Narrative:

Burbank airport, pilot's home base, routinely conducts simultaneous operations on intersecting runways (8 and 15). Landing clrncs typically contain a 'hold short' instruction, requiring a full stop prior to reaching the intersecting runway. Pilot has successfully executed such 'land and hold short' instructions at burbank on over 100 occasions. In the present instance, pilot was cleared to land on runway 8, with an instruction to 'hold short' of runway 15. A strong crosswind was present on runway 8 (then current ATIS at bur stated winds out of 140 degrees and 12 KTS). Pilot executed a normal, stabilized approach to landing on runway 8, but encountered a strong crosswind gust on flareout (believed to be substantially stronger than 12 KTS), causing the aircraft to land hard on one wheel and to bounce. Pilot attempted to correct but, in pilot's judgement, had excessive drift due to the gusty xwinds to successfully complete the landing on runway 8. Thus, as he had been trained to do, pilot aborted the landing attempt, applied full power and executed a go around. Pilot announced the go around to the tower immediately upon deciding to do so. Pilot's aircraft crossed the intersection with runway 15 while climbing at approximately 50 ft AGL. Pilot then was cleared to land on runway 15 and did so without further incident. After landing, pilot was advised by the tower that another aircraft had been cleared for takeoff on runway 15 and, because of the go around, had to abort the takeoff. Pilot was advised that the departing aircraft on runway 15 was able to come to a full stop prior to reaching the intersection of runway 8. Nonetheless, as the tower controller explained (and as pilot acknowledges) there was clearly the potential for a disastrous traffic conflict arising out of pilot's failure to successfully execute the 'hold short' instruction. Pilot nonetheless believes that, given his primary responsibility for the safety of his passenger and himself, he had no alternative under the circumstances but to abort the landing and execute the go around. On initial contact with socal approach, approximately 15 mi out, pilot requested a straight-in to runway 15 and was sequenced to land #2 on straight-in approach to runway 15. After handoff to bur tower, pilot was initially told that he was #2 for landing on runway 15. Approximately 3 mi out, however, tower requested pilot to make left base for landing on runway 8. In retrospect, given pilot's knowledge that winds strongly favored runway 15 for landing and pilot's relatively low time in aircraft type, pilot probably should have rejected the landing clearance on runway 8 and insisted on a clearance to land on runway 15. Pilot's confidence in his crosswind landing abilities and desire not to disrupt the flow of traffic into a busy airport probably should not have been allowed to override his earlier judgement that landing on runway 15 was the best and safest course of action. In pilot's view 'simultaneous operations' on intersecting runways should not necessarily include issuance of simultaneous clrncs on the intersecting runways without regard for potential traffic conflicts. Particularly where a controller is aware of a significant crosswind or other potentially adverse landing conditions on one of the intersecting runways, it seems that the controller should at least wait until the landing aircraft is observed to be safely on the ground and rolling out before issuing a takeoff clearance on the intersecting runway. It seems that the few seconds to be saved by omitting this step are hardly worth the risks involved. Pilot had only about 8 hours total time in cessna 210 and had never landed that particular aircraft in a substantial crosswind. Another possible contributing factor, in retrospect, was pilot fatigue. The subject incident occurred at the conclusion of a 1 hour and 40 min cross country flight returning from a ski trip, where pilot had been skiing for approximately 4 hours on the morning of the incident. Had pilot gotten more rest after engaging in strenuous physical activity, his flying skills may well have been a bit sharper and up to what proved to be demanding situation. Suggestion: there is no reason why airports conducting simultaneous operations on intersecting runways should be inherently more dangerous than others. Nonetheless, controllers should recognize that as landing conditions on one of the intersecting rwysbecome increasingly adverse, due to xwinds or other factors, the margin of safety should be correspondingly increased. Although this pilot has learned the hard way, from experience, it is suggested that efforts be made to educate pilots about using airports conducting simultaneous operations on intersecting runways. Pilots should be made aware that acceptance of a 'land and hold short' clearance can result in their having very limited options available to them once they are over the runway threshold. Pilots should be reminded that, as the ones responsible for the safety of their passenger, they are not required to accept such a 'land and hold short' clearance on a runway with unfavorable landing conditions but that they should insist on a clearance to land on the more favorable runway if their better judgement tells them to do so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER ACCEPTING A 'LAND AND HOLD SHORT' CLRNC, THE RPTR BOUNCED A C210 WHILE LNDG IN A XWIND AND EXECUTED A GAR. THE RPTR'S ACFT CONFLICTED WITH ANOTHER ACFT THAT HAD RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC FROM AN INTERSECTING RWY. THE OTHER ACFT ABORTED TKOF.

