Narrative:

The actual mishap occurred during landing on runway 28 at syracuse hancock international and physical damage to the right leading edge and trailing edge flaps (all outboard) were discovered. I say 'discovered' because the damage was actually found during the mechanic's postflt. The crew and 2 jumpseaters had no idea that ground contact had taken place (other than normal!). The mishap followed an approach to CAT I minimums with 1800 ft RVR at night. This WX had deteriorated from approximately 1 1/2 mi visibility over the time that it took to fly from standiford field, louisville, ky, to syracuse (approximately +30). It was the first officer's leg. When we received the first ATIS, visibility had dropped to about 3/4 mi, and then as we descended/maneuvered for the approach, visibility dropped to 1800 ft RVR (still legal). The approach was properly briefed and the fact that it would be a coupled approach was mentioned -- since the visibility was below 3/4 mi/4000 ft RVR. I also mentioned, in the late stages before the approach, that since the ceiling was now 100 ft we should expect to see only approach lights at minimums and were legal to continue to 100 ft AGL and then below if we then saw the 'red' lights. It was still 'legal' for the first officer to fly the approach as per our recent change to our flight operations manual. As we intercepted the localizer the aircraft overshot the course but the first officer intercepted the course by manually kicking off the autoplt and flying the aircraft. By GS intercept we were on course but off autoplt -- still legal if the autocoupler was not up to snuff. The first officer flew a very nice, stabilized approach. A few hundred ft above minimums she was slightly left (approximately 1/3 to 1/2 DOT) and I casually mentioned this trend so that she would casually correct, which she did very smoothly. At 100 ft above minimums we still had not picked up any lights, etc, and I was expecting a go around. Just at minimums, I call 'minimums' and was ready to say go around when I then saw the approach lights at approximately 12 O'clock so I called them and said 'you can continue.' shortly thereafter I saw the red side bar lights and runway lights but we were drifting slightly right. I mentioned this and the first officer corrected to the left (still in a nice, stabilized descent). She overshot the centerline to the left and was still drifting when I came on the controls to arrest the drift and right wing low situation. A smooth touchdown was made slightly left of centerline as I said 'I have the aircraft.' there was no indication of any contact with the runway (other than normal). In fact both myself and both company jumpseaters mentioned the nice approach and smooth touchdown to the first officer. When we (the crew) were in the hotel van we talked more about the approach/landing. The first officer said 'thanks for the help on the landing' and I replied that I may have been premature and that she probably didn't need the help. In hindsight, that was obviously wrong, I should have helped out sooner and landed or directed a go around. By the time I took control, the only options were to land, or go around after the touchdown. This points out some problems in multi-crew member aircraft and cockpit resource management. We, as a crew, were new to each other, and even though what we did was legal, it obviously was not the best answer! I assumed that since the first officer was doing a nice job overall and on the approach that the landing transition would also be acceptable. That was obviously not the case. Given our unfamiliarity, I should have shot the approach and landing, considering the low visibility. I think the performance of other crew members can only be assessed by observance and I had not seen the first officer land before -- I assumed it would be as good as the rest of her performance. That unfamiliarity and the incipient change from not so bad WX to minimums WX contributed to this incident. I will never forget the seriousness of this business, nor this 'near miss' and I hope we all can learn something in regards to 'legal' and 'smart.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WITH WX AT MINIMUMS, ACFT WAS DRIFTING JUST PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN, CORRECTION MADE, BUT ACFT WING HIT GND DAMAGING LEADING AND TRAILING EDGE FLAPS.

