Narrative:

10 mins prior to departure, an FAA inspector entered the cockpit and asked if we had done a walk around. I replied that I had. He advised us that our right stall vane was bent and that he had called maintenance. We accompanied him to the ramp, where he showed us the bent vane and discussed the possible causes and effects of the damage. He said he found quite a few on his walk arounds and that he was trying to get some action from the FAA air carrier and or teledyne to fix what he saw as a significant hazard (he cited the twa 1011 mishap at jfk). The interaction between the FAA inspector and ord maintenance made us wonder if there was an agenda that went beyond the safety of our particular airplane. Certainly my own preflight of the stall vane will change from looking at it from the side only to sighting down the fuselage, which is the only way the bend was visible. Supplemental information from acn 352005: in dealing with the inspector and maintenance it became clear that there was some tension between the parties. Maintenance seemed to feel the vane was not a problem, while the inspector felt that the seemingly bent vane on our aircraft was not only a problem that needed to be fixed, but an example of a more wide spread problem. My concern is since our walk around inspection did not reveal the problem found by the inspector, that we somehow become involved in the hard feelings between maintenance and the inspector.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MD80, SUPER 80 FLC IS INFORMED BY AN FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR THAT THE R STALL WARNING VANE WAS OUT OF ALIGNMENT.

Narrative: 10 MINS PRIOR TO DEP, AN FAA INSPECTOR ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND ASKED IF WE HAD DONE A WALK AROUND. I REPLIED THAT I HAD. HE ADVISED US THAT OUR R STALL VANE WAS BENT AND THAT HE HAD CALLED MAINT. WE ACCOMPANIED HIM TO THE RAMP, WHERE HE SHOWED US THE BENT VANE AND DISCUSSED THE POSSIBLE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE DAMAGE. HE SAID HE FOUND QUITE A FEW ON HIS WALK AROUNDS AND THAT HE WAS TRYING TO GET SOME ACTION FROM THE FAA ACR AND OR TELEDYNE TO FIX WHAT HE SAW AS A SIGNIFICANT HAZARD (HE CITED THE TWA 1011 MISHAP AT JFK). THE INTERACTION BTWN THE FAA INSPECTOR AND ORD MAINT MADE US WONDER IF THERE WAS AN AGENDA THAT WENT BEYOND THE SAFETY OF OUR PARTICULAR AIRPLANE. CERTAINLY MY OWN PREFLT OF THE STALL VANE WILL CHANGE FROM LOOKING AT IT FROM THE SIDE ONLY TO SIGHTING DOWN THE FUSELAGE, WHICH IS THE ONLY WAY THE BEND WAS VISIBLE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 352005: IN DEALING WITH THE INSPECTOR AND MAINT IT BECAME CLR THAT THERE WAS SOME TENSION BTWN THE PARTIES. MAINT SEEMED TO FEEL THE VANE WAS NOT A PROB, WHILE THE INSPECTOR FELT THAT THE SEEMINGLY BENT VANE ON OUR ACFT WAS NOT ONLY A PROB THAT NEEDED TO BE FIXED, BUT AN EXAMPLE OF A MORE WIDE SPREAD PROB. MY CONCERN IS SINCE OUR WALK AROUND INSPECTION DID NOT REVEAL THE PROB FOUND BY THE INSPECTOR, THAT WE SOMEHOW BECOME INVOLVED IN THE HARD FEELINGS BTWN MAINT AND THE INSPECTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.