Narrative:

The flight was from danbury, ct (owd), to lancaster, PA (lns). The route was cmk sax etx lrp. The flight was VFR with radar advisories and a VFR flight plan. Forecast and conditions were VFR, with ceilings 4500 ft or so all along the route of flight. Flight precautions for icing hadn't been mentioned in my briefing. Along the leg from cmk to sax there were scattered clouds at 4500 ft, and no other layers. It was very bumpy and my passenger was prone to motion sickness, so I elected to climb above the 4500 ft layer. Visibility was reporting unrestr at lancaster, so I felt confident I could descend at the other end. Continuing along the route I found that the clouds continued to thicken and additional layers showed up, but I could still see lots of large holes in the clouds where cities showed through. It seemed I could always descend through one of these holes. I continued to climb, to 10500 ft. The cloud deck beneath me was well illuminated by the moon, and appeared to have a maximum ht of about 8500 ft. There were still several holes 20 or 25 mi to the north and to the south of my route of flight where I could have easily descended. By this time I was tracking etx inbound and had been cruising at 10500 ft for about 25 mins. My autoplt was engaged and I was comfortably tracking etx, watching traffic and enjoying the scenery. Suddenly it occurred to me I was feeling a little too good, and that I was feeling lightheaded. I became very concerned I might be suffering hypoxia, so I informed ATC I would be descending, and initiated a descent. At around 9500 ft, I was 1000 ft above the cloud deck and had to make a decision. I wanted to descend further, but because I was closer to the cloud tops I was no longer able to see the holes that I could descend through VFR. I didn't want to climb back up to look for them. I didn't want to engage ATC in a long discussion about how to get down. I probably should have called flight watch and ascertained the conditions at my destination, and just stayed at my altitude till I got there, but I was worried about lack of oxygen even at 9500 ft and how that would be affecting me an hour later. Also, on the last 2 or 3 occasions over the last few months when I had tried to reach flight watch I had not received any response. I didn't want to arrive over my destination at 9500 ft and realize that I had to turn around. I was conscious of fuel management. My flight from norwood had been planned for 2 hours 41 mins fuel, and I had taken 5 hours fuel, but I had landed at danbury without taking on more fuel and this had added nearly an hour to my fuel use. That meant that wandering around for an extra 1/2 hour looking for a way out would eat into my reserves. I didn't know where I'd be able to land. I didn't want to cause a lot of confusion with ATC. I had some get-there-itis. I was comfortable with my flight plan and didn't want to wander off searching for an airport to land at. I didn't want the situation to become more complicated, and convinced myself that descent through the clouds was the safest and most practical choice. For some reason which seems ludicrous to me now, I was convinced that the cloud layer was very thin, that since I had been able to see all the way through here and there just a few mins before, the cloud deck couldn't be very thick. This was a major lesson for me about how different the WX can be from 1 mi to the next. Thinking all this through, it seemed that a quick descent through the clouds would be the safest course of action. So on instruments I maintained my course and descended into the clouds. Much to my surprise (why was I surprised?), the descent was not brief. When I was at about 5000 ft I verified on the VFR