Narrative: BURBANK ARPT, PLT'S HOME BASE, ROUTINELY CONDUCTS SIMULTANEOUS OPS ON INTERSECTING RWYS (8 AND 15). LNDG CLRNCS TYPICALLY CONTAIN A 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTION, REQUIRING A FULL STOP PRIOR TO REACHING THE INTERSECTING RWY. PLT HAS SUCCESSFULLY EXECUTED SUCH 'LAND AND HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTIONS AT BURBANK ON OVER 100 OCCASIONS. IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE, PLT WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 8, WITH AN INSTRUCTION TO 'HOLD SHORT' OF RWY 15. A STRONG XWIND WAS PRESENT ON RWY 8 (THEN CURRENT ATIS AT BUR STATED WINDS OUT OF 140 DEGS AND 12 KTS). PLT EXECUTED A NORMAL, STABILIZED APCH TO LNDG ON RWY 8, BUT ENCOUNTERED A STRONG XWIND GUST ON FLAREOUT (BELIEVED TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY STRONGER THAN 12 KTS), CAUSING THE ACFT TO LAND HARD ON ONE WHEEL AND TO BOUNCE. PLT ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT BUT, IN PLT'S JUDGEMENT, HAD EXCESSIVE DRIFT DUE TO THE GUSTY XWINDS TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THE LNDG ON RWY 8. THUS, AS HE HAD BEEN TRAINED TO DO, PLT ABORTED THE LNDG ATTEMPT, APPLIED FULL PWR AND EXECUTED A GAR. PLT ANNOUNCED THE GAR TO THE TWR IMMEDIATELY UPON DECIDING TO DO SO. PLT'S ACFT CROSSED THE INTXN WITH RWY 15 WHILE CLBING AT APPROX 50 FT AGL. PLT THEN WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 15 AND DID SO WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AFTER LNDG, PLT WAS ADVISED BY THE TWR THAT ANOTHER ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 15 AND, BECAUSE OF THE GAR, HAD TO ABORT THE TKOF. PLT WAS ADVISED THAT THE DEPARTING ACFT ON RWY 15 WAS ABLE TO COME TO A FULL STOP PRIOR TO REACHING THE INTXN OF RWY 8. NONETHELESS, AS THE TWR CTLR EXPLAINED (AND AS PLT ACKNOWLEDGES) THERE WAS CLRLY THE POTENTIAL FOR A DISASTROUS TFC CONFLICT ARISING OUT OF PLT'S FAILURE TO SUCCESSFULLY EXECUTE THE 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTION. PLT NONETHELESS BELIEVES THAT, GIVEN HIS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SAFETY OF HIS PAX AND HIMSELF, HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES BUT TO ABORT THE LNDG AND EXECUTE THE GAR. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH SOCAL APCH, APPROX 15 MI OUT, PLT REQUESTED A STRAIGHT-IN TO RWY 15 AND WAS SEQUENCED TO LAND #2 ON STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO RWY 15. AFTER HDOF TO BUR TWR, PLT WAS INITIALLY TOLD THAT HE WAS #2 FOR LNDG ON RWY 15. APPROX 3 MI OUT, HOWEVER, TWR REQUESTED PLT TO MAKE L BASE FOR LNDG ON RWY 8. IN RETROSPECT, GIVEN PLT'S KNOWLEDGE THAT WINDS STRONGLY FAVORED RWY 15 FOR LNDG AND PLT'S RELATIVELY LOW TIME IN ACFT TYPE, PLT PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE REJECTED THE LNDG CLRNC ON RWY 8 AND INSISTED ON A