Narrative:

Prior to a company flight the pilot reviewed the aircraft rental logbook and noted that the aircraft had only been flown 1.7 hours (hobbs time) since it was last refueled and the pilot was the one who refueled it. During the preflight the pilot noted that the right fuel gauge indicated 3/4 full while the left tank indicated empty. However, he noted that the left gauge had been written up as inaccurate. Over the yrs the pilot has noted that using a fuel consumption figure of 6 gal/hour was a conservative and safe number to use in calculating the endurance time in a C150. With this information in hand he determined that he had sufficient fuel to fly from shn to 1s0 a distance of 35 NM, and return with 1 hour fuel reserve remaining. The flight to 1s0 was uneventful, but on the return leg he had to use carburetor heat twice due to a partial loss of power and engine roughness. Use of the carburetor heat resolved the roughness and restored normal power. (OAT was 50 degrees F with light rain at 3000 ft MSL.) at approximately 7.5 NM from shn the engine abruptly quit. The immediate application of carburetor heat failed to produce a restart. The pilot checked the fuel gauges and noted that the right tanks still indicated between 1/4 and 1/2 full while the left tank gauge still indicated empty. No attempt was made to contact sea approach since the pilot felt that they could provide no immediate assistance other than creating a distraction for the pilot. The pilot was intimately familiar with the area since he had simulated engine failure hundreds of times for the benefit of his primary students. His possible landing sites consisted of the shoreline around the bay, the golf course, several farm fields and the selected site, mcewen prairie rd. The road presented the best chance of an uneventful landing since traffic was light, there were no power lines and it was sufficiently wide. The landing was uneventful and assistance immediately available. The fuel caps were finally removed to visually check the fuel level. The left tank was empty and the right tank had 2-3 gals remaining. 5 gals of fuel were added to each tank and the left gauge still indicated empty while the right indicated full. After a successful full power run-up was conducted, traffic was blocked to allow the aircraft to be flown off the road. Upon return to shn the aircraft was topped off with 15.7 gals of 80/87. It is estimated that 2-3 gals of fuel were burned during the engine run-up and return flight to the airport. (15.7 plus 10.0 minus 2.5 equals 23.7 gals). The poh of this aircraft lists the fuel capacity of 26 gals with only 22.5 gals being usable. This CFI had allowed himself to fall into a trap. He had developed a bad habit of trusting the fuel gauges of the aircraft that he regularly flew, especially when they confirmed his fuel remaining calculations. The fact that he was not completely familiar with this particular aircraft did not alter his procedure and the possibility that someone might have siphoned fuel from the aircraft never entered his mind. Good preflight procedure always has, and always will, include the visual checking of the fuel level, but sometimes we develop shortcuts which short circuit the old proven methods. This flight instructor will no longer fly without a visual check of the fuel and you may rest assured that none of his students will either!! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he learned later after reviewing the matter that there was not the fuel aboard that he had calculated since the flight he believed to be the previous flight was not. The student he thought used the aircraft for only a short time prior to his flight had actually used another aircraft. His aircraft had been used for a longer time and therefore, the fuel remaining was only sufficient for the time he subsequently flew the aircraft. He would like to have the opportunity to tell his experience to other pilots whenever possible since it had such a profound impact on his flight instructor career. He further stated that the FAA inspector advised that she was sending her report to FAA legal for action against his pilot's certificate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF AN SMA SEL MADE AN OFF ARPT FORCED LNDG AFTER THE ENG QUIT DUE TO RUNNING OUT OF FUEL.

