Narrative:

Conditions were reported by ATIS as 1400 overcast, 2 mi visibility in light snow with winds at 340 degrees, 23 KTS, gusting 29 KTS. The tower reported on initial contact that the runway had just been plowed and the braking action was reported as good. On touchdown, the spoilers had to be manually extended by the so, probably because of the lack of main wheel spinup. Before I had time to reach for the thrust reversers, the aircraft wxvaned into the wind and started an immediate slide for the runway edge to the right. I elected not to use any reverse thrust as I felt it would only aggravate the slide and tried to keep the airplane on the runway with rudder while continuing to hold the aileron in. I felt we might have exited the runway surface or at least struck some runway lights and the aircraft remained in a 10-15 degree alignment to the left of runway heading. In an effort to return us back to the runway, I added some power on all engines. The addition of power brought us back up onto the runway surface approximately 2500 ft from where we initially exited the pavement. I taxied to the gate and requested a debrief from the company duty officer at the aircraft. Several factors, some determined the next day, enter into the chain of events that led to this incident. Although the tower controller reported to us on initial contact that the runway had been recently plowed and the braking action was good, it had in fact been treated by 3 trucks covering a width of about 40 ft down the centerline 10 mins prior to our landing. The width of the DC10 gear is 40 ft. This meant that the treatment added further liquid to the snow and slush covered runway surface, or changed the snow into slush further contaminating the runway. I believe the depth of the contamination, judging by our view of the tracks left by the maintenance vehicle used by the inspecting mechanics, exceeded the 1 inch maximum of our aircraft specifications. Also, I do not know what effect the deicing fluid had on the braking effectiveness. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said that the runway had been plowed and that 3 or 4 trucks had spread urea on the plowed center section of the runway. This, in the reporter's opinion, simply created an effect similar to a ditch full of slush. As the DC10-10 touched down it immediately started to wxvane and slide towards the edge of the runway. The reporter said that he was not sure how far off the runway surface the aircraft had traveled, but he thought that they were closer than they were. The FAA has ruled this an incident. All of the tires had to be changed as well as the brakes and 2 flap segments were changed because of dents. Maintenance also changed engines #1 and #2. The reporter was unable to get information on the engine changes which were puzzling to him as neither of these engines went off the hard surface and would not have been exposed to mud. The company did not issue any discipline. The reporter further said that the mechanics attempted to inspect the engines during the unloading process, but the engine's spin could not be stopped in the high wind morning so the inspection was postponed. In the reporter's opinion the runway should have been completely plowed and swept or it should have been closed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10-10 FREIGHTER SLID OFF RWY 5R AT IND AFTER TOUCHING DOWN ON SNOW AND SLUSH WITH A STRONG XWIND. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS DAMAGE TO THE ACFT THE FAA HAS RULED THIS AN INCIDENT.

Narrative: CONDITIONS WERE RPTED BY ATIS AS 1400 OVCST, 2 MI VISIBILITY IN LIGHT SNOW WITH WINDS AT 340 DEGS, 23 KTS, GUSTING 29 KTS. THE TWR RPTED ON INITIAL CONTACT THAT THE RWY HAD JUST BEEN PLOWED AND THE BRAKING ACTION WAS RPTED AS GOOD. ON TOUCHDOWN, THE SPOILERS HAD TO BE MANUALLY EXTENDED BY THE SO, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF MAIN WHEEL SPINUP. BEFORE I HAD TIME TO REACH FOR THE THRUST REVERSERS, THE ACFT WXVANED INTO THE WIND AND STARTED AN IMMEDIATE SLIDE FOR THE RWY EDGE TO THE R. I ELECTED NOT TO USE ANY REVERSE THRUST AS I FELT IT WOULD ONLY AGGRAVATE THE SLIDE AND TRIED TO KEEP THE AIRPLANE ON THE RWY WITH RUDDER WHILE CONTINUING TO HOLD THE AILERON IN. I FELT WE MIGHT HAVE EXITED THE RWY SURFACE OR AT LEAST STRUCK SOME RWY LIGHTS AND THE ACFT REMAINED IN A 10-15 DEG ALIGNMENT TO THE L OF RWY HDG. IN AN EFFORT TO RETURN US BACK TO THE RWY, I ADDED SOME PWR ON ALL ENGS. THE ADDITION OF PWR BROUGHT US BACK UP ONTO THE RWY SURFACE APPROX 2500 FT FROM WHERE WE INITIALLY EXITED THE PAVEMENT. I TAXIED TO THE GATE AND REQUESTED A DEBRIEF FROM THE COMPANY DUTY OFFICER AT THE ACFT. SEVERAL FACTORS, SOME DETERMINED THE NEXT DAY, ENTER INTO THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THIS INCIDENT. ALTHOUGH THE TWR CTLR RPTED TO US ON INITIAL CONTACT THAT THE RWY HAD BEEN RECENTLY PLOWED AND THE BRAKING ACTION WAS GOOD, IT HAD IN FACT BEEN TREATED BY 3 TRUCKS COVERING A WIDTH OF ABOUT 40 FT DOWN THE CTRLINE 10 MINS PRIOR TO OUR LNDG. THE WIDTH OF THE DC10 GEAR IS 40 FT. THIS MEANT THAT THE TREATMENT ADDED FURTHER LIQUID TO THE SNOW AND SLUSH COVERED RWY SURFACE, OR CHANGED THE SNOW INTO SLUSH FURTHER CONTAMINATING THE RWY. I BELIEVE THE DEPTH OF THE CONTAMINATION, JUDGING BY OUR VIEW OF THE TRACKS LEFT BY THE MAINT VEHICLE USED BY THE INSPECTING MECHS, EXCEEDED THE 1 INCH MAX OF OUR ACFT SPECS. ALSO, I DO NOT KNOW WHAT EFFECT THE DEICING FLUID HAD ON THE BRAKING EFFECTIVENESS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT THE RWY HAD BEEN PLOWED AND THAT 3 OR 4 TRUCKS HAD SPREAD UREA ON THE PLOWED CTR SECTION OF THE RWY. THIS, IN THE RPTR'S OPINION, SIMPLY CREATED AN EFFECT SIMILAR TO A DITCH FULL OF SLUSH. AS THE DC10-10 TOUCHED DOWN IT IMMEDIATELY STARTED TO WXVANE AND SLIDE TOWARDS THE EDGE OF THE RWY. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE HOW FAR OFF THE RWY SURFACE THE ACFT HAD TRAVELED, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE CLOSER THAN THEY WERE. THE FAA HAS RULED THIS AN INCIDENT. ALL OF THE TIRES HAD TO BE CHANGED AS WELL AS THE BRAKES AND 2 FLAP SEGMENTS WERE CHANGED BECAUSE OF DENTS. MAINT ALSO CHANGED ENGS #1 AND #2. THE RPTR WAS UNABLE TO GET INFO ON THE ENG CHANGES WHICH WERE PUZZLING TO HIM AS NEITHER OF THESE ENGS WENT OFF THE HARD SURFACE AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO MUD. THE COMPANY DID NOT ISSUE ANY DISCIPLINE. THE RPTR FURTHER SAID THAT THE MECHS ATTEMPTED TO INSPECT THE ENGS DURING THE UNLOADING PROCESS, BUT THE ENG'S SPIN COULD NOT BE STOPPED IN THE HIGH WIND MORNING SO THE INSPECTION WAS POSTPONED. IN THE RPTR'S OPINION THE RWY SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY PLOWED AND SWEPT OR IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLOSED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.