Narrative:

En route we had an avionics malfunction on the r-hand side (first officer's side). Both EFIS tubes were affected. After running the checklist the problem seemed to have corrected itself. This is common in the saab. The captain determined not to write it up. On approach into mem, I noted a good localizer indication on EFIS. We were given an intercept heading and instructed to remain at 2000 ft until inside the 14 DME fix and cleared the approach. I intercepted the localizer and once inside the fix the GS came alive. I informed the captain that once I'd intercepted it, I'd follow it down. He acknowledged. This would give us a GS intercept outside the marker and above final fix altitude. The captain did not make any of the standard ILS approach calls. He never called localizer or GS alive. He didn't make altitude calls, the most critical of which is 'final fix altitude, instrument xchk, no flags.' the aircraft we were assigned that night has no DME readout on the first officer's side. This affects your scan somewhat, though I had DME information from his side. Throughout most of the approach all indications were normal. Near the marker the captain said 'you're not on it.' this is a nonstandard call and the only call he made during the entire approach. My side still showed exactly on localizer and GS. The needles were centered and there was no abnormal indication. I looked over at his tubes and saw the GS needle indicating 1 1/2 dots low. When I looked back at mine the GS indicator had now red flagged. I initiated a pull-up and transitioned the controls over to him since it was obvious that my side was providing erroneous information. He also saw the red flag by now. At this point approach said they had an altitude alert on us but noted we were climbing. The captain reported an avionics failure on the r-hand side. We wrote this up on the ground. There was never any warning caption alerting us that my side didn't agree with his. I was focused on my instruments so was not scanning his. He should have been scanning mine, however. He also should have called GS deviation before allowing a 1 1/2 DOT deviation. He should have been making altitude calls and the final fix call. On my part, I should have monitored the DME readout from his side more closely. This would have alerted me to the fact that my altitude should have been higher at that DME distance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT WASN'T HELPING RPTR FO DURING INST ILS APCH. HE DIDN'T MAKE ANY STANDARD CALLOUTS AND DIDN'T ALERT THE FO THAT HER ILS WAS FLAGGED AND THE ACFT WAS 1 1/2 DOTS LOW ON GS. RPTR TURNED ACFT OVER TO CAPT JUST AS CTLR INTERVENED WITH LOW ALT ALERT CALL.

Narrative: ENRTE WE HAD AN AVIONICS MALFUNCTION ON THE R-HAND SIDE (FO'S SIDE). BOTH EFIS TUBES WERE AFFECTED. AFTER RUNNING THE CHKLIST THE PROB SEEMED TO HAVE CORRECTED ITSELF. THIS IS COMMON IN THE SAAB. THE CAPT DETERMINED NOT TO WRITE IT UP. ON APCH INTO MEM, I NOTED A GOOD LOC INDICATION ON EFIS. WE WERE GIVEN AN INTERCEPT HDG AND INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN AT 2000 FT UNTIL INSIDE THE 14 DME FIX AND CLRED THE APCH. I INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND ONCE INSIDE THE FIX THE GS CAME ALIVE. I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT ONCE I'D INTERCEPTED IT, I'D FOLLOW IT DOWN. HE ACKNOWLEDGED. THIS WOULD GIVE US A GS INTERCEPT OUTSIDE THE MARKER AND ABOVE FINAL FIX ALT. THE CAPT DID NOT MAKE ANY OF THE STANDARD ILS APCH CALLS. HE NEVER CALLED LOC OR GS ALIVE. HE DIDN'T MAKE ALT CALLS, THE MOST CRITICAL OF WHICH IS 'FINAL FIX ALT, INST XCHK, NO FLAGS.' THE ACFT WE WERE ASSIGNED THAT NIGHT HAS NO DME READOUT ON THE FO'S SIDE. THIS AFFECTS YOUR SCAN SOMEWHAT, THOUGH I HAD DME INFO FROM HIS SIDE. THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE APCH ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. NEAR THE MARKER THE CAPT SAID 'YOU'RE NOT ON IT.' THIS IS A NONSTANDARD CALL AND THE ONLY CALL HE MADE DURING THE ENTIRE APCH. MY SIDE STILL SHOWED EXACTLY ON LOC AND GS. THE NEEDLES WERE CTRED AND THERE WAS NO ABNORMAL INDICATION. I LOOKED OVER AT HIS TUBES AND SAW THE GS NEEDLE INDICATING 1 1/2 DOTS LOW. WHEN I LOOKED BACK AT MINE THE GS INDICATOR HAD NOW RED FLAGGED. I INITIATED A PULL-UP AND TRANSITIONED THE CTLS OVER TO HIM SINCE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT MY SIDE WAS PROVIDING ERRONEOUS INFO. HE ALSO SAW THE RED FLAG BY NOW. AT THIS POINT APCH SAID THEY HAD AN ALT ALERT ON US BUT NOTED WE WERE CLBING. THE CAPT RPTED AN AVIONICS FAILURE ON THE R-HAND SIDE. WE WROTE THIS UP ON THE GND. THERE WAS NEVER ANY WARNING CAPTION ALERTING US THAT MY SIDE DIDN'T AGREE WITH HIS. I WAS FOCUSED ON MY INSTS SO WAS NOT SCANNING HIS. HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SCANNING MINE, HOWEVER. HE ALSO SHOULD HAVE CALLED GS DEV BEFORE ALLOWING A 1 1/2 DOT DEV. HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MAKING ALT CALLS AND THE FINAL FIX CALL. ON MY PART, I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED THE DME READOUT FROM HIS SIDE MORE CLOSELY. THIS WOULD HAVE ALERTED ME TO THE FACT THAT MY ALT SHOULD HAVE BEEN HIGHER AT THAT DME DISTANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.