chart the minimum obstruction clearance for the area was better than 2100 ft, and decided that if I reached 3000 ft without breaking out I would start to climb back. At 4500 ft I broke out of the clouds, having passed through a solid cloud deck almost 4000 ft thick. During the descent the controller said: 'xyz confirm you're on a VFR flight plan.' I simply applied 'affirmative, xyz.' at the time, perhaps because of mild hypoxia,it seemed that descending was an urgent priority and that I was within the pilot's prerogative to violate FARS in an emergency, but upon landing it became clear to me I had other options I hadn't exercised. My state of mind was interesting. I wasn't panicking or frightened, I simply decided logically that I would get into more trouble if I didn't descend through the clouds. I was in good VFR and flew into the clouds because I had become convinced that there were overriding reasons to be doing that. I was anxious about the physiological factors of hypoxia that were an unknown to me, and yet ironically I may have been responding to those very factors in making the decision. That night, I had a terrible night's sleep feeling guilty and worried, running the situation over and over in my mind. Why didn't I talk to ATC? A combination of arrogance and fear I suppose. I had never done anything like this before and while it seemed sensible at the time, it seemed in retrospect to be incredibly stupid and arrogant the more I thought about it. The fact that I'm so close to acquiring an instrument rating notwithstanding, and that I've just bought my own airplane after 10 yrs of seriously planning to get one, I want to survive to enjoy it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT ON VFR FLT PLAN AND NOT IFR RATED FLEW INTO CLOUDS. A VERY CONFUSED LOW TIME PLT.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS FROM DANBURY, CT (OWD), TO LANCASTER, PA (LNS). THE RTE WAS CMK SAX ETX LRP. THE FLT WAS VFR WITH RADAR ADVISORIES AND A VFR FLT PLAN. FORECAST AND CONDITIONS WERE VFR, WITH CEILINGS 4500 FT OR SO ALL ALONG THE RTE OF FLT. FLT PRECAUTIONS FOR ICING HADN'T BEEN MENTIONED IN MY BRIEFING. ALONG THE LEG FROM CMK TO SAX THERE WERE SCATTERED CLOUDS AT 4500 FT, AND NO OTHER LAYERS. IT WAS VERY BUMPY AND MY PAX WAS PRONE TO MOTION SICKNESS, SO I ELECTED TO CLB ABOVE THE 4500 FT LAYER. VISIBILITY WAS RPTING UNRESTR AT LANCASTER, SO I FELT CONFIDENT I COULD DSND AT THE OTHER END. CONTINUING ALONG THE RTE I FOUND THAT THE CLOUDS CONTINUED TO THICKEN AND ADDITIONAL LAYERS SHOWED UP, BUT I COULD STILL SEE LOTS OF LARGE HOLES IN THE CLOUDS WHERE CITIES SHOWED THROUGH. IT SEEMED I COULD ALWAYS DSND THROUGH ONE OF THESE HOLES. I CONTINUED TO CLB, TO 10500 FT. THE CLOUD DECK BENEATH ME WAS WELL ILLUMINATED BY THE MOON, AND APPEARED TO HAVE A MAX HT OF ABOUT 8500 FT. THERE WERE STILL SEVERAL HOLES 20 OR 25 MI TO THE N AND TO THE S OF MY RTE OF FLT WHERE I COULD HAVE EASILY DSNDED. BY THIS TIME I WAS TRACKING ETX INBOUND AND HAD BEEN CRUISING AT 10500 FT FOR ABOUT 25 MINS. MY AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND I WAS COMFORTABLY TRACKING ETX, WATCHING TFC AND ENJOYING THE SCENERY. SUDDENLY IT OCCURRED TO ME I WAS FEELING A LITTLE TOO GOOD, AND THAT I WAS FEELING LIGHTHEADED. I BECAME VERY CONCERNED I MIGHT BE SUFFERING HYPOXIA, SO I INFORMED ATC I WOULD BE DSNDING, AND INITIATED A DSCNT. AT AROUND 9500 FT, I WAS 1000 FT ABOVE THE CLOUD DECK AND HAD TO MAKE A DECISION. I WANTED TO DSND FURTHER, BUT BECAUSE I WAS CLOSER TO THE CLOUD TOPS I WAS NO LONGER ABLE TO SEE THE HOLES THAT I COULD DSND THROUGH VFR. I DIDN'T WANT TO CLB BACK UP TO LOOK FOR THEM. I DIDN'T WANT TO ENGAGE ATC IN A LONG DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW