Narrative:

Ground staff loaded aircraft with all existing baggage, company mail, and cargo, then placed 18 passenger aboard. During loading at cargo area, miscounted baggage and cargo weights. Crew departed after deplaning 2 passenger and 2 bags. On arrival to out-station asked for recount which we picked up during our off-call. Due to short flts and ground turn times it was 3 flts later when the magnitude of the problem was determined. Aircraft was originally 500 pounds over maximum ramp weight before load reduction. After that, it had departed 125 pounds over maximum ramp weight. Our takeoff was 150 pounds over maximum takeoff weight (certified maximum weight), 150 pounds over maximum structural climb weight. Arrived at the destination airport 180 pounds over maximum certified landing weight. Cargo area 'aft 1' was overloaded by 241 pounds. Center of gravity was guessed (since no figures exist for the overweight cargo area) to be 8-10 index units aft of the aft limit value on our graphs. Once problem was realized the aircraft was inspected by maintenance personnel and ok'd for return to service. However, the aircraft was operated for 3 flight segments before being inspected for structural problems. Recommendations: 1) commuter/regional airlines train ground staffs to be familiar with limitations on loading cargo areas. Presently, they seem to think that as long as there is physical space available, they can continue to put on baggage and cargo. 2) flcs who sense a load problem and request a recount, not depart on any further flight until sure that aircraft was not overloaded. Or if it was, get the structural inspection required before departure. Commuter stage lengths and ground times tend to delay final analysis if it's being carried out while trying to maintain the company's schedule. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states he reported to company and they reported to FAA in an agreement that no punitive action is taken. The problem arose that this had happened 3 times in 4 months. It does not appear to be one person's fault, but the entire loading procedures. 5 people pick up baggage/cargo from around the field plus from a holding area at the company facility. Consequently there are 6 people loading the aircraft. They are supposed to mark a form indicating how many bags are loaded. Some feel if there is room/space they can load it on. People forget to mark the form at times. Reporter also states that many of their passenger are infantry men going to fort riley. Their bags do not 'average' as normal travelers do. They are usually much heavier. Company is examining the training of ground personnel and teaching how the aircraft can be safely loaded. FAA is very involved in this and indicate they want hard evidence of the changes. Reporter's main concern is that the flight crew flew 3 legs before they got the actual weights, and then realized how poorly they were loaded and how far aircraft center of gravity limits were exceeded without an inspection. Part of this is due to the quick turn around and reluctance of flight crew to cause delay while the records are computed. In this instance they were given information to indicate a 54 pound overweight, when it was actually 338 pounds. The BE1900D has a grey section on the aft center of gravity chart where one can use full nose down trim to compensate at takeoff. This allowed the takeoff with no extreme control aspects. Reporter is worried that at some time an overweight/aft loading could cause loss of aircraft control. Interestingly enough the maintenance inspector suggested reporter send the ASRS report. Reporter's main concern is to assure that this will not happen again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER ACFT OVERLOADED AND OUT OF CTR OF GRAVITY. 3 LEGS FLOWN WITHOUT INSPECTION OF ACFT.

