Narrative:

First officer was flying the aircraft, climbing initially up to 17000 ft, expecting an initial cruising altitude in the low 30's. After passing 10000 ft, I starting executing my duties, which includes company ETA's for all the points in the flight plan. Meanwhile, I periodically kept an eye on the progress of the flight, to include the monitoring of aircraft system. Initially, the first officer was flying a heading provided by ATC. The autoplt was hooked up, he said, although I didn't really notice one way or another. Within 1000 ft of level off, ATC cleared the flight direct to abr, along with a frequency change. The captain acknowledged ATC and the first officer reiterated the clearance, direct to abr. We checked our INS's, set up the new course, and somewhere along the line the altitude alerter went off, the altitude was acknowledged by both the captain and the first officer, and it appeared the aircraft was leveling off at 17000 ft (which leads me to believe the autoplt was engaged, as the first officer later declared). Right around level off, the first officer stated he was having problems going direct to abr -- the aircraft turned right when he thought it should have turned left. Looking to the front, I looked to see if there was some system malfunction. I noticed the autoplt was off at this point (the first officer later stated he had punched it off when it didn't appear to be going in the right direction). While looking toward the captain's flight instruments, I noticed the altitude had climbed to 17300 ft plus or minus 300 ft. Thinking I had missed an altitude clearance, I looked at the altitude alerter window, saw that 17000 ft was apparently the last cleared altitude, and then called out, 'altitude.' the necessary correction was made, we leveled off at 17000 ft, and went on our way, direct to abr. The handoff to another ATC controller -- no mention was made of the deviation by either sector controller, nor was there any traffic. Strict, disciplined fly-the-aircraft-first philosophy probably could have prevented this from occurring. If the first officer had just concentrated on flying the aircraft, while letting the other crew members solve any problem, this may not have occurred. So delegation of work was a factor. Also, ATC was partially culpable, issuing an unnecessary clearance, leveling off. Supplemental information from acn 328794: due to vacation the first officer had not flown for 3 weeks prior to this trip.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A WDB OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT DURING CLB WHEN THEY WERE GIVEN A DIRECT CLRNC AND RADIO CHANGE WHILE LEVELING OFF. THE FLC BECAME DISTRACTED BY A DIRECT COURSE THAT DIDN'T APPEAR CORRECT.

Narrative: FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT, CLBING INITIALLY UP TO 17000 FT, EXPECTING AN INITIAL CRUISING ALT IN THE LOW 30'S. AFTER PASSING 10000 FT, I STARTING EXECUTING MY DUTIES, WHICH INCLUDES COMPANY ETA'S FOR ALL THE POINTS IN THE FLT PLAN. MEANWHILE, I PERIODICALLY KEPT AN EYE ON THE PROGRESS OF THE FLT, TO INCLUDE THE MONITORING OF ACFT SYS. INITIALLY, THE FO WAS FLYING A HEADING PROVIDED BY ATC. THE AUTOPLT WAS HOOKED UP, HE SAID, ALTHOUGH I DIDN'T REALLY NOTICE ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. WITHIN 1000 FT OF LEVEL OFF, ATC CLRED THE FLT DIRECT TO ABR, ALONG WITH A FREQ CHANGE. THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED ATC AND THE FO REITERATED THE CLRNC, DIRECT TO ABR. WE CHKED OUR INS'S, SET UP THE NEW COURSE, AND SOMEWHERE ALONG THE LINE THE ALT ALERTER WENT OFF, THE ALT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY BOTH THE CAPT AND THE FO, AND IT APPEARED THE ACFT WAS LEVELING OFF AT 17000 FT (WHICH LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED, AS THE FO LATER DECLARED). RIGHT AROUND LEVEL OFF, THE FO STATED HE WAS HAVING PROBS GOING DIRECT TO ABR -- THE ACFT TURNED R WHEN HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD HAVE TURNED L. LOOKING TO THE FRONT, I LOOKED TO SEE IF THERE WAS SOME SYS MALFUNCTION. I NOTICED THE AUTOPLT WAS OFF AT THIS POINT (THE FO LATER STATED HE HAD PUNCHED IT OFF WHEN IT DIDN'T APPEAR TO BE GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION). WHILE LOOKING TOWARD THE CAPT'S FLT INSTS, I NOTICED THE ALT HAD CLBED TO 17300 FT PLUS OR MINUS 300 FT. THINKING I HAD MISSED AN ALT CLRNC, I LOOKED AT THE ALT ALERTER WINDOW, SAW THAT 17000 FT WAS APPARENTLY THE LAST CLRED ALT, AND THEN CALLED OUT, 'ALT.' THE NECESSARY CORRECTION WAS MADE, WE LEVELED OFF AT 17000 FT, AND WENT ON OUR WAY, DIRECT TO ABR. THE HDOF TO ANOTHER ATC CTLR -- NO MENTION WAS MADE OF THE DEV BY EITHER SECTOR CTLR, NOR WAS THERE ANY TFC. STRICT, DISCIPLINED FLY-THE-ACFT-FIRST PHILOSOPHY PROBABLY COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS FROM OCCURRING. IF THE FO HAD JUST CONCENTRATED ON FLYING THE ACFT, WHILE LETTING THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS SOLVE ANY PROB, THIS MAY NOT HAVE OCCURRED. SO DELEGATION OF WORK WAS A FACTOR. ALSO, ATC WAS PARTIALLY CULPABLE, ISSUING AN UNNECESSARY CLRNC, LEVELING OFF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 328794: DUE TO VACATION THE FO HAD NOT FLOWN FOR 3 WKS PRIOR TO THIS TRIP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.