Narrative:

Departure was delayed because aircraft's automatic fueling shut- offs closed early and prevented fuel from being added. Various maintenance procedures were attempted without correcting the problem. About 6 hours passed and some passenger were off-loaded and rebooked. Also some cargo was off-loaded. The result was that the fuel on board was adequate for dispatch. Because of maintenance personnel transferring fuel between tanks in their effort to correct problem, fuel load was 'non standard.' tank qtys were relayed to weight and balance personnel through the dispatcher. During pushback we received a radio message that #2 main had to be burned down to 84.5 before takeoff and we complied. I monitored company radio frequency in case additional information was broadcast before takeoff, none was heard. After takeoff, since it was an augmented crew, I took a 3 hour break. Upon returning to the cockpit I was told that dispatch had sent an ACARS message that the outboard reserves had to be 'full' for the takeoff to be legal. Message was discovered in queue about 1 hour after takeoff. Crew members in the cockpit told me they had sent a message that reserves had been 'full' for the takeoff (they had actually been short by 600-1000 pounds). Takeoff performance appeared normal. We were somewhat at a disadvantage in discovering the problem ourselves, since our only way of determining the requirement restr was an obscure note in our cockpit operating manual. We relied on 'the airline's system' to keep us out of trouble and it didn't work very well.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB ACFT TKOF DTW WITH IMPROPER FUEL LOADING.

Narrative: DEP WAS DELAYED BECAUSE ACFT'S AUTOMATIC FUELING SHUT- OFFS CLOSED EARLY AND PREVENTED FUEL FROM BEING ADDED. VARIOUS MAINT PROCS WERE ATTEMPTED WITHOUT CORRECTING THE PROB. ABOUT 6 HRS PASSED AND SOME PAX WERE OFF-LOADED AND REBOOKED. ALSO SOME CARGO WAS OFF-LOADED. THE RESULT WAS THAT THE FUEL ON BOARD WAS ADEQUATE FOR DISPATCH. BECAUSE OF MAINT PERSONNEL TRANSFERRING FUEL BTWN TANKS IN THEIR EFFORT TO CORRECT PROB, FUEL LOAD WAS 'NON STANDARD.' TANK QTYS WERE RELAYED TO WT AND BAL PERSONNEL THROUGH THE DISPATCHER. DURING PUSHBACK WE RECEIVED A RADIO MESSAGE THAT #2 MAIN HAD TO BE BURNED DOWN TO 84.5 BEFORE TKOF AND WE COMPLIED. I MONITORED COMPANY RADIO FREQ IN CASE ADDITIONAL INFO WAS BROADCAST BEFORE TKOF, NONE WAS HEARD. AFTER TKOF, SINCE IT WAS AN AUGMENTED CREW, I TOOK A 3 HR BREAK. UPON RETURNING TO THE COCKPIT I WAS TOLD THAT DISPATCH HAD SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE THAT THE OUTBOARD RESERVES HAD TO BE 'FULL' FOR THE TKOF TO BE LEGAL. MESSAGE WAS DISCOVERED IN QUEUE ABOUT 1 HR AFTER TKOF. CREW MEMBERS IN THE COCKPIT TOLD ME THEY HAD SENT A MESSAGE THAT RESERVES HAD BEEN 'FULL' FOR THE TKOF (THEY HAD ACTUALLY BEEN SHORT BY 600-1000 LBS). TKOF PERFORMANCE APPEARED NORMAL. WE WERE SOMEWHAT AT A DISADVANTAGE IN DISCOVERING THE PROB OURSELVES, SINCE OUR ONLY WAY OF DETERMINING THE REQUIREMENT RESTR WAS AN OBSCURE NOTE IN OUR COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL. WE RELIED ON 'THE AIRLINE'S SYS' TO KEEP US OUT OF TROUBLE AND IT DIDN'T WORK VERY WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.