CLRNC TO LAND ON RWY 15. PLT'S CONFIDENCE IN HIS XWIND LNDG ABILITIES AND DESIRE NOT TO DISRUPT THE FLOW OF TFC INTO A BUSY ARPT PROBABLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO OVERRIDE HIS EARLIER JUDGEMENT THAT LNDG ON RWY 15 WAS THE BEST AND SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. IN PLT'S VIEW 'SIMULTANEOUS OPS' ON INTERSECTING RWYS SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY INCLUDE ISSUANCE OF SIMULTANEOUS CLRNCS ON THE INTERSECTING RWYS WITHOUT REGARD FOR POTENTIAL TFC CONFLICTS. PARTICULARLY WHERE A CTLR IS AWARE OF A SIGNIFICANT XWIND OR OTHER POTENTIALLY ADVERSE LNDG CONDITIONS ON ONE OF THE INTERSECTING RWYS, IT SEEMS THAT THE CTLR SHOULD AT LEAST WAIT UNTIL THE LNDG ACFT IS OBSERVED TO BE SAFELY ON THE GND AND ROLLING OUT BEFORE ISSUING A TKOF CLRNC ON THE INTERSECTING RWY. IT SEEMS THAT THE FEW SECONDS TO BE SAVED BY OMITTING THIS STEP ARE HARDLY WORTH THE RISKS INVOLVED. PLT HAD ONLY ABOUT 8 HRS TOTAL TIME IN CESSNA 210 AND HAD NEVER LANDED THAT PARTICULAR ACFT IN A SUBSTANTIAL XWIND. ANOTHER POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR, IN RETROSPECT, WAS PLT FATIGUE. THE SUBJECT INCIDENT OCCURRED AT THE CONCLUSION OF A 1 HR AND 40 MIN XCOUNTRY FLT RETURNING FROM A SKI TRIP, WHERE PLT HAD BEEN SKIING FOR APPROX 4 HRS ON THE MORNING OF THE INCIDENT. HAD PLT GOTTEN MORE REST AFTER ENGAGING IN STRENUOUS PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, HIS FLYING SKILLS MAY WELL HAVE BEEN A BIT SHARPER AND UP TO WHAT PROVED TO BE DEMANDING SIT. SUGGESTION: THERE IS NO REASON WHY ARPTS CONDUCTING SIMULTANEOUS OPS ON INTERSECTING RWYS SHOULD BE INHERENTLY MORE DANGEROUS THAN OTHERS. NONETHELESS, CTLRS SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT AS LNDG CONDITIONS ON ONE OF THE INTERSECTING RWYSBECOME INCREASINGLY ADVERSE, DUE TO XWINDS OR OTHER FACTORS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY SHOULD BE CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASED. ALTHOUGH THIS PLT HAS LEARNED THE HARD WAY, FROM EXPERIENCE, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT EFFORTS BE MADE TO EDUCATE PLTS ABOUT USING ARPTS CONDUCTING SIMULTANEOUS OPS ON INTERSECTING RWYS. PLTS SHOULD BE MADE AWARE THAT ACCEPTANCE OF A 'LAND AND HOLD SHORT' CLRNC CAN RESULT IN THEIR HAVING VERY LIMITED OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THEM ONCE THEY ARE OVER THE RWY THRESHOLD. PLTS SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT, AS THE ONES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF THEIR PAX, THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT SUCH A 'LAND AND HOLD SHORT' CLRNC ON A RWY WITH UNFAVORABLE LNDG CONDITIONS BUT THAT THEY SHOULD INSIST ON A CLRNC TO LAND ON THE MORE FAVORABLE RWY IF THEIR BETTER JUDGEMENT TELLS THEM TO DO SO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.