Narrative: GND STAFF LOADED ACFT WITH ALL EXISTING BAGGAGE, COMPANY MAIL, AND CARGO, THEN PLACED 18 PAX ABOARD. DURING LOADING AT CARGO AREA, MISCOUNTED BAGGAGE AND CARGO WEIGHTS. CREW DEPARTED AFTER DEPLANING 2 PAX AND 2 BAGS. ON ARR TO OUT-STATION ASKED FOR RECOUNT WHICH WE PICKED UP DURING OUR OFF-CALL. DUE TO SHORT FLTS AND GND TURN TIMES IT WAS 3 FLTS LATER WHEN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROB WAS DETERMINED. ACFT WAS ORIGINALLY 500 LBS OVER MAX RAMP WEIGHT BEFORE LOAD REDUCTION. AFTER THAT, IT HAD DEPARTED 125 LBS OVER MAX RAMP WEIGHT. OUR TKOF WAS 150 LBS OVER MAX TKOF WEIGHT (CERTIFIED MAX WEIGHT), 150 LBS OVER MAX STRUCTURAL CLB WEIGHT. ARRIVED AT THE DEST ARPT 180 LBS OVER MAX CERTIFIED LNDG WEIGHT. CARGO AREA 'AFT 1' WAS OVERLOADED BY 241 LBS. CTR OF GRAVITY WAS GUESSED (SINCE NO FIGURES EXIST FOR THE OVERWT CARGO AREA) TO BE 8-10 INDEX UNITS AFT OF THE AFT LIMIT VALUE ON OUR GRAPHS. ONCE PROB WAS REALIZED THE ACFT WAS INSPECTED BY MAINT PERSONNEL AND OK'D FOR RETURN TO SVC. HOWEVER, THE ACFT WAS OPERATED FOR 3 FLT SEGMENTS BEFORE BEING INSPECTED FOR STRUCTURAL PROBS. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) COMMUTER/REGIONAL AIRLINES TRAIN GND STAFFS TO BE FAMILIAR WITH LIMITATIONS ON LOADING CARGO AREAS. PRESENTLY, THEY SEEM TO THINK THAT AS LONG AS THERE IS PHYSICAL SPACE AVAILABLE, THEY CAN CONTINUE TO PUT ON BAGGAGE AND CARGO. 2) FLCS WHO SENSE A LOAD PROB AND REQUEST A RECOUNT, NOT DEPART ON ANY FURTHER FLT UNTIL SURE THAT ACFT WAS NOT OVERLOADED. OR IF IT WAS, GET THE STRUCTURAL INSPECTION REQUIRED BEFORE DEP. COMMUTER STAGE LENGTHS AND GND TIMES TEND TO DELAY FINAL ANALYSIS IF IT'S BEING CARRIED OUT WHILE TRYING TO MAINTAIN THE COMPANY'S SCHEDULE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES HE RPTED TO COMPANY AND THEY RPTED TO FAA IN AN AGREEMENT THAT NO PUNITIVE ACTION IS TAKEN. THE PROB AROSE THAT THIS HAD HAPPENED 3 TIMES IN 4 MONTHS. IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ONE PERSON'S FAULT, BUT THE ENTIRE LOADING PROCS. 5 PEOPLE PICK UP BAGGAGE/CARGO FROM AROUND THE FIELD PLUS FROM A HOLDING AREA AT THE COMPANY FACILITY. CONSEQUENTLY THERE ARE 6 PEOPLE LOADING THE ACFT. THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO MARK A FORM INDICATING HOW MANY BAGS ARE LOADED. SOME FEEL IF THERE IS ROOM/SPACE THEY CAN LOAD IT ON. PEOPLE FORGET TO MARK THE FORM AT TIMES. RPTR ALSO STATES THAT MANY OF THEIR PAX ARE INFANTRY MEN GOING TO FORT RILEY. THEIR BAGS DO NOT 'AVERAGE' AS NORMAL TRAVELERS DO. THEY ARE USUALLY MUCH HEAVIER. COMPANY IS EXAMINING THE TRAINING OF GND PERSONNEL AND TEACHING HOW THE ACFT CAN BE SAFELY LOADED. FAA IS VERY INVOLVED IN THIS AND INDICATE THEY WANT HARD EVIDENCE OF THE CHANGES. RPTR'S MAIN CONCERN IS THAT THE FLC FLEW 3 LEGS BEFORE THEY GOT THE ACTUAL WTS, AND THEN REALIZED HOW POORLY THEY WERE LOADED AND HOW FAR ACFT CTR OF GRAVITY LIMITS WERE EXCEEDED WITHOUT AN INSPECTION. PART OF THIS IS DUE TO THE QUICK TURN AROUND AND RELUCTANCE OF FLC TO CAUSE DELAY WHILE THE RECORDS ARE COMPUTED. IN THIS INSTANCE THEY WERE GIVEN INFO TO INDICATE A 54 LB OVERWT, WHEN IT WAS ACTUALLY 338 LBS. THE BE1900D HAS A GREY SECTION ON THE AFT CTR OF GRAVITY CHART WHERE ONE CAN USE FULL NOSE DOWN TRIM TO COMPENSATE AT TKOF. THIS ALLOWED THE TKOF WITH NO EXTREME CTL ASPECTS. RPTR IS WORRIED THAT AT SOME TIME AN OVERWT/AFT LOADING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ACFT CTL. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH THE MAINT INSPECTOR SUGGESTED RPTR SEND THE ASRS RPT. RPTR'S MAIN CONCERN IS TO ASSURE THAT THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.