Narrative:

After having been cleared to land, ord tower issued a go around clearance for us at about 50 ft AGL. The apparent reason for the clearance was an aircraft on the rollout end of runway 4R which had not fully cleared the runway. As I could tell that our landing would occur after the other airplane cleared, I elected to continue and land rather than go around. I chose to land primarily because the apparent reason for the go around, was no longer a factor. Tower did not repeat the clearance and we landed with the other aircraft well clear of the runway. To their credit, the first officer and the flight engineer repeated the tower clearance for a go around and intimated that I should comply with the tower's suggestion. I said we would land and we did. My experience in this particular area of airport operations, although not free of possible misunderstandings and erroneous assumptions, led me to believe that the tower simply couldn't verify at 100 percent that the rollout traffic had cleared. A follow-up phone call to the tower confirmed this and, in fact, the tower personnel expressed their belief that the continued landing was safe, saved time and confusion and, simply, worked out. The tower confirmed that they weren't able to 100 percent visually verify the clearing of the rollout traffic and therefore issued the go around clearance. The tower folks 'had no problem' with our actions. In retrospect, I could give several reasons why I think that the decision was 'right,' but the fact that we weren't 100 percent sure of why we were asked to go around leaves some measurable doubt as to the level of safety I brought to us. Perhaps a short and concise reason given along with a go around clearance would make these operations more obvious to the pilots and create an additional flexibility, a safe one, that the pilots can use to maintain the efficiency of operations at high volume airports.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT CREW FAILED TO FOLLOW AN ATC EVASIVE ACTION GAR CLRNC.

Narrative: AFTER HAVING BEEN CLRED TO LAND, ORD TWR ISSUED A GAR CLRNC FOR US AT ABOUT 50 FT AGL. THE APPARENT REASON FOR THE CLRNC WAS AN ACFT ON THE ROLLOUT END OF RWY 4R WHICH HAD NOT FULLY CLRED THE RWY. AS I COULD TELL THAT OUR LNDG WOULD OCCUR AFTER THE OTHER AIRPLANE CLRED, I ELECTED TO CONTINUE AND LAND RATHER THAN GAR. I CHOSE TO LAND PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE APPARENT REASON FOR THE GAR, WAS NO LONGER A FACTOR. TWR DID NOT REPEAT THE CLRNC AND WE LANDED WITH THE OTHER ACFT WELL CLR OF THE RWY. TO THEIR CREDIT, THE FO AND THE FE REPEATED THE TWR CLRNC FOR A GAR AND INTIMATED THAT I SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE TWR'S SUGGESTION. I SAID WE WOULD LAND AND WE DID. MY EXPERIENCE IN THIS PARTICULAR AREA OF ARPT OPS, ALTHOUGH NOT FREE OF POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS, LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE TWR SIMPLY COULDN'T VERIFY AT 100 PERCENT THAT THE ROLLOUT TFC HAD CLRED. A FOLLOW-UP PHONE CALL TO THE TWR CONFIRMED THIS AND, IN FACT, THE TWR PERSONNEL EXPRESSED THEIR BELIEF THAT THE CONTINUED LNDG WAS SAFE, SAVED TIME AND CONFUSION AND, SIMPLY, WORKED OUT. THE TWR CONFIRMED THAT THEY WEREN'T ABLE TO 100 PERCENT VISUALLY VERIFY THE CLRING OF THE ROLLOUT TFC AND THEREFORE ISSUED THE GAR CLRNC. THE TWR FOLKS 'HAD NO PROB' WITH OUR ACTIONS. IN RETROSPECT, I COULD GIVE SEVERAL REASONS WHY I THINK THAT THE DECISION WAS 'RIGHT,' BUT THE FACT THAT WE WEREN'T 100 PERCENT SURE OF WHY WE WERE ASKED TO GAR LEAVES SOME MEASURABLE DOUBT AS TO THE LEVEL OF SAFETY I BROUGHT TO US. PERHAPS A SHORT AND CONCISE REASON GIVEN ALONG WITH A GAR CLRNC WOULD MAKE THESE OPS MORE OBVIOUS TO THE PLTS AND CREATE AN ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY, A SAFE ONE, THAT THE PLTS CAN USE TO MAINTAIN THE EFFICIENCY OF OPS AT HIGH VOLUME ARPTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.