Narrative:

The flight is about 30 NM south of mtj on V361 at FL180. I ask for lower at my first officer request (first officer is the PF). ZDV clears us to descend to and maintain 16000 ft, which I read back, and we both confirm the assigned altitude entered into the altitude alerter. The first officer is hand-flying the aircraft at this time. I then asked the first officer to guard the #1 communication while I get the ASOS for mtj. I look out of the cockpit and can see the overcast is starting to clear to the south of the airport with it coming into view. As I return to the #1 communication, I find my first officer talking to ZDV about holding instructions over mtj and ask the first officer to clarify the clearance to me. The first officer stated hold over the mtj VOR as published, efc XA45. I pick up my chart to view the published hold on the chart. At this time ZDV called out our altitude of 14700 ft MSL and asked our assigned altitude. I looked at the altimeter and the altitude alerter to confirm the discrepancy. We then begin a climb back up to 16000 ft. ZDV then clears us for the ILS DME runway 17 approach. The rest of the flight was completed without incident. In the following discussion with my first officer I learn my first officer did not copy the clearance in its entirety. Instead of center asking if we were ready to copy, the controller just started to issue the clearance. The first officer picked up a pen and only copied down the efc of XA45 and read back the clearance to the controller. As I came up on the #1 communication and requested the clearance from my first officer which further distracted him from flying the aircraft. During the discussion I asked what altitude was assigned and he claimed not receiving an altitude nor copying it down. I feel that the communication of the clearance during the descent is what covered up the 3 chimes from the altitude alerter from being heard. No procedures were different on this flight as any other because I have flown this route many times. Areas of breakdown and correction. Center should ask 'ready to copy.' the first officer was flying the aircraft and should have told center and myself to stand by. (I have flown with this first officer on many occasions and found him eager to do a good job, but while trying to do the job failed to show command of the situation.) as I came back to communication #1 I caught only the tail of the clearance and while requesting the rest, I distracted the first officer and failed to back up the altitude. With what I heard from ASOS and what I saw outside and the thought of canceling the IFR and then hearing the holding clearance, distracted myself during a critical time. I should have monitored the first officer's flying more closely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN LTT OVERSHOT ASSIGNED DSCNT ALT DUE TO COCKPIT WORK TASK DISTR.

Narrative: THE FLT IS ABOUT 30 NM S OF MTJ ON V361 AT FL180. I ASK FOR LOWER AT MY FO REQUEST (FO IS THE PF). ZDV CLRS US TO DSND TO AND MAINTAIN 16000 FT, WHICH I READ BACK, AND WE BOTH CONFIRM THE ASSIGNED ALT ENTERED INTO THE ALT ALERTER. THE FO IS HAND-FLYING THE ACFT AT THIS TIME. I THEN ASKED THE FO TO GUARD THE #1 COM WHILE I GET THE ASOS FOR MTJ. I LOOK OUT OF THE COCKPIT AND CAN SEE THE OVCST IS STARTING TO CLR TO THE S OF THE ARPT WITH IT COMING INTO VIEW. AS I RETURN TO THE #1 COM, I FIND MY FO TALKING TO ZDV ABOUT HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS OVER MTJ AND ASK THE FO TO CLARIFY THE CLRNC TO ME. THE FO STATED HOLD OVER THE MTJ VOR AS PUBLISHED, EFC XA45. I PICK UP MY CHART TO VIEW THE PUBLISHED HOLD ON THE CHART. AT THIS TIME ZDV CALLED OUT OUR ALT OF 14700 FT MSL AND ASKED OUR ASSIGNED ALT. I LOOKED AT THE ALTIMETER AND THE ALT ALERTER TO CONFIRM THE DISCREPANCY. WE THEN BEGIN A CLB BACK UP TO 16000 FT. ZDV THEN CLRS US FOR THE ILS DME RWY 17 APCH. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. IN THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH MY FO I LEARN MY FO DID NOT COPY THE CLRNC IN ITS ENTIRETY. INSTEAD OF CTR ASKING IF WE WERE READY TO COPY, THE CTLR JUST STARTED TO ISSUE THE CLRNC. THE FO PICKED UP A PEN AND ONLY COPIED DOWN THE EFC OF XA45 AND READ BACK THE CLRNC TO THE CTLR. AS I CAME UP ON THE #1 COM AND REQUESTED THE CLRNC FROM MY FO WHICH FURTHER DISTRACTED HIM FROM FLYING THE ACFT. DURING THE DISCUSSION I ASKED WHAT ALT WAS ASSIGNED AND HE CLAIMED NOT RECEIVING AN ALT NOR COPYING IT DOWN. I FEEL THAT THE COM OF THE CLRNC DURING THE DSCNT IS WHAT COVERED UP THE 3 CHIMES FROM THE ALT ALERTER FROM BEING HEARD. NO PROCS WERE DIFFERENT ON THIS FLT AS ANY OTHER BECAUSE I HAVE FLOWN THIS RTE MANY TIMES. AREAS OF BREAKDOWN AND CORRECTION. CTR SHOULD ASK 'READY TO COPY.' THE FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND SHOULD HAVE TOLD CTR AND MYSELF TO STAND BY. (I HAVE FLOWN WITH THIS FO ON MANY OCCASIONS AND FOUND HIM EAGER TO DO A GOOD JOB, BUT WHILE TRYING TO DO THE JOB FAILED TO SHOW COMMAND OF THE SIT.) AS I CAME BACK TO COM #1 I CAUGHT ONLY THE TAIL OF THE CLRNC AND WHILE REQUESTING THE REST, I DISTRACTED THE FO AND FAILED TO BACK UP THE ALT. WITH WHAT I HEARD FROM ASOS AND WHAT I SAW OUTSIDE AND THE THOUGHT OF CANCELING THE IFR AND THEN HEARING THE HOLDING CLRNC, DISTRACTED MYSELF DURING A CRITICAL TIME. I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED THE FO'S FLYING MORE CLOSELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.