TO GET DOWN. I PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE CALLED FLT WATCH AND ASCERTAINED THE CONDITIONS AT MY DEST, AND JUST STAYED AT MY ALT TILL I GOT THERE, BUT I WAS WORRIED ABOUT LACK OF OXYGEN EVEN AT 9500 FT AND HOW THAT WOULD BE AFFECTING ME AN HR LATER. ALSO, ON THE LAST 2 OR 3 OCCASIONS OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS WHEN I HAD TRIED TO REACH FLT WATCH I HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY RESPONSE. I DIDN'T WANT TO ARRIVE OVER MY DEST AT 9500 FT AND REALIZE THAT I HAD TO TURN AROUND. I WAS CONSCIOUS OF FUEL MGMNT. MY FLT FROM NORWOOD HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR 2 HRS 41 MINS FUEL, AND I HAD TAKEN 5 HRS FUEL, BUT I HAD LANDED AT DANBURY WITHOUT TAKING ON MORE FUEL AND THIS HAD ADDED NEARLY AN HR TO MY FUEL USE. THAT MEANT THAT WANDERING AROUND FOR AN EXTRA 1/2 HR LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT WOULD EAT INTO MY RESERVES. I DIDN'T KNOW WHERE I'D BE ABLE TO LAND. I DIDN'T WANT TO CAUSE A LOT OF CONFUSION WITH ATC. I HAD SOME GET-THERE-ITIS. I WAS COMFORTABLE WITH MY FLT PLAN AND DIDN'T WANT TO WANDER OFF SEARCHING FOR AN ARPT TO LAND AT. I DIDN'T WANT THE SIT TO BECOME MORE COMPLICATED, AND CONVINCED MYSELF THAT DSCNT THROUGH THE CLOUDS WAS THE SAFEST AND MOST PRACTICAL CHOICE. FOR SOME REASON WHICH SEEMS LUDICROUS TO ME NOW, I WAS CONVINCED THAT THE CLOUD LAYER WAS VERY THIN, THAT SINCE I HAD BEEN ABLE TO SEE ALL THE WAY THROUGH HERE AND THERE JUST A FEW MINS BEFORE, THE CLOUD DECK COULDN'T BE VERY THICK. THIS WAS A MAJOR LESSON FOR ME ABOUT HOW DIFFERENT THE WX CAN BE FROM 1 MI TO THE NEXT. THINKING ALL THIS THROUGH, IT SEEMED THAT A QUICK DSCNT THROUGH THE CLOUDS WOULD BE THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. SO ON INSTS I MAINTAINED MY COURSE AND DSNDED INTO THE CLOUDS. MUCH TO MY SURPRISE (WHY WAS I SURPRISED?), THE DSCNT WAS NOT BRIEF. WHEN I WAS AT ABOUT 5000 FT I VERIFIED ON THE VFR CHART THE MINIMUM OBSTRUCTION CLRNC FOR THE AREA WAS BETTER THAN 2100 FT, AND DECIDED THAT IF I REACHED 3000 FT WITHOUT BREAKING OUT I WOULD START TO CLB BACK. AT 4500 FT I BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS, HAVING PASSED THROUGH A SOLID CLOUD DECK ALMOST 4000 FT THICK. DURING THE DSCNT THE CTLR SAID: 'XYZ CONFIRM YOU'RE ON A VFR FLT PLAN.' I SIMPLY APPLIED 'AFFIRMATIVE, XYZ.' AT THE TIME, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF MILD HYPOXIA,IT SEEMED THAT DSNDING WAS AN URGENT PRIORITY AND THAT I WAS WITHIN THE PLT'S PREROGATIVE TO VIOLATE FARS IN AN EMER, BUT UPON LNDG IT BECAME CLR TO ME I HAD OTHER OPTIONS I HADN'T EXERCISED. MY STATE OF MIND WAS INTERESTING. I WASN'T PANICKING OR FRIGHTENED, I SIMPLY DECIDED LOGICALLY THAT I WOULD GET INTO MORE TROUBLE IF I DIDN'T DSND THROUGH THE CLOUDS. I WAS IN GOOD VFR AND FLEW INTO THE CLOUDS BECAUSE I HAD BECOME CONVINCED THAT THERE WERE OVERRIDING REASONS TO BE DOING THAT. I WAS ANXIOUS ABOUT THE PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF HYPOXIA THAT WERE AN UNKNOWN TO ME, AND YET IRONICALLY I MAY HAVE BEEN RESPONDING TO THOSE VERY FACTORS IN MAKING THE DECISION. THAT NIGHT, I HAD A TERRIBLE NIGHT'S SLEEP FEELING GUILTY AND WORRIED, RUNNING THE SIT OVER AND OVER IN MY MIND. WHY DIDN'T I TALK TO ATC? A COMBINATION OF ARROGANCE AND FEAR I SUPPOSE. I HAD NEVER DONE ANYTHING LIKE THIS BEFORE AND WHILE IT SEEMED SENSIBLE AT THE TIME, IT SEEMED IN RETROSPECT TO BE INCREDIBLY STUPID AND ARROGANT THE MORE I THOUGHT ABOUT IT. THE FACT THAT I'M SO CLOSE TO ACQUIRING AN INST RATING NOTWITHSTANDING, AND THAT I'VE JUST BOUGHT MY OWN AIRPLANE AFTER 10 YRS OF SERIOUSLY PLANNING TO GET ONE, I WANT TO SURVIVE TO ENJOY IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.