Narrative: PRIOR TO A COMPANY FLT THE PLT REVIEWED THE ACFT RENTAL LOGBOOK AND NOTED THAT THE ACFT HAD ONLY BEEN FLOWN 1.7 HRS (HOBBS TIME) SINCE IT WAS LAST REFUELED AND THE PLT WAS THE ONE WHO REFUELED IT. DURING THE PREFLT THE PLT NOTED THAT THE R FUEL GAUGE INDICATED 3/4 FULL WHILE THE L TANK INDICATED EMPTY. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT THE L GAUGE HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP AS INACCURATE. OVER THE YRS THE PLT HAS NOTED THAT USING A FUEL CONSUMPTION FIGURE OF 6 GAL/HR WAS A CONSERVATIVE AND SAFE NUMBER TO USE IN CALCULATING THE ENDURANCE TIME IN A C150. WITH THIS INFO IN HAND HE DETERMINED THAT HE HAD SUFFICIENT FUEL TO FLY FROM SHN TO 1S0 A DISTANCE OF 35 NM, AND RETURN WITH 1 HR FUEL RESERVE REMAINING. THE FLT TO 1S0 WAS UNEVENTFUL, BUT ON THE RETURN LEG HE HAD TO USE CARB HEAT TWICE DUE TO A PARTIAL LOSS OF PWR AND ENG ROUGHNESS. USE OF THE CARB HEAT RESOLVED THE ROUGHNESS AND RESTORED NORMAL PWR. (OAT WAS 50 DEGS F WITH LIGHT RAIN AT 3000 FT MSL.) AT APPROX 7.5 NM FROM SHN THE ENG ABRUPTLY QUIT. THE IMMEDIATE APPLICATION OF CARB HEAT FAILED TO PRODUCE A RESTART. THE PLT CHKED THE FUEL GAUGES AND NOTED THAT THE R TANKS STILL INDICATED BTWN 1/4 AND 1/2 FULL WHILE THE L TANK GAUGE STILL INDICATED EMPTY. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONTACT SEA APCH SINCE THE PLT FELT THAT THEY COULD PROVIDE NO IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE OTHER THAN CREATING A DISTR FOR THE PLT. THE PLT WAS INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA SINCE HE HAD SIMULATED ENG FAILURE HUNDREDS OF TIMES FOR THE BENEFIT OF HIS PRIMARY STUDENTS. HIS POSSIBLE LNDG SITES CONSISTED OF THE SHORELINE AROUND THE BAY, THE GOLF COURSE, SEVERAL FARM FIELDS AND THE SELECTED SITE, MCEWEN PRAIRIE RD. THE ROAD PRESENTED THE BEST CHANCE OF AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG SINCE TFC WAS LIGHT, THERE WERE NO PWR LINES AND IT WAS SUFFICIENTLY WIDE. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL AND ASSISTANCE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. THE FUEL CAPS WERE FINALLY REMOVED TO VISUALLY CHK THE FUEL LEVEL. THE L TANK WAS EMPTY AND THE R TANK HAD 2-3 GALS REMAINING. 5 GALS OF FUEL WERE ADDED TO EACH TANK AND THE L GAUGE STILL INDICATED EMPTY WHILE THE R INDICATED FULL. AFTER A SUCCESSFUL FULL PWR RUN-UP WAS CONDUCTED, TFC WAS BLOCKED TO ALLOW THE ACFT TO BE FLOWN OFF THE ROAD. UPON RETURN TO SHN THE ACFT WAS TOPPED OFF WITH 15.7 GALS OF 80/87. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 2-3 GALS OF FUEL WERE BURNED DURING THE ENG RUN-UP AND RETURN FLT TO THE ARPT. (15.7 PLUS 10.0 MINUS 2.5 EQUALS 23.7 GALS). THE POH OF THIS ACFT LISTS THE FUEL CAPACITY OF 26 GALS WITH ONLY 22.5 GALS BEING USABLE. THIS CFI HAD ALLOWED HIMSELF TO FALL INTO A TRAP. HE HAD DEVELOPED A BAD HABIT OF TRUSTING THE FUEL GAUGES OF THE ACFT THAT HE REGULARLY FLEW, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY CONFIRMED HIS FUEL REMAINING CALCULATIONS. THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT COMPLETELY FAMILIAR WITH THIS PARTICULAR ACFT DID NOT ALTER HIS PROC AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEONE MIGHT HAVE SIPHONED FUEL FROM THE ACFT NEVER ENTERED HIS MIND. GOOD PREFLT PROC ALWAYS HAS, AND ALWAYS WILL, INCLUDE THE VISUAL CHKING OF THE FUEL LEVEL, BUT SOMETIMES WE DEVELOP SHORTCUTS WHICH SHORT CIRCUIT THE OLD PROVEN METHODS. THIS FLT INSTRUCTOR WILL NO LONGER FLY WITHOUT A VISUAL CHK OF THE FUEL AND YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT NONE OF HIS STUDENTS WILL EITHER!! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE LEARNED LATER AFTER REVIEWING THE MATTER THAT THERE WAS NOT THE FUEL ABOARD THAT HE HAD CALCULATED SINCE THE FLT HE BELIEVED TO BE THE PREVIOUS FLT WAS NOT. THE STUDENT HE THOUGHT USED THE ACFT FOR ONLY A SHORT TIME PRIOR TO HIS FLT HAD ACTUALLY USED ANOTHER ACFT. HIS ACFT HAD BEEN USED FOR A LONGER TIME AND THEREFORE, THE FUEL REMAINING WAS ONLY SUFFICIENT FOR THE TIME HE SUBSEQUENTLY FLEW THE ACFT. HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL HIS EXPERIENCE TO OTHER PLTS WHENEVER POSSIBLE SINCE IT HAD SUCH A PROFOUND IMPACT ON HIS FLT INSTRUCTOR CAREER. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE FAA INSPECTOR ADVISED THAT SHE WAS SENDING HER RPT TO FAA LEGAL FOR ACTION AGAINST HIS PLT'S CERTIFICATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.