Narrative:

We were executing the NDB/DME runway 9 at ptpn, WX was approximately 1200 broken to overcast, visibility at 75 mi with rain. First officer was PF. I was PNF also giving initial operating experience to the first officer as a check airman. We flew the published DME arc transition arriving from the west on R584 from truk. We arced north on the 12 mi arc and joined the 114 degree bearing inbound. At the 700 ft MSL MDA and reaching the map at 3 DME the runway lights and the rotating beacon were in sight and we continued to the airport. The sokeh cliffs are located at about a 3/4 mi final to runway 9 at 906 ft MSL. We briefed to maintain 700 ft MDA until approximately 2.5 DME in order to fly a 300 ft per mi vertical profile and to augment that with the VASI. Unfortunately, the 24 degree angle of the final approach course to the runway does not allow a view of VASI until aligned closer to final. We initiated a 700 FPM rate of descent at the agreed vdp. I recall crossing 2 DME at 600 ft MSL. From then on, I spent considerable time looking outside to provide headings to the first officer to place him on an approximately 1 mi final aligned with runway centerline. Aware of the cliffs, my 'vectoring' was conservative and we maintained a substantial angle to the centerline. This made the VASI not visible, as well as the trapezoid viewing of the runway. Apparently during the descent and maneuvering, the first officer was spending most of his time 'outside.' in addition, our so and a fourth crew member in the jump seat (giving so IOE) also were looking for visual clues in the rain distorted view out the windshield. At some point the visual clues did not look right, and an 'internal alarm' went off telling me all was not right. Looking at the flight/navigation instruments we were at 1.5 NM passing 100 ft MSL descent at about 1000 FPM! I commanded a go around and a left turn once we were climbing. We over flew the airport, leveled at 1000 ft MSL, and flew a downwind base and final to a normal landing. After parking at the gate, I pointed out our near 'splash' to the other 3 crew members as I was not sure they fully appreciated what had almost occurred. From my thoughts on the approach, I surmized that all 4 of us went outside looking for visual clues, with nobody minding the store monitoring the flight instruments. I suspect, as the first officer strained to look out the windshield, that there may have been an inadvertent forward elevator pressure that increased our rate of descent. Our training emphasizes the need to maintain profile awareness during these non precision maneuvers, however, we all got lured into finding the visual clues that rainy night at the expense of our descent profile. I have always been conscientious in briefing the MDA, map, and missed approach procedure, and make sure the so is involved with the guys up front. I shall further emphasize the need for someone staying inside to monitor the airplane's progress during these approachs. Previous simulator training emphasized that, when one pilot is 'outside,' the other should be 'inside.' I will be sure that when I am outside that the other pilot will keep his attention mostly inside. When there are sufficient visual clues to continue visual and he confirms 'runway in sight' or 'I'm visual' we will then swap duties with he being mostly outside with me going inside. There needs to be a dialogue back and forth between the 2 pilots for this to work. The so needs to be the backstop. From his position he can see the approach develop before him and should be active in calling out any deviations that the captain and first officer don't detect. Sometimes good SOP's are in place, they just need emphasizing on a regular basis to keep incidents like this from occurring.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MAKING AN APCH INTO PTPN, THE CAROLINA ISLANDS, DSNDS TO 100 FT AGL AS ALL 4 CREW MEMBERS ARE 'OUTSIDE.' MAP.

