supposed to assist me in any information I needed. I was nervous about this whole situation and forgot to mention weight change. Mistakes like this will continue to happen when supervisors use threats and intimidation to get work on aircraft done faster. Callback conversation with reporter of 316711 and 317810 revealed the following information: the reporter works for a company providing helicopters for use supplying oil tower operations in the gulf of mexico. The helicopters operate in a salt air environment at all times. Someone, unknown to the reporter, notified the FAA of this particular blade corrosion situation. The FAA investigated and, when the reporter said that he had sent a report to the ASRS, his part of the investigation was ended. The local bell technical representative sent drawings of the corroded blade to the bell factory. The reply was to fly the blade out for its remaining life (109 hours). The reporter lost his bii inspection privileges and pay check, and received a letter of reprimand from his employer because he wouldn't cooperate with the company investigation into who notified the FAA. The reporter believes that all this was worth it, because the supervisor that pressured him has been moved to another facility. Supplemental information from acn 316711: corrosion was found in tip end of main rotor blade spar. I found it to be dissimilar metal corrosion from lead weights contacting spar which is aluminum alloy. The corrosion was in an area about 1/2 inch by 2 inch strip and about .010-.030 deep. I went to the bell 206l1 maintenance and overhaul and could not find any criteria concerning corrosion in that area of the blade. An inspector at our main facility was also unsuccessful at finding any limits. My maintenance manager, mr Y, said 'I am not trying to pressure you, but do you want to give up your bii inspection slot? Is it becoming too much of a burden to you?' I said no. He also asked if I wanted a transfer out of patterson. I said no. In the event I would give up the bii inspection slot, I would lose money and possibly be pay capped. I would stand to lose money. He also reiterated 'I am not pressuring you.' well, I ask you, if that ain't pressure, what is? I cleaned, treated and primed corrosion. Supplemental information from acn 316719: I would not say anything, because mr Y has threatened and written me up to be fired, because of objecting to installing out of limit parts on aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB CORRODED ROTOR BLADE AND REPAIR STATION MGMNT PROBS.

Narrative: AFTER DOING MORE RESEARCH ON THE CORROSION LIMITS OF THE MAIN ROTOR BLADE IN QUESTION, I LEARNED OF SOME SERIOUS ERRORS I HAD MADE. THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS: THE AREA OF THE MAIN ROTOR BLADE WHERE THE CORROSION IS, IS CONSIDERED BY BELL HELI TO BE CRITICAL. ANY CORROSION IN THIS AREA HAS TO BE CONSIDERED BY BELL ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS TO DETERMINE THE BLADE'S SERVICEABILITY. ANY WT ADDED TO OR SUBTRACTED FROM THE TIP BLOCK HAS TO BE AUTH BY BELL. I ADDED WT TO THE BLADE. I FOUND OUT OCT/FRI/95, ABOUT THE WT CHANGE IN THE TIP BLOCK HAVING TO BE APPROVED BY A BELL TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE. AS STATED IN ACN 316711, BECAUSE OF BEING PRESSURED BY MR Y THAT I DIDN'T HAVE CLR THOUGHTS AND A CHANCE TO COMPLETELY RESEARCH ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE SURE EVERYTHING WAS AS PER THE MAINT AND OVERHAUL. TIP BLOCK WT CHANGES ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE MAINT AND OVERHAUL MANUAL THAT I COULD FIND. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT THE TIP WTS ON BELL 206L SERIES HELI ARE VERY SELDOM TOUCHED AND, IN BEING PRESSURED INTO NOT CHKING INTO THE CORROSION, I LOST MY CONCENTRATION OF THE PROB. IN THE PAST, I HAVE SEEN OTHER PEOPLE ADD OR SUBTRACT WTS TO TIP BLOCKS, AND NOTHING IS WRITTEN DOWN. THAT COMES CLOSE TO WHAT THE PROB IS (LIKE DON'T SAY ANYTHING ABOUT REMOVING THE TIPCAP). MY MAINT MGR, MR Y, VIOLATED COMPANY POLICY BY PRESSURING ME INSTEAD OF TRYING TO HELP ME, HE WAS SUPPOSED TO ASSIST ME IN ANY INFO I NEEDED. I WAS NERVOUS ABOUT THIS WHOLE SIT AND FORGOT TO MENTION WT CHANGE. MISTAKES LIKE THIS WILL CONTINUE TO HAPPEN WHEN SUPVRS USE THREATS AND INTIMIDATION TO GET WORK ON ACFT DONE FASTER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF 316711 AND 317810 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WORKS FOR A COMPANY PROVIDING HELIS FOR USE SUPPLYING OIL TWR OPS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO. THE HELIS OPERATE IN A SALT AIR ENVIRONMENT AT ALL TIMES. SOMEONE, UNKNOWN TO THE RPTR, NOTIFIED THE FAA OF THIS PARTICULAR BLADE CORROSION SIT. THE FAA INVESTIGATED AND, WHEN THE RPTR SAID THAT HE HAD SENT A RPT TO THE ASRS, HIS PART OF THE INVESTIGATION WAS ENDED. THE LCL BELL TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE SENT DRAWINGS OF THE CORRODED BLADE TO THE BELL FACTORY. THE REPLY WAS TO FLY THE BLADE OUT FOR ITS REMAINING LIFE (109 HRS). THE RPTR LOST HIS BII INSPECTION PRIVILEGES AND PAY CHK, AND RECEIVED A LETTER OF REPRIMAND FROM HIS EMPLOYER BECAUSE HE WOULDN'T COOPERATE WITH THE COMPANY INVESTIGATION INTO WHO NOTIFIED THE FAA. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT ALL THIS WAS WORTH IT, BECAUSE THE SUPVR THAT PRESSURED HIM HAS BEEN MOVED TO ANOTHER FACILITY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 316711: CORROSION WAS FOUND IN TIP END OF MAIN ROTOR BLADE SPAR. I FOUND IT TO BE DISSIMILAR METAL CORROSION FROM LEAD WTS CONTACTING SPAR WHICH IS ALUMINUM ALLOY. THE CORROSION WAS IN AN AREA ABOUT 1/2 INCH BY 2 INCH STRIP AND ABOUT .010-.030 DEEP. I WENT TO THE BELL 206L1 MAINT AND OVERHAUL AND COULD NOT FIND ANY CRITERIA CONCERNING CORROSION IN THAT AREA OF THE BLADE. AN INSPECTOR AT OUR MAIN FACILITY WAS ALSO UNSUCCESSFUL AT FINDING ANY LIMITS. MY MAINT MGR, MR Y, SAID 'I AM NOT TRYING TO PRESSURE YOU, BUT DO YOU WANT TO GIVE UP YOUR BII INSPECTION SLOT? IS IT BECOMING TOO MUCH OF A BURDEN TO YOU?' I SAID NO. HE ALSO ASKED IF I WANTED A TRANSFER OUT OF PATTERSON. I SAID NO. IN THE EVENT I WOULD GIVE UP THE BII INSPECTION SLOT, I WOULD LOSE MONEY AND POSSIBLY BE PAY CAPPED. I WOULD STAND TO LOSE MONEY. HE ALSO REITERATED 'I AM NOT PRESSURING YOU.' WELL, I ASK YOU, IF THAT AIN'T PRESSURE, WHAT IS? I CLEANED, TREATED AND PRIMED CORROSION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 316719: I WOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING, BECAUSE MR Y HAS THREATENED AND WRITTEN ME UP TO BE FIRED, BECAUSE OF OBJECTING TO INSTALLING OUT OF LIMIT PARTS ON ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.