Narrative:

We were parked at our gate at mci airport. After passenger boarding and upon completing all checklists prior to taxi, I gave our marshaller the signal that we were ready to power back from the gate. Our operations specifications authorizes us to power back from this gate straight back. The marshaller gave us the signal to power back and as we were proceeding straight back the marshaller gave us a signal to begin 'tailing' to the right. Instinctively, I began turning the aircraft during power back. As we were turning, I realized that the marshaller was not familiar with our power back procedure at that particular gate and that the procedure had to be terminated immediately. At this particular point, I brought the engines out of reverse and almost came to a complete stop, but the marshaller motioned me to come forward and make a hard left turn out of the gate area, which we did. Technically, in this particular situation, we did not follow our power back procedure at this particular gate. However, I spoke with our station manager via telephone and he assured me that we had plenty of clearance from other aircraft, ground personnel, and ground equipment. He also told me we had powered back, straight back, further than normal distance prior to his signal for me to 'tail right' so that we would have plenty of clearance from other aircraft. I told him that it didn't matter how much clearance we had from other aircraft, our operations specifications specifically states that we are only authorized to power back straight back from that gate, move forward, then make a turn out of the gate area. The station manager stated that he understood the procedure completely after I had explained it to him. Fortunately, everything worked out fine, no one was in danger or any aircraft was in danger. The source of the problem in this situation was obviously lack of communication between myself and the marshaller (station manager) mainly because he obviously did not know our power back procedure. When he gave me the signal to 'tail right,' that's when I should have terminated the procedure by bringing the engines out of reverse immediately without any hesitation and stopping the aircraft. In this situation, I was a few seconds late realizing what exactly was taking place and had already begun turning during power back before bringing the engines out of reverse.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG PUSH BACK OP CONTRARY TO APPROVED OPS SPECIFICATION PROC.

Narrative: WE WERE PARKED AT OUR GATE AT MCI ARPT. AFTER PAX BOARDING AND UPON COMPLETING ALL CHKLISTS PRIOR TO TAXI, I GAVE OUR MARSHALLER THE SIGNAL THAT WE WERE READY TO PWR BACK FROM THE GATE. OUR OPS SPECS AUTHORIZES US TO PWR BACK FROM THIS GATE STRAIGHT BACK. THE MARSHALLER GAVE US THE SIGNAL TO PWR BACK AND AS WE WERE PROCEEDING STRAIGHT BACK THE MARSHALLER GAVE US A SIGNAL TO BEGIN 'TAILING' TO THE R. INSTINCTIVELY, I BEGAN TURNING THE ACFT DURING PWR BACK. AS WE WERE TURNING, I REALIZED THAT THE MARSHALLER WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH OUR PWR BACK PROC AT THAT PARTICULAR GATE AND THAT THE PROC HAD TO BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY. AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT, I BROUGHT THE ENGS OUT OF REVERSE AND ALMOST CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP, BUT THE MARSHALLER MOTIONED ME TO COME FORWARD AND MAKE A HARD L TURN OUT OF THE GATE AREA, WHICH WE DID. TECHNICALLY, IN THIS PARTICULAR SIT, WE DID NOT FOLLOW OUR PWR BACK PROC AT THIS PARTICULAR GATE. HOWEVER, I SPOKE WITH OUR STATION MGR VIA TELEPHONE AND HE ASSURED ME THAT WE HAD PLENTY OF CLRNC FROM OTHER ACFT, GND PERSONNEL, AND GND EQUIP. HE ALSO TOLD ME WE HAD POWERED BACK, STRAIGHT BACK, FURTHER THAN NORMAL DISTANCE PRIOR TO HIS SIGNAL FOR ME TO 'TAIL R' SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE PLENTY OF CLRNC FROM OTHER ACFT. I TOLD HIM THAT IT DIDN'T MATTER HOW MUCH CLRNC WE HAD FROM OTHER ACFT, OUR OPS SPECS SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT WE ARE ONLY AUTHORIZED TO PWR BACK STRAIGHT BACK FROM THAT GATE, MOVE FORWARD, THEN MAKE A TURN OUT OF THE GATE AREA. THE STATION MGR STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROC COMPLETELY AFTER I HAD EXPLAINED IT TO HIM. FORTUNATELY, EVERYTHING WORKED OUT FINE, NO ONE WAS IN DANGER OR ANY ACFT WAS IN DANGER. THE SOURCE OF THE PROB IN THIS SIT WAS OBVIOUSLY LACK OF COM BTWN MYSELF AND THE MARSHALLER (STATION MGR) MAINLY BECAUSE HE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT KNOW OUR PWR BACK PROC. WHEN HE GAVE ME THE SIGNAL TO 'TAIL R,' THAT'S WHEN I SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED THE PROC BY BRINGING THE ENGS OUT OF REVERSE IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT ANY HESITATION AND STOPPING THE ACFT. IN THIS SIT, I WAS A FEW SECONDS LATE REALIZING WHAT EXACTLY WAS TAKING PLACE AND HAD ALREADY BEGUN TURNING DURING PWR BACK BEFORE BRINGING THE ENGS OUT OF REVERSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.