Narrative: WE WERE EXECUTING THE NDB/DME RWY 9 AT PTPN, WX WAS APPROX 1200 BROKEN TO OVCST, VISIBILITY AT 75 MI WITH RAIN. FO WAS PF. I WAS PNF ALSO GIVING INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE TO THE FO AS A CHK AIRMAN. WE FLEW THE PUBLISHED DME ARC TRANSITION ARRIVING FROM THE W ON R584 FROM TRUK. WE ARCED N ON THE 12 MI ARC AND JOINED THE 114 DEG BEARING INBOUND. AT THE 700 FT MSL MDA AND REACHING THE MAP AT 3 DME THE RWY LIGHTS AND THE ROTATING BEACON WERE IN SIGHT AND WE CONTINUED TO THE ARPT. THE SOKEH CLIFFS ARE LOCATED AT ABOUT A 3/4 MI FINAL TO RWY 9 AT 906 FT MSL. WE BRIEFED TO MAINTAIN 700 FT MDA UNTIL APPROX 2.5 DME IN ORDER TO FLY A 300 FT PER MI VERT PROFILE AND TO AUGMENT THAT WITH THE VASI. UNFORTUNATELY, THE 24 DEG ANGLE OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE TO THE RWY DOES NOT ALLOW A VIEW OF VASI UNTIL ALIGNED CLOSER TO FINAL. WE INITIATED A 700 FPM RATE OF DSCNT AT THE AGREED VDP. I RECALL XING 2 DME AT 600 FT MSL. FROM THEN ON, I SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME LOOKING OUTSIDE TO PROVIDE HDGS TO THE FO TO PLACE HIM ON AN APPROX 1 MI FINAL ALIGNED WITH RWY CTRLINE. AWARE OF THE CLIFFS, MY 'VECTORING' WAS CONSERVATIVE AND WE MAINTAINED A SUBSTANTIAL ANGLE TO THE CTRLINE. THIS MADE THE VASI NOT VISIBLE, AS WELL AS THE TRAPEZOID VIEWING OF THE RWY. APPARENTLY DURING THE DSCNT AND MANEUVERING, THE FO WAS SPENDING MOST OF HIS TIME 'OUTSIDE.' IN ADDITION, OUR SO AND A FOURTH CREW MEMBER IN THE JUMP SEAT (GIVING SO IOE) ALSO WERE LOOKING FOR VISUAL CLUES IN THE RAIN DISTORTED VIEW OUT THE WINDSHIELD. AT SOME POINT THE VISUAL CLUES DID NOT LOOK RIGHT, AND AN 'INTERNAL ALARM' WENT OFF TELLING ME ALL WAS NOT RIGHT. LOOKING AT THE FLT/NAV INSTS WE WERE AT 1.5 NM PASSING 100 FT MSL DSCNT AT ABOUT 1000 FPM! I COMMANDED A GAR AND A L TURN ONCE WE WERE CLBING. WE OVER FLEW THE ARPT, LEVELED AT 1000 FT MSL, AND FLEW A DOWNWIND BASE AND FINAL TO A NORMAL LNDG. AFTER PARKING AT THE GATE, I POINTED OUT OUR NEAR 'SPLASH' TO THE OTHER 3 CREW MEMBERS AS I WAS NOT SURE THEY FULLY APPRECIATED WHAT HAD ALMOST OCCURRED. FROM MY THOUGHTS ON THE APCH, I SURMIZED THAT ALL 4 OF US WENT OUTSIDE LOOKING FOR VISUAL CLUES, WITH NOBODY MINDING THE STORE MONITORING THE FLT INSTS. I SUSPECT, AS THE FO STRAINED TO LOOK OUT THE WINDSHIELD, THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN AN INADVERTENT FORWARD ELEVATOR PRESSURE THAT INCREASED OUR RATE OF DSCNT. OUR TRAINING EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PROFILE AWARENESS DURING THESE NON PRECISION MANEUVERS, HOWEVER, WE ALL GOT LURED INTO FINDING THE VISUAL CLUES THAT RAINY NIGHT AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR DSCNT PROFILE. I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CONSCIENTIOUS IN BRIEFING THE MDA, MAP, AND MISSED APCH PROC, AND MAKE SURE THE SO IS INVOLVED WITH THE GUYS UP FRONT. I SHALL FURTHER EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR SOMEONE STAYING INSIDE TO MONITOR THE AIRPLANE'S PROGRESS DURING THESE APCHS. PREVIOUS SIMULATOR TRAINING EMPHASIZED THAT, WHEN ONE PLT IS 'OUTSIDE,' THE OTHER SHOULD BE 'INSIDE.' I WILL BE SURE THAT WHEN I AM OUTSIDE THAT THE OTHER PLT WILL KEEP HIS ATTN MOSTLY INSIDE. WHEN THERE ARE SUFFICIENT VISUAL CLUES TO CONTINUE VISUAL AND HE CONFIRMS 'RWY IN SIGHT' OR 'I'M VISUAL' WE WILL THEN SWAP DUTIES WITH HE BEING MOSTLY OUTSIDE WITH ME GOING INSIDE. THERE NEEDS TO BE A DIALOGUE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE 2 PLTS FOR THIS TO WORK. THE SO NEEDS TO BE THE BACKSTOP. FROM HIS POS HE CAN SEE THE APCH DEVELOP BEFORE HIM AND SHOULD BE ACTIVE IN CALLING OUT ANY DEVS THAT THE CAPT AND FO DON'T DETECT. SOMETIMES GOOD SOP'S ARE IN PLACE, THEY JUST NEED EMPHASIZING ON A REGULAR BASIS TO KEEP INCIDENTS LIKE THIS FROM OCCURRING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.