Narrative:

From an in hold position on runway 9L at mia, we were cleared for takeoff by mia tower only 1 min after heavy airbus had started his takeoff roll. The airbus was just beyond the departure end of runway 9L. We declined the clearance based on insufficient wake separation criteria. Mia tower then abruptly told us to either takeoff or exit the runway. We told him we preferred to exit. He then directed us to turn right off the runway if we had adequate clearance. At this point he directed an aircraft landing runway 9L to go around. The airbus was slow to initiate takeoff roll after cleared because he was positioning himself on the runway. Both the captain and I both hacked our clocks when the airbus actually began his takeoff. From the time he began his roll to the point when we received our takeoff clearance was only 1 min. The slow roll by the airbus may have led to the controller's perception that there was adequate clearance when in fact there was not. Other things we noted while waiting for our original clearance included: 1) an airbus was cleared into position on runway 12, he complied, then tower had him taxi off runway 12 and into position and hold on runway 9L. 2) at about the same time the tower asked a commuter on short final for runway 9L to change to runway 12. The commuter pilot complained about the change, and complained that was the fifth runway change on that approach. 3) while the commuter was maneuvering for the change, the airbus cleared onto runway 9L delayed because he was not sure now which runway the commuter was landing and had to clarify with the tower. My point is, too much change leads to confusion -- too much confusion leads to accidents. This needs addressing.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 HOLDING IN POS ON RWY 9L REFUSES TKOF 1 MIN BEHIND A DEPARTING HVY AIRBUS. CTLR INSTRUCTS THE B767 TO EXIT THE RWY, THEN ISSUES A GAR TO A LNDG COMMUTER ACFT.

Narrative: FROM AN IN HOLD POS ON RWY 9L AT MIA, WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF BY MIA TWR ONLY 1 MIN AFTER HVY AIRBUS HAD STARTED HIS TKOF ROLL. THE AIRBUS WAS JUST BEYOND THE DEP END OF RWY 9L. WE DECLINED THE CLRNC BASED ON INSUFFICIENT WAKE SEPARATION CRITERIA. MIA TWR THEN ABRUPTLY TOLD US TO EITHER TKOF OR EXIT THE RWY. WE TOLD HIM WE PREFERRED TO EXIT. HE THEN DIRECTED US TO TURN R OFF THE RWY IF WE HAD ADEQUATE CLRNC. AT THIS POINT HE DIRECTED AN ACFT LNDG RWY 9L TO GAR. THE AIRBUS WAS SLOW TO INITIATE TKOF ROLL AFTER CLRED BECAUSE HE WAS POSITIONING HIMSELF ON THE RWY. BOTH THE CAPT AND I BOTH HACKED OUR CLOCKS WHEN THE AIRBUS ACTUALLY BEGAN HIS TKOF. FROM THE TIME HE BEGAN HIS ROLL TO THE POINT WHEN WE RECEIVED OUR TKOF CLRNC WAS ONLY 1 MIN. THE SLOW ROLL BY THE AIRBUS MAY HAVE LED TO THE CTLR'S PERCEPTION THAT THERE WAS ADEQUATE CLRNC WHEN IN FACT THERE WAS NOT. OTHER THINGS WE NOTED WHILE WAITING FOR OUR ORIGINAL CLRNC INCLUDED: 1) AN AIRBUS WAS CLRED INTO POS ON RWY 12, HE COMPLIED, THEN TWR HAD HIM TAXI OFF RWY 12 AND INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 9L. 2) AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE TWR ASKED A COMMUTER ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 9L TO CHANGE TO RWY 12. THE COMMUTER PLT COMPLAINED ABOUT THE CHANGE, AND COMPLAINED THAT WAS THE FIFTH RWY CHANGE ON THAT APCH. 3) WHILE THE COMMUTER WAS MANEUVERING FOR THE CHANGE, THE AIRBUS CLRED ONTO RWY 9L DELAYED BECAUSE HE WAS NOT SURE NOW WHICH RWY THE COMMUTER WAS LNDG AND HAD TO CLARIFY WITH THE TWR. MY POINT IS, TOO MUCH CHANGE LEADS TO CONFUSION -- TOO MUCH CONFUSION LEADS TO ACCIDENTS. THIS NEEDS ADDRESSING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.