Narrative:

The occurrences of the flight were as follows: while en route to rdu I encountered unforecast IFR conditions at approximately 35 mi southeast of rdu. While flying at approximately 1300 ft MSL, I was just able to pick up rdu's ATIS information and realized that the WX had deteriorated to much worse than was forecast. Conditions were 4 overcast 2 mi fog at rdu at approximately XA20 am. I was already greater than 1/2 way to my destination and knew of the high towers close to my route. Because it was night, I decided that it would be unsafe and illegal to descend any lower. A turn back towards oaj was not feasible. I had encountered IMC and was more than 1/2 way to my destination, therefore not legally able to continue the flight under VFR. Moreover, I was concerned about the safety of the flight due to ground obstructions near my position and the absence of forward visibility. I am a current and rated instrument pilot. My part 135 training and judgement made me realize it was necessary for me to declare an emergency in accordance with regulations. I squawked 7700 and contacted gsb approach on 123.7, the closest radar approach facility. I informed gsb approach that I was declaring an emergency because I am VFR part 135 pilot and had encountered unforecast IMC and requested an IFR flight plan to rdu. I began an immediate climb away from danger to 4000 ft MSL, changed my squawk code and proceeded direct rdu as instructed by gsb approach. I was handed off to rdu approach and completed the ILS runway 23R approach into rdu without incident. I then taxied to commercial cargo operations where I immediately contacted director of operations, and I was instructed to remain at rdu because the flight could not be completed under VFR part 135 regulations. I have over 800 hours of flight time, and have been trained well for part 135 operations. Company policy insists that our pilots operate in strict accordance with our operations manual. I was concerned for my safety and refuse to operate contrary to part 135 regulations. This is the reason for my actions. Accurate WX information is pertinent to any flight. I now realize that I did not have the most recent WX prior to my departure. I cannot be certain if this would have made a difference because I do not have access to past WX at this time. Rdu could have still been MVFR upon my departure and deteriorated while en route. I will not know. Regardless, the briefer did not mention any conditions less than MVFR at the time of my standard briefing. I did inform him of my departure time and he failed to mention that the WX would be updated in less than 1/2 hour. If I would have known this, I would certainly have rechked before departing. Therefore, I feel that to prevent recurrence of this or similar sits, WX briefer should always make pilots aware of the timeliness of WX updates. Better WX education for pilots is a foundation as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE RPTR CONTINUED IN MARGINAL VFR INTO UNFORECAST IFR, DECLARED AN EMER AND RECEIVED AN IFR CLRNC TO HIS DEST RDU.

Narrative: THE OCCURRENCES OF THE FLT WERE AS FOLLOWS: WHILE ENRTE TO RDU I ENCOUNTERED UNFORECAST IFR CONDITIONS AT APPROX 35 MI SE OF RDU. WHILE FLYING AT APPROX 1300 FT MSL, I WAS JUST ABLE TO PICK UP RDU'S ATIS INFO AND REALIZED THAT THE WX HAD DETERIORATED TO MUCH WORSE THAN WAS FORECAST. CONDITIONS WERE 4 OVCST 2 MI FOG AT RDU AT APPROX XA20 AM. I WAS ALREADY GREATER THAN 1/2 WAY TO MY DEST AND KNEW OF THE HIGH TWRS CLOSE TO MY RTE. BECAUSE IT WAS NIGHT, I DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE UNSAFE AND ILLEGAL TO DSND ANY LOWER. A TURN BACK TOWARDS OAJ WAS NOT FEASIBLE. I HAD ENCOUNTERED IMC AND WAS MORE THAN 1/2 WAY TO MY DEST, THEREFORE NOT LEGALLY ABLE TO CONTINUE THE FLT UNDER VFR. MOREOVER, I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE FLT DUE TO GND OBSTRUCTIONS NEAR MY POS AND THE ABSENCE OF FORWARD VISIBILITY. I AM A CURRENT AND RATED INST PLT. MY PART 135 TRAINING AND JUDGEMENT MADE ME REALIZE IT WAS NECESSARY FOR ME TO DECLARE AN EMER IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGS. I SQUAWKED 7700 AND CONTACTED GSB APCH ON 123.7, THE CLOSEST RADAR APCH FACILITY. I INFORMED GSB APCH THAT I WAS DECLARING AN EMER BECAUSE I AM VFR PART 135 PLT AND HAD ENCOUNTERED UNFORECAST IMC AND REQUESTED AN IFR FLT PLAN TO RDU. I BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE CLB AWAY FROM DANGER TO 4000 FT MSL, CHANGED MY SQUAWK CODE AND PROCEEDED DIRECT RDU AS INSTRUCTED BY GSB APCH. I WAS HANDED OFF TO RDU APCH AND COMPLETED THE ILS RWY 23R APCH INTO RDU WITHOUT INCIDENT. I THEN TAXIED TO COMMERCIAL CARGO OPS WHERE I IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED DIRECTOR OF OPS, AND I WAS INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN AT RDU BECAUSE THE FLT COULD NOT BE COMPLETED UNDER VFR PART 135 REGS. I HAVE OVER 800 HRS OF FLT TIME, AND HAVE BEEN TRAINED WELL FOR PART 135 OPS. COMPANY POLICY INSISTS THAT OUR PLTS OPERATE IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OPS MANUAL. I WAS CONCERNED FOR MY SAFETY AND REFUSE TO OPERATE CONTRARY TO PART 135 REGS. THIS IS THE REASON FOR MY ACTIONS. ACCURATE WX INFO IS PERTINENT TO ANY FLT. I NOW REALIZE THAT I DID NOT HAVE THE MOST RECENT WX PRIOR TO MY DEP. I CANNOT BE CERTAIN IF THIS WOULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE BECAUSE I DO NOT HAVE ACCESS TO PAST WX AT THIS TIME. RDU COULD HAVE STILL BEEN MVFR UPON MY DEP AND DETERIORATED WHILE ENRTE. I WILL NOT KNOW. REGARDLESS, THE BRIEFER DID NOT MENTION ANY CONDITIONS LESS THAN MVFR AT THE TIME OF MY STANDARD BRIEFING. I DID INFORM HIM OF MY DEP TIME AND HE FAILED TO MENTION THAT THE WX WOULD BE UPDATED IN LESS THAN 1/2 HR. IF I WOULD HAVE KNOWN THIS, I WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE RECHKED BEFORE DEPARTING. THEREFORE, I FEEL THAT TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THIS OR SIMILAR SITS, WX BRIEFER SHOULD ALWAYS MAKE PLTS AWARE OF THE TIMELINESS OF WX UPDATES. BETTER WX EDUCATION FOR PLTS IS A FOUNDATION AS WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.