Narrative:

We were cleared for takeoff on runway 23L while still taxiing and completing checklists. We taxied into position and started our takeoff roll. An alert tower controller ordered us to abort our takeoff, we were rolling down the wrong runway (runway 28, a much shorter runway). We aborted and taxied back for the proper runway. If we had not received the order to abort, the results would have been catastrophic. Amazingly, two of us had flown out of cle on numerous occasions in the past yr. We were both aware of the confusing intersection of runways 28 and 23L at cle. We even mentioned it in our brief. Yet, in the sequence of events that occurred, we all three allowed ourselves to make the mistake we said we wouldn't let happen, due to distractions, timing, and misleading cues. The flight was the first of a week-long trip. We had all been off for a week or more (I hadn't flown in 3 weeks due to other duties). It had been 4 months since I had flown out of cle. It was the first flight for this crew together. We were all adjusting our sleep patterns for a week of night freight. In a nutshell, many things seemed 'out of sync.' as a crew, we hadn't developed a good rhythm of coordination. My body was out of sync, everything seemed to require extra effort or thought. It was also the first time in about 6 months I'd flown the B200 model and its particular cockpit layout/instrumentation. Upon block out we experienced communication problems over VHF #1, our primary radio. Due to pre departure clearance procedures, the first test of our radios was the call to taxi. We eventually switched to VHF #2 as a primary radio, but on taxi-out, including a CRM brief, a takeoff brief, and the takeoff checklist, confusion developed over which radio was in use. We were expecting runway 23R, but before calling ready the tower cleared us for takeoff on runway 23L. I saw the red 'runway 23L-5R' sign and pulled into position as we completed the takeoff checklist. I was aware there was traffic behind us. After seeing the sign, I think I trusted the first officer's familiarity. I think he trusted my familiarity. We both failed to check our heading bug in the effort to expedite our takeoff. Due to the many things occupying my attention at that point, I inadvertently lined up on runway 28. The location of the 'runway 23L-5R' sign at taxiway J is very misleading and is very dangerous in my opinion, especially for night operations. This sign lulled me into making a dangerous mistake. It should be moved or removed. Thank god for an alert controller and one good radio. Supplemental information from acn 327766: the captain and myself have both flown out of cleveland on runway 23L on many occasions. We were both very aware of the close proximity of the 2 runways and I even mentioned it while taxiing out. So we were both aware of the confusing intersection at runways 28 and 23L. Due to distractions (VHF #1 problems), timing (being cleared early for takeoff), and misleading cues (runway markers), plus first flight with a new crew and schedule, we made the error.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF STARTED ON WRONG RWY AT CLE. ABORT CALLED BY TWR.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 23L WHILE STILL TAXIING AND COMPLETING CHKLISTS. WE TAXIED INTO POS AND STARTED OUR TKOF ROLL. AN ALERT TWR CTLR ORDERED US TO ABORT OUR TKOF, WE WERE ROLLING DOWN THE WRONG RWY (RWY 28, A MUCH SHORTER RWY). WE ABORTED AND TAXIED BACK FOR THE PROPER RWY. IF WE HAD NOT RECEIVED THE ORDER TO ABORT, THE RESULTS WOULD HAVE BEEN CATASTROPHIC. AMAZINGLY, TWO OF US HAD FLOWN OUT OF CLE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS IN THE PAST YR. WE WERE BOTH AWARE OF THE CONFUSING INTXN OF RWYS 28 AND 23L AT CLE. WE EVEN MENTIONED IT IN OUR BRIEF. YET, IN THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT OCCURRED, WE ALL THREE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO MAKE THE MISTAKE WE SAID WE WOULDN'T LET HAPPEN, DUE TO DISTRACTIONS, TIMING, AND MISLEADING CUES. THE FLT WAS THE FIRST OF A WK-LONG TRIP. WE HAD ALL BEEN OFF FOR A WK OR MORE (I HADN'T FLOWN IN 3 WKS DUE TO OTHER DUTIES). IT HAD BEEN 4 MONTHS SINCE I HAD FLOWN OUT OF CLE. IT WAS THE FIRST FLT FOR THIS CREW TOGETHER. WE WERE ALL ADJUSTING OUR SLEEP PATTERNS FOR A WK OF NIGHT FREIGHT. IN A NUTSHELL, MANY THINGS SEEMED 'OUT OF SYNC.' AS A CREW, WE HADN'T DEVELOPED A GOOD RHYTHM OF COORD. MY BODY WAS OUT OF SYNC, EVERYTHING SEEMED TO REQUIRE EXTRA EFFORT OR THOUGHT. IT WAS ALSO THE FIRST TIME IN ABOUT 6 MONTHS I'D FLOWN THE B200 MODEL AND ITS PARTICULAR COCKPIT LAYOUT/INSTRUMENTATION. UPON BLOCK OUT WE EXPERIENCED COM PROBS OVER VHF #1, OUR PRIMARY RADIO. DUE TO PDC PROCS, THE FIRST TEST OF OUR RADIOS WAS THE CALL TO TAXI. WE EVENTUALLY SWITCHED TO VHF #2 AS A PRIMARY RADIO, BUT ON TAXI-OUT, INCLUDING A CRM BRIEF, A TKOF BRIEF, AND THE TKOF CHKLIST, CONFUSION DEVELOPED OVER WHICH RADIO WAS IN USE. WE WERE EXPECTING RWY 23R, BUT BEFORE CALLING READY THE TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF ON RWY 23L. I SAW THE RED 'RWY 23L-5R' SIGN AND PULLED INTO POS AS WE COMPLETED THE TKOF CHKLIST. I WAS AWARE THERE WAS TFC BEHIND US. AFTER SEEING THE SIGN, I THINK I TRUSTED THE FO'S FAMILIARITY. I THINK HE TRUSTED MY FAMILIARITY. WE BOTH FAILED TO CHK OUR HEADING BUG IN THE EFFORT TO EXPEDITE OUR TKOF. DUE TO THE MANY THINGS OCCUPYING MY ATTN AT THAT POINT, I INADVERTENTLY LINED UP ON RWY 28. THE LOCATION OF THE 'RWY 23L-5R' SIGN AT TXWY J IS VERY MISLEADING AND IS VERY DANGEROUS IN MY OPINION, ESPECIALLY FOR NIGHT OPS. THIS SIGN LULLED ME INTO MAKING A DANGEROUS MISTAKE. IT SHOULD BE MOVED OR REMOVED. THANK GOD FOR AN ALERT CTLR AND ONE GOOD RADIO. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 327766: THE CAPT AND MYSELF HAVE BOTH FLOWN OUT OF CLEVELAND ON RWY 23L ON MANY OCCASIONS. WE WERE BOTH VERY AWARE OF THE CLOSE PROX OF THE 2 RWYS AND I EVEN MENTIONED IT WHILE TAXIING OUT. SO WE WERE BOTH AWARE OF THE CONFUSING INTXN AT RWYS 28 AND 23L. DUE TO DISTRACTIONS (VHF #1 PROBS), TIMING (BEING CLRED EARLY FOR TKOF), AND MISLEADING CUES (RWY MARKERS), PLUS FIRST FLT WITH A NEW CREW AND SCHEDULE, WE MADE THE ERROR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.