Narrative: THE ACTUAL MISHAP OCCURRED DURING LNDG ON RWY 28 AT SYRACUSE HANCOCK INTL AND PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE R LEADING EDGE AND TRAILING EDGE FLAPS (ALL OUTBOARD) WERE DISCOVERED. I SAY 'DISCOVERED' BECAUSE THE DAMAGE WAS ACTUALLY FOUND DURING THE MECH'S POSTFLT. THE CREW AND 2 JUMPSEATERS HAD NO IDEA THAT GND CONTACT HAD TAKEN PLACE (OTHER THAN NORMAL!). THE MISHAP FOLLOWED AN APCH TO CAT I MINIMUMS WITH 1800 FT RVR AT NIGHT. THIS WX HAD DETERIORATED FROM APPROX 1 1/2 MI VISIBILITY OVER THE TIME THAT IT TOOK TO FLY FROM STANDIFORD FIELD, LOUISVILLE, KY, TO SYRACUSE (APPROX +30). IT WAS THE FO'S LEG. WHEN WE RECEIVED THE FIRST ATIS, VISIBILITY HAD DROPPED TO ABOUT 3/4 MI, AND THEN AS WE DSNDED/MANEUVERED FOR THE APCH, VISIBILITY DROPPED TO 1800 FT RVR (STILL LEGAL). THE APCH WAS PROPERLY BRIEFED AND THE FACT THAT IT WOULD BE A COUPLED APCH WAS MENTIONED -- SINCE THE VISIBILITY WAS BELOW 3/4 MI/4000 FT RVR. I ALSO MENTIONED, IN THE LATE STAGES BEFORE THE APCH, THAT SINCE THE CEILING WAS NOW 100 FT WE SHOULD EXPECT TO SEE ONLY APCH LIGHTS AT MINIMUMS AND WERE LEGAL TO CONTINUE TO 100 FT AGL AND THEN BELOW IF WE THEN SAW THE 'RED' LIGHTS. IT WAS STILL 'LEGAL' FOR THE FO TO FLY THE APCH AS PER OUR RECENT CHANGE TO OUR FLT OPS MANUAL. AS WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC THE ACFT OVERSHOT THE COURSE BUT THE FO INTERCEPTED THE COURSE BY MANUALLY KICKING OFF THE AUTOPLT AND FLYING THE ACFT. BY GS INTERCEPT WE WERE ON COURSE BUT OFF AUTOPLT -- STILL LEGAL IF THE AUTOCOUPLER WAS NOT UP TO SNUFF. THE FO FLEW A VERY NICE, STABILIZED APCH. A FEW HUNDRED FT ABOVE MINIMUMS SHE WAS SLIGHTLY L (APPROX 1/3 TO 1/2 DOT) AND I CASUALLY MENTIONED THIS TREND SO THAT SHE WOULD CASUALLY CORRECT, WHICH SHE DID VERY SMOOTHLY. AT 100 FT ABOVE MINIMUMS WE STILL HAD NOT PICKED UP ANY LIGHTS, ETC, AND I WAS EXPECTING A GAR. JUST AT MINIMUMS, I CALL 'MINIMUMS' AND WAS READY TO SAY GAR WHEN I THEN SAW THE APCH LIGHTS AT APPROX 12 O'CLOCK SO I CALLED THEM AND SAID 'YOU CAN CONTINUE.' SHORTLY THEREAFTER I SAW THE RED SIDE BAR LIGHTS AND RWY LIGHTS BUT WE WERE DRIFTING SLIGHTLY R. I MENTIONED THIS AND THE FO CORRECTED TO THE L (STILL IN A NICE, STABILIZED DSCNT). SHE OVERSHOT THE CTRLINE TO THE L AND WAS STILL DRIFTING WHEN I CAME ON THE CTLS TO ARREST THE DRIFT AND R WING LOW SIT. A SMOOTH TOUCHDOWN WAS MADE SLIGHTLY L OF CTRLINE AS I SAID 'I HAVE THE ACFT.' THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF ANY CONTACT WITH THE RWY (OTHER THAN NORMAL). IN FACT BOTH MYSELF AND BOTH COMPANY JUMPSEATERS MENTIONED THE NICE APCH AND SMOOTH TOUCHDOWN TO THE FO. WHEN WE (THE CREW) WERE IN THE HOTEL VAN WE TALKED MORE ABOUT THE APCH/LNDG. THE FO SAID 'THANKS FOR THE HELP ON THE LNDG' AND I REPLIED THAT I MAY HAVE BEEN PREMATURE AND THAT SHE PROBABLY DIDN'T NEED THE HELP. IN HINDSIGHT, THAT WAS OBVIOUSLY WRONG, I SHOULD HAVE HELPED OUT SOONER AND LANDED OR DIRECTED A GAR. BY THE TIME I TOOK CTL, THE ONLY OPTIONS WERE TO LAND, OR GAR AFTER THE TOUCHDOWN. THIS POINTS OUT SOME PROBS IN MULTI-CREW MEMBER ACFT AND COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT. WE, AS A CREW, WERE NEW TO EACH OTHER, AND EVEN THOUGH WHAT WE DID WAS LEGAL, IT OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT THE BEST ANSWER! I ASSUMED THAT SINCE THE FO WAS DOING A NICE JOB OVERALL AND ON THE APCH THAT THE LNDG TRANSITION WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE. THAT WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT THE CASE. GIVEN OUR UNFAMILIARITY, I SHOULD HAVE SHOT THE APCH AND LNDG, CONSIDERING THE LOW VISIBILITY. I THINK THE PERFORMANCE OF OTHER CREW MEMBERS CAN ONLY BE ASSESSED BY OBSERVANCE AND I HAD NOT SEEN THE FO LAND BEFORE -- I ASSUMED IT WOULD BE AS GOOD AS THE REST OF HER PERFORMANCE. THAT UNFAMILIARITY AND THE INCIPIENT CHANGE FROM NOT SO BAD WX TO MINIMUMS WX CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. I WILL NEVER FORGET THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS BUSINESS, NOR THIS 'NEAR MISS' AND I HOPE WE ALL CAN LEARN SOMETHING IN REGARDS TO 'LEGAL' AND